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Timely
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·· I

~~

Does the Military Selective Service Act, 50

451, et s eg., unconstit•Jtionally dis c riminate

against wome n by excluding them from registering f o r the draft?
2.

FACTS:

The Military Selective Service Ac t

(MSSA)

provides sep a rately f o r registr a tion and for conscription.
§

Under

452, the President is empowered to issue a procl amation

requiring nll mal e citizen s an d Jllale resident alie ns between the
ag e s of e ight ee n and twenty-six to regi s ter.
di s co ntinu e d by Pr es i dent Fo r d in 1975.
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Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, President Carter on July 2
reinstituted the registration procedures by requiring 19- and 20year-old males to register.

The President also recommended to

Congress that the MSSA be amended to permit the registration and
possible conscription of women.

Congress agreed that

registration was necessary and appropriated funds for that
purpose.

H.R.J. Res. 521.

Congress did not, however, amend the

MSSA to include women.
The present suit was filed in 1971 by male citizens arguing
that the Selective Service Act violated, inter alia, their right
to equal protection of the laws.
was convened pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

In 1974, a three-judge court
(1970 ed.)

§

2282, to consider

whether the MSSA Act impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
sex by excluding females from the registration requirements.
After years of inaction, the suit was scheduled for trial in
1980.

On July 18, 1980, the three-judge district court issued

its opinion.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

In a unanimous opinion, the three-judge
~

district court found the registration requirements of the MSSA
u~

The court first found that it had jurisdiction

over the case in that plaintiffs had standing and the case was
ripe for determination.

The court next addressed the essential

question of the appropriate standard of review.

It noted that a

middle level standard of review is normally applied in sex
discrimination cases requiring the government to demonstrate an
"important government interest" in support of the classification.
~'

~.s_.,

Personnel Administration of Massachl.!setts v. Feeney,

'

.
--3-

442

u.s. 256, 273 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

This heightened standard of review is justified because the Equal
Protection Clause is intended to guard against "seemingly wellintended classifications that in fact relegate women to an
inferior status."
Ballard, 419

V""

The Government's citation of Schlesinger v.

u.s. 498 (1975), for the proposition that a less

stringent test is appropriate given the important governmental
interest in matt e rs involving the armed forces is not persuasive.
Schlesinger did not explicitly state that a rational relation s hip
test was being applied, and the fact that the Court stated that
mere administrative convenience was insufficient to justify the
classification indicates that it was not the test being applied.
The fact that Congress' war powers are invoked is not cause to

(
change the standard of review.

Korematsu v. United States, 323

u.s. 214 (1944).
The court, applying the middle level of review, found the
Government's showing to be inadequate.

Essentially, the

Government argued that since women could not fill combat
positions in the armed services it would serve no purpose to
register women since, if conscription were required, the primary
need would be for draftees to fill combat-related positions.

The

court, citing Department of Defense studies, rejected the
argument since it was clear that the armed service s could use
certain number of women to fill noncombat position s and thus free
men from those positions.

The availability of women registrants

would materially increase the armed services' flexibility, as

-4-

opposed to hampering it.

Moreover, Congress has in the past

encouraged female participation in the armed services.
"It is incongruous that Congress b~lieves on
the one hand that it substantially enhances our
national defense to constantly expand the
utilization of women in the military, and on the
other hand endorses legislation excluding women
from the pool of registrants available for
induction. Congre s s allocates funds so that the
milit a ry can us e and a ctiv e ly see k mor e fem a le
recruits but noneth e le s s asser t s that th e re is
justification for excluding females fro m
selective s e rvice, de s pite the shortfall in the
recruitment of women. Congress rejects the
current opinion of each of the military service s
and asserts that women can contribute to the
military effectively only as volunteers and not
as inductees."
(Footnot e s omitt e d.)
The court concluded, therefore, that the MSSA was
unconstitutional and enjoined the Selective Service Department
(

from requiring any registration under the Act.
On July 19, Mr. Justice Brennan stayed the execution and
enforcement of the district court's judgment.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

The Government argues that the district

rather than the rational relationship test employed in
Schlesin~.

In Schlesinger, the Court recognized that Congress

has broad constitutional power to raise armies under Art. 1,

§

8,

and emphasized that the responsibility for determining how the
military should fight or prepare to fight wars rests with
Congress.

The result of the heightened standard of review is to

place the court in the position of considering policy arguments
beyond its technical competence.

First Amendment. cases have

shown that the full panoply of constitutional safeguards are not
i~herently afforded when the military is involved.

~.g., Greer

-5'

~

I

v.

~oc~,

424

u.s. 838 (1976).

ngress

Moreover, deference

the

is appropriate because the question of registration
subject of continuing and vigorous congressional debat .

In such

the~

instances, the legislature is the proper forum for resolving
issues.

Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432

u.s. 464, 479 (1977).

lv

~

The Government, in the alternative, argues that even under
the heightened standard of review the Act is constitutional.

The

system of conscription, of which registration is a necessary
part, is combat-oriented.

Registration and subscription must be

structured to satisfy Congress• perception of military needs.
Congress has recently concluded that in times of national
emergency the draft will be required to fill critical manpower
shortages in combat positions that are foreclosed to women.
Congress also found that noncombat positions can presently be
satisfactorily filled by women volunteers.

Congress was of the

view that all potential draftees should be comba t-capable to
provide maximum flexibility in the event of national emergency.
All draftees, regardless of their assigned position, are
potential combat troops if the need arises.

Thus, the Act is

constitutional because it bears a substantial relationship to the
Act's central purpose of creating an effective system to mobilize
the Country's human resources during a national crisis.
5.

DISCUSSION:

As Mr. Justice Brennan stated in his in-

chambers opinion granting a stay of execution and e nforcement of
the district court judgment, "[t)he importance of the question
and substantiality of the constitutional issues
cavil."

~re

beyond

The district court opinion is arguably inc onsistent with

-6Schlesinge~,

and arguably does not afford su"fficient weight to

the legislative determinations recently made by Congress . . Given
the fundamental importance of the question raised, and the
potentially serious impact of the district court's judgment on
the conduct of the Nation's miliary operations, the Court should
note probable jurisdiction.
Response has been waived.
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BACKGROUND:

Timely

Sixteen female citizens of the United

States, ranging in age from eighteen to twenty-six, move for
leave to intervene as appellants in this case.

The potentiul

intervenors believe "for a variety of reasons, with broad
societal significance," that women should not be f o rced to
register.

"The Movants believe that it is imperative that this

Court not determine the constitutionality of an all-male
Selectiv e Se rvice System without full presentation and
consider a tion of the r e asons, including sociologic 21,

De/?f.

~v~~ ~ ,-YJ~i:.e ~e.;/ ~~/'>1~ ~ ~/c::l

&~

~
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('

psychological and religious grounds, why million of women oppose
compulsory service in the Armed Forces."
Movants allege that the Government has not adequately
presented the factors enumerated above.

The Government seeks to

justify the all-male draft solely on the grounds of military
efficiency.

Moreover, the Government is not tot·ally adverse to

appellees' position, as evidenced by the fact that the Executive
branch at one point supported the drafting of women.
Movants

did not attempt to intervene in this case earlier

because they were unaware of it.

They did, however, file a

motion to intervene in the more publicized case of Barnett v.
Rostker, No. 80-1578 (D.C. D.C., filed June 26, 1980).

c\

The

district court in Barnett stayed proceedings pending final
disposition of this action before deciding on the motion to
intervene.
Movants are well suited to
the Act.
concerns.

ar~ue

the constitutionality of

Their interests are mirror-image of appellees'
Movants adequately typify the interests of similarly

situated females who are now exempt and wish to remain so because
of

~

number of social reasons such as physical

inferio~ity

to

men, fear of sexual harassment, desire for motherhood, etc.

It

is clear that this advocacy i s needed since the district court
failed to take into account the societal interests considered by
Congress.

"Such assessments of the broad social i mpact of a

decision to draft women are within the unique prov i nce of
Congress to make and are not for the courts to ignore, especially

-~-

1 ~
I

where, as here, questions of our national defense and Congress'

'

power are concerned."
2.

DISCUSSION:

A motion to intervene is rarely granted.

Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice . 432-38 (5th ed. 1978).
On occasion, the Court has permitted intervention where the
intervenor's interests are directly at stake.

Id.

See generally

United States v. Jerminal Railroad Association, 236 U.S. 194
(permitting intervention for the purposes of seeking modification
of decree that operated prejudicially to intervenors).
Here, rnovants have not demonstrated any special interest in
the matter under

review.

Other than their status as females, it

is not claimed that they speak for any particular groups or
organizations possessing national prominence or support.
Moreover, they have not demonstrated that the quality of their
advocacy will materially advance resolution of this case.
Government is capable of presenting the legal

argu~ents

The

even

though the Executive branch initially favored registration of
women.

It is clear that the Government has acted quickly and

forcefully to overturn the decision below.

Movants present no

argument why their position could not adequately be presented by
filing an amicus brief.

9/25/80
ME
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

March 10, 1981

Paul Smith
No. No. 80-251:

Rostker v. Goldberg

Question Presented
Whether

the

Military

Selective

Service

Act

discriminates unconstitutionally on the basis of sex because
it

requires

all

men

of

a

certain

age

to

register,

excluding from registration and induction all women.

Background

while

2.

I. The Statutory Scheme
Under § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 50
u.s.c. App. § 454(a), the President is authorized to require
every male citizen and resident between the ages of 18 and 26
to register

for

454 (a),

each

subject

to

the draft.

registrant

Under §

who

conscription.

is

4 (a),

classified

However,

under

50 u.s.c.

App.

appropriately
50

U.S.C.

App.

§

is
§

467(c), actual induction of draftees was prohibited after July
j'

7

.,

1, 1973.
require

Thus,

although the President is now authorized to

registration,

Congress would

draft could be resumed.
funds

be

appropriated

registration.
authorizing
to

resume

He

also

In 1980, President Carter asked that
to

pay

sought

for
an

registration of women.
registration,

need to act before the

H.R.J.

Res.

a

resumption

amendment

to

in
the

draft
Act

Congress allocated funds
521,

but

after

various

hearings refused to amend the act to require registration of
women.l
II. This Litigation
This suit arose in 1971, when male citizens subject
to registration and induction brought suit challenging the Act

l

lsee SG' s Brief at n. 7.
Some of these hearings occur red
prior to the President's recommendation concerning registering
women.
Others ccurred after the recommendation.
The Senate
Armed Services Committee made findings of fact on the subject
that were endorsed by House-S e nate conf erees' considering the
1981 Defense Authorization Bill. J.S. App. at 26-28.

3.

on

various

constitutional grounds.

A three-judge court was

denied on the ground that the claims were insubstantial, but
the

CA3

reversed

discrimination
this

claim

this

claim.

On

substantial

standing.

ruling

with

remand,

and

respect

the

ruled

District

that

the

-

The government's motion

378 F. Supp. 766

for

summary

the

Court

sexfound

plaintiffs

A three-judge court was convened,

motion to dismiss in 1974.

to

had

which denied

a

(E.D. Pa. 1974).

judgment was

denied

in

February 1980 (the suit was dormant for about five years), and
the court allowed intervention by a plaintiff subject to the
renewed draft registration.

A class of all draft-eligible men

was certified, and the court proceeded to rule on the basis of
a five-volume stipulated record.
In
standing

of

its
two

opinion
groups

of

last

July,

class

the

court

members--those

registration now or in the near future,

upheld

the

subject

to

and those registered

prior to 1975 who are still subject to possible induction.

It

found that registration itself was a "sufficient intrusion on

1

----------

individual rights" to give these persons standing, under Duke
Power Co.
(1978),

(

the

--

v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438

and Baker v.

court

held

that

Carr,

u.s.

369

there was

186,

sufficient

204

(1962).

u.s.

59

Next,

immediate harm to

create a "case of controversy" and that prudential doctrines
of

ripeness

did

not

until

after

induction

court

held,

to

wait

counsel
begins.
until

a

it

to delay

this

It would make
national

adjudication

no sense,

emergency

the

requires

a

4.

draft to begin.
Turning to the merits, the court subjected this law
Jl

,,

to intermediate scrutiny,

(1976), and other cases.

under Craig v. Boren, 429

also

rejected

scrutiny applies

(1975).

The

the

argument

then

interests are at stake.

that

under Schlesinger

court

190

It rejected the argument that strict

scrutiny applies because fundamental
It

u.s.

rejected

v.
the

mere

"rational

basis"

419 U.S.

Ballard,

government's

498

argument

that a total exclusion of women from registration is related
to the governmental interest in maintaining the flexibility of
the

armed

relied

on

forces
a

in

times

Defense

of

emergency.

Department

In

estimate

so
that

mobilization would require 650,000 new recruits,

------

to

80,000

of

these

could

---

be

women

without

doing,
a

it

major

and that up

impairing

the

--~--------------..

flexibility or strength of the forces.

It found no basis for

the congressional conclusion that women as volunteers should
be increased, whereas the drafting of women should be totally
ruled out:
The die is already cast for substantial female
involvement in the military.
Furthermore,
the
military does not lose flexibility if women are
registered because induction calJ.s for females can
b~ made gg_cord.Jng to m1litary needs as they accrue
in the"'-ruture.
Tffough military flexibility might
call for less utilization of femalL inductees than
male inductees in a given crisis situation, it is
the antithesis of "flexibility" to exclude women
from the pool of registrants that could be called
upon in a time of national need.

J.S. App. at 41-43.

5.

I

The court granted declaratory and injunctive relief,
and refused to stay its order.

Justice Brennan then entered a

stay pending action in this Court.

Discussion
I. The Standard of Review
The parties differ over the proper level of scrutiny
to be applied

to this act.

This

may

There are three competing alternatives:
rational

basis

test,

and

be

a

critical

strict scrutiny, the

"intermediate

exemplified in Craig v. Boren, 429

u.s.

issue.

190

scrutiny"

as

(1976), and other

sex-discrimination cases.
A. Strict Scrutiny
In the court below, respondents argued that a draft
implicates

"fundamental

interests"

and

therefore

its

classifications must be subject to strict scrutiny, just like
classifications in the area of voting, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972), and travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
(1969).
4.

u.s.

618

See generally Gunther, Constitutional Law chap. 10, §

They do not press this point here, however.

There is some

force to the argument that draft classifications must receive
strict scrutiny, because the draft deprives individuals of a
whole range of
even life.
such

"fundamental

interests"--liberty,

and perhaps

However I tend to agree with the court below that

scrutiny

would

make

Classifications are necessary,

no

sense

in

this

context.

yet almost any line would be

6.

unsupportable

if

"Fundamental
where there

subjected

interests"

to

the

analysis

strictest

only

makes

of

sense

scrutiny.
in

areas

is a presumption against any deprivation of

the

relevant interest--the right to vote, or travel, for example.
Here,

it cannot be said that there is a presumption against

governmental power to induct people to defend the Nation.
B. Rational Relationship
The United States
should

only

be

subjected

-

argues
to

that

"mere

this

classification

rationality"

scrutiny,
To support

t his proposition,
U.S.

498

they refer

(1975),

in

which

to Schlesinger v.

Ballard,

the

differential

Court

upheld

419

periods of time applicable to male and female Naval officers
during which they were required to be promoted or discharged.
The Court in Schlesinger upheld the additional period of time
given to women officers as

justified compensation for

disadvantages imposed on women in the Navy.
distinguished Reed v. Reed, 404
v.

Richardson,

411 U.S.

6 77

intermediate scrutiny for
to appear.
the Navy

u.s.

other

In so doing,

it

71 (1971), and Frontiero

( 19 7 3) --two cases

in which

the

gender classifications first began

The Court relied on the fact that women and men in
are

~

"similarl L situated"

and therefore may be

) treated differently.

------

The Court did not state that it was applying a lower

level

of

military.

scrutiny

to

the

case

because

it

involved

the

It did refer to the "complete rationality" of the

classification,

419

U.S.,

at

509,

and

then

stated

the

following:
This Court has recognized that "it is the primary
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready
to fight wars should the occasion arise."
Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17.
See also Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 u.s. 83, 94. The responsibility for
determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend
to that business rests with Congress, see U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14, and with the
President.
See u.s. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. l.
We
cannot
say
that,
in exercising
its broad
constitutional power here, Congress has violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id., at 510.
I

A.~

M

~
~

~
5

this

the same
easier

standard of

language

in all contexts,

to

meet

in

some

scrutiny

requires

although

contexts

to

the

Rather, I would adopt appellees' view that the standard

be

lesser

that

laws.

be

apply a

hold

to

will

~

not

Court

{~~ should
~

would

the draft

that

than

standard

in

others.

Indeed that is the fairest reading of Schlesinger v. Ballard

~

LY ~
~

itself:

there

military

area

important

are
and

governmental

interests

in

the

those may on occasion be pursued through

gender classifications that recognized that men and women are
Any other reading neglects that fact

not similarly situated.

that Frontiero itself was a military case, and the fact that
the Court in Schlesinger applied Frontiero.
In

sum,

I

would

not

hold

that

the

heightened

scrutiny of sex classifications is not vitiated by the "war
power" of the Congress.
258,

263-64

(1967)

See United States v. Robel, 398 U.S.

("'Even

the

war

power

does

not

remove

8.

constitutional

safeguarding

limitations

essential

liberties.'"); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse
Co.,

u.s.

251

146,

156

(1919)

("The War

power,

like

other

powers and like the police power of the states, is subject to
applicable
disposed
valid,

constitutional
to

decide

that

limitations.").
this

Even

particular

to

dangerous precedent.

do

so

would

you

are

classification

I would not ground the decision on a

scrutiny--because

if

create

lower

is

level of

something

of

a

In my view, First Amendment cases from

the military context like Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974),
and

Brown

v.

distinguished
speech

to

the

protections

premised
discipline

on

444

u.s.

348

extent

that

they

Glines,

the

and

to military
assumption ~

organization

to

(1980) ,
accord

personnel.
that

the

function

should
lesser

These

and

free-

cases

military

be

are

requires

that

service

personnel necessarily give up some of the freedoms possessed
by civilians.

Such a rationale cannot justify lesser scrutiny

of the classification by which persons are forced to register
for

the draft.

This classification affects only

civilians,

and, especially in light of the enormous personal interests at
stake, there remains a need to see that it is related to an
important governmental interest. On the other hand, when the
proferred governmental interest implicates military expertise,
there is plenty of room for deference to that expertise.

This

deference should come in at the next level--of assessing the
importance and validity of the underlying state interests.

9.

The government seems to make a separate argument for
lesser scrutiny based on the fact

that women are

ineligible

for combat.

They argue that this gender classification merely

reflects

legitimate

a

eligible and
rephrased;

classification

ineligible

it

might

classify by gender

for

be

combat.

argued

where

of

people

who

This argument might be

that

it

is

permissible

U.S.

at 508

to

the sexes are necessarily situated

differently with respect to a relevant characteristic,
combat-eligibility.

are

Cf.

Schlesinger v.

("the different

Ballard,

treatment of

i.e.,

supra,

419

men and women

the demonstrable fact that male and female line

reflects

officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect

~

to opportunities

~. ,~~ Sonoma
~r

County

concurring)

for

professional

Superior

("we

have

Court,

service");

No.

recognized

79-1344
that

in

Michael

M.

(Stewart,
certain

v.
J.,

narrow

circumstances men and women are not similarly situated, and in
these

circumstances

a

gender

differences

between

the

legislative

classification

classification

sexes

is

not

realistically

based

on

invidious,
based

upon

clear
and

a

those

differences is not unconstitutional.").
On problem with this argument is that it conflates
the question of the level of scrutiny with the second set of
issues surrounding the state interests being asserted.
women

differ

in

a

relevant

way,

this

may

If men
be

a

justification for a gender classification, but it is not clear
why it makes sense to alter the level of scrutiny itself.

In

10.

any event,

such an argument is probably inapplicable to the

present case because a

line

between men and women does

not

accurately reflect the distinction between combat-eligibility
and combat-ineligibility.

Many men must register, even though

they have exemptions from the draft.

Moreover, many women may

be physically capable of many tasks denoted as

"combat" and

actually are permitted into many jobs that involve combat in
some

sense.

Finally,

the

draft

does

produce draftees for combat jobs.

~~·
~

_

_.Jl. J.a

~
~

be

"similarly situated"

the draft laws.

~ scrutiny

In such a

applies.

exist

solely

to

Historically, many draftees

Thus, some men and some women may

never performed such jobs.
well

not

Indeed,

and yet treated differently by
case,

the

the

intermediate

government

may

level of

well

have

conceded this when they conceded below that this law is a pure
gender

classification.

undisputed

that

See Op.

the

below,

MSSA

J.S.

creates

at 43a

("It

is

gender-based

a

classification").
II. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
A. The Standard
As phrased by Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren 429

u.s.

190

important

(1976),

"classifications

governmental

objectives

related

to achievement of

These

governmental

Nor

can

gender

and must

be

must

serve

substantially

objectives."

Id.,

cannot

include

objectives

administrative convenience,
690.

those

by

at

197.
mere

id., at 198; Frontiero, supra, at

the government seek

to promote "old notions"

11.

about the proper roles of men and women.

Craig v. Boren, at

198; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15.
not "substantially related"

Finally, a law is

to governmental objectives if it

employs "gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane
bases
"

1

of

[A] rchaic and overbroad 1

are

unacceptable

even

if

v.

Craig

classification."

Boren,

generalizations,"
there

is

some

at

198.

id., about women

"congruence

between

gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purport[s]
to represent," id., at 199.
This

standard

justifications for
military-based
concerning

must

be

applied

to

two

sets

the SG 1 s

the refusal to register women:

arguments,

preservation

and

of

the

arguments

the
family

and

of

by

respect

amici
for

the

values of part of the population.
B. The SG 1 s Justifications

follows:

The

SG 1 s

(1)

Even

basic

argument

in times

may

be

of emergency,

the

summarized
armed

as

forces

could fulfill all of its needs by drafting from an exclusively
male pool of registrants.
register women.
draft

(3)

large numbers

( 2)

There is therefore no need to

Indeed, if the government were forced to
of women

this would

interfere

with

the

defense of the nation in a time of emergency either by cutting

--------------~-----,~-----------------~------------------------down
on the number of men who could be drafted, or by taking
up~.
space----~----------------'----------------------in training facilities for unneeded women.
These conclusions are

based

in part on

exclusions

of

from combat positions that are unchallenged in this case.

(4)
women
(5)

12.

As a

result of

these

restrictions on women in combat,

government cannot draft

large numbers of women,

the

because it

must maintain the flexibility that is produced by rotations
between combat and non-combat positions.
I
reasons

would

stated

argument

does

reject

by
a

the
very

this

argument,

District
poor

job

basically

Court.
of

exclusion of women from registration.

In

my

for

view

justifying

the
this

the

total

At most, this argument

shows why Congress found no military need to register women,
and why there are strong state interests in not drafting too
many women.

But the argument does not begin to show why it

would harm governmental

interests to register women in case

there

is a situation in the

would

be

desirable.

Such

future

in which drafting

registration

in

itself

them

can only

enhance the flexibility of the armed forces by allowing this
option
~

(3~

to

number

~~ ~ decisions
~

available.

And

this

case

does

not

involve

military decisions concerning assignment of women to combat or

~ the

~~

be

of

women who should

be

in

the

service.

Those

should be left to the Army, regardless of whether

women are asked to register.
To

be

sure,

the

Constitution

does

not

compel

registration of women if there is no prospect at all that they
could ever be inducted without interfering with the defense of
the country.

But it fair to say that the Constitution does

require women to register

if a substantial number could be

accomodated in the armed forces in time of emergency without

13.

limiting

military

government
pass.

flexibility.

The

bur den

must

be

on

to show that such an eventuality cannot come

the
to

This is a burden that the government cannot satisfy,

because the Defense Department's own studies show that up to
80,000 women usefully could be taken into the Army in a time
of

mass

mobilization

without

military

flexibility.

See

V Richard

Danzig,

Principal

any

J .A.

interference
at

Deputy

with

needed

275-276

(Deposition

of

Assistant

Secretary

of

Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics); Opinion
Below, J.A. at 31-32 (" [T]he figure of 80,000 female inductees
does

not

represent

an

estimate

of

the

number

of

positions

women could fill--i.e. noncombat, noncombat reserve positions-but represents the number of female
of

overall

plan."). 2

benefit

to

the

inductees that would be

effectiveness

of

a

mobilization

It is not surprising that so many representatives

2 These figures accept the various limitations on women in
combat
that
are
presently
in
force.
No
doubt
these
limitations are valid in themselves, but there is a likelihood
that some of the "combat" jobs in the Army will in the future
become open to women.
The Defense Dept has sought repeal of
all statutory limitations on assignment of women, and has
opened up many Army positions previously closed to them. See
America's Volunteers, J.A.
at 85-89.
These changes are
reflected in the large increase in the number of women
volunteers accepted that has been and is taking place.
If
this process continues, the number of women who can be used in
a mobilization will increase.
Arguably, the Army could obtain 80,000 volunteers on
an emergency basis, but this is only a possibility. Certainly
it could only be more efficient to have registrations of women
showing their available skills.

1

14.

of

the

Army

testified

that

they

would

available pool of female registrants.

like

to

have

an

See id., at 39-40, n.

30.
Appellees
justification
considered

argue

for

at

not

all,

at

length

that

registering
since

it

the

women

is

"flexibility"

should

merely

a

not

be

post

hoc

rationalization by Congress in 1980 for an act passed in 1948.
This argument seems overly technical

to me,

in view of the

importance of this case and the serious consideration given to
registering women by Congress in 1980.
to

invalidate

immediately
other

the

1948

act

the

1980

based on

hand,

I

am

convinced

if

it

the

question

whether

could

legislative

that

even

history does not help the government.
with

It would make no sense

the

be

reenacted

history.
1980

On

the

legislative

Most of it is concerned

drafting

women

is

militarily
1-f

necessary.

But

the

real

issue

is

whether

the

mere

registration"'of women is so pointless as to be irrational, or

----~~----~---------------------------

somehow itself an interference with governmental objectives.
This showing has not been made here.
The case turns,

in my view, on the validity of the

"Battle of the Bulge" rationale--that draftees must be men in
order

to given the army flexibility
and reserves in time of
..,

dire emergency.

But this argument simply does not justify a

refusal to register women or to induct some of them to fill in
the thousands of support posit ions
view

of

the

fact

that

the

in the armed forces.

justifications

offered

by

In
the

15.

government for this classification are so weak,3 and even seem
to defy common sense on occasion,
conclude

that

the

it

may

well

be

fair

to

real motivation for Congress's refusal to

register women in 1980 was the same as in 1948--a desire to
shield

women

from

induction

because

such

service

is

not

"appropriate" for members of their sex.

c.

Other Justifications
Various amici argue that the exclusion of women from

registration

is

justified

by

the

pervasive

belief

in

our

society that women should not be drafted, and by the need to
shield the family from such an interference.

These arguments

are largely illegitimate or, at best, insufficient to justify
a

complete

exemption of

all women

from

the draft.

To

the

extent that the argument is based on the beliefs of portions
of

the

population,

it

probably cannot

be

controlling.

The

existence of "stereotypes" has been recognized in past cases,
see

supra,

and

it

cannot

gender classification.

itself

be

a

justification

for

a

To the extent that beliefs about women

and military service are religious

in nature,

they probably

are sufficient to justify a conscientious-objector exemption
under existing law.

The non-religious beliefs of others are,

3The Justice Dept appeared, to recognize the weakness in the
available arguments support~ all-male registration when it
asked Congress to provide new'Yationales during 1980 hearings-making explicit reference to the pending litigation in
Philadelphia. J.A., at 218-221.

16.

from a purely legal point of view, no more relevant than the
beliefs of many that the government should not draft anyone-men or women.
To

be

sure

there

are more

tangible

problems with

drafting women--involving pregnancy, child care, the family in

-

general.

But

these

problems are present to a

w hen men are drafted as well.

large degree

If the Congress thinks they are

serious, they should be handled by sex-neutral exemptions for
parents, or single-parents, or married persons.
selective approach satisfies

Only such a

the standard in Craig v.

Boren

requiring that gender not be used as a rough approximation of
other, more salient characteristics, especially when archaic
views of proper sex roles are implicated.
discussions about

In the end, these

the need to preserve the family amount to

invocations of stereotypes about the proper role for women in
this

society.

These

arguments

are

irrelevant

to

the

legal

issue.
To be sure,

it is partly the deep feelings of many

opponents of draft registration
"big"

case.

The

disruption may enter

prospect

for

of

women that

political

make

this

opposition

a
or

into your calculations at the level of

what Alexander Bickel called the "passive virtues."

The Court

simply may not be ready to take on the deep-seated beliefs of
many citizens

in such a case.

But

it

is worth recognizing

that there are strong feelings on both sides of this issue,
and registration may be a perfect place in which to continue

17.

the process of equalizing treatment of men and women.

Long

before there would be any actual induction of women,

there

would be time for the country to get accustomed to the idea
that both sexes are available when needed.

Summary and Conclusion
The appropriate level of scrutiny for this explicit
gender

classification

Schlesinger v.

is

drawn

from

...;:C~r;..:;a:;;.:i:...giL.-_v.:_:_.---=B=-o=-=.r...::;e=n •

Ballard does not support a mere rationality

approach in this case, and First Amendment military cases are
distinguishable and refer to quite different problems.
Applying the "important governmental interest" test
to this classification,

the SG argues that an exclusion of

women enhances military flexibility.
by
.---common ...._sense and

But this is contradicted

e opinions of the Defense Department. *--

To be sure, the
women

in

particular

not to draft
settings

and

should

be

able

judgments about where women should be assigned.

to

make

But the flat

exclusion of women from registration serves no governmental

7?

c:::

~

interest at all, and cannot be justified on the theory that
there will never be a setting in which the drafting of women
would be desirable.
The

other

justifications

largely illegitimate or

insufficient

offered
to

by

amici

are

justify a complete

exclusion of women from registration.
I

would

therefore

invalidate

this

gender

18.

classification.

In

so doing,

I

would make

measure of

discretion left to the military

concerning

actual

soldiers.

induction

of

women

and

clear
and

the large

to Congress

use

of

women

I would also leave to Congress the decision about

whether to enact registration that includes women, rather than
simply
applies.

enlarging

the

class

to

which

the

present

statute

Library:
Please obtain for me as promptly as possible, my
own personal copies, of the following documents:
Senate Report, No. 96-826 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 157
(1980) •

Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration under
the Military Selective Service Act: Bearing on s. 109 and
s. 226 Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1979) (testimony of General Rogers).
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PS 03/17/81

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Paul Smith
Re:

No. 80-251, Rostker v. Goldberg

I got the sense from your marginal notations on my
original bench memo that I had not adequately explored the
factual
favor

support
of

for

the

excluding

state

women

from

interests
the

asserted

draft.

Those

interests may be divided into two categories:
societal.

here

in

state

military and

I will treat these separately.

I. Military Justifications
The

single

argument

made

by

the

government

in

favor of the exclusion of women from registration is that
there would
emergency,

be

no

reason

to draft women,

and that doing so would

in fact

even

in a dire

interfere with

the military effort by undermining flexibility.

In my view,

2.

one can accept the present exclusions of women from various
"combat" positions, and accept that idea that there needs to
be considerable

rotation of men from combat to non-combat

positions during a war, and still find no real support for
the

view

that

registering

women

would

harm

our

military

preparedness.
There

are

two

reasons

for

this.

First,

as

a

matter of pure logic, as long as the Army is not required to
draft women that it does not want, the mere registration of
Indeed~

women can cause no harm.
event--giving
face

it can only be a positive

the Army an additional option with which to

any possible

future

crisis.

It was

for

this

reason

that the "representatives of the various armed services all
testifed

that

registration

of

Rogers put it:
order

for

they

us

would

women."

have

Op.

no

below

objection
at

39a.

As

to

the

General

"Women should be required to register ••• in
to

have

an

inventory of

what

the

available

strength which is within the military qualifed pool in this
country."

Id.
To be sure, requiring registration of women would

be

a

pointless exercise

if

there

were

no

possibility of

their use in a time of crisis that would not interfere with
military flexibility.
the government's
shown

that

flexibility.

all

But that is where the second flaw in

argument comes
use

Instead,

in.

They simply have not

of

women

draftees

would

inhibit

the

"current uniform opinion of the

3.

armed

services

and

Department

of

Defense

is

that

women

inductees could be utilized, and that it would be valuable
to include women in the pool of
the draft."

registrants available for

Op. below at 30a, n. 20.

This is based in part

on Defense Department estimates that 80,000 women could be
inducted during a time of full mobilization and trained for
proper

jobs without any cost in terms of preparedness and

flexibility.

Op.

below

at

3la.

These

women

would

be

drafted after the first 90 days of a mobilization, as part
of a total mobilization of 650,000 over six months.
299.
be

This view also makes common sense.

true

that

the military would

be

JA at

It simply cannot

harmed

if 80,000 non-

combat jobs, out of total armed forces of several million,
were filled with women draftees.

After all the rotations of

troops into combat are hardly likely to involve all of the
many personnel who will remain stationed here in the United
States.

Rather,

it makes more sense to think that such a

number of women would only be freeing men for combat.

And

they would not need to fill up "basic training" centers if
they

were

intended

their civilian work.

for

administrative

duties

similar

to

As an Assistant Secretary of Defense

and the Director of Selective Service put it:
It is in the interest of national
security that, in an emergency requiring the
conscription for military service of the nation's
youth, the best qualified people for a wide
variety of tasks in our Armed Forces be available.
The performance of women in our Armed Forces today
strongly supports the conclusion that many of the
best qualified people for some military jobs in

4.

teh 18-26 age category will be women.
The
Administration strongly believes they should be
available for service in the jobs they can do,
just as men will be available for jobs they can
do.
J .A.

at

212

(Statement of Asst.

Sec' y Pirie

and Director

Rostker).
To
disagreeing

the

extent

with

that

Congress's

you

think

perception

that

I

of

am merely

the

military

facts,

it is important to recognize that Congress last year

never

found

flexibility
findings
below.

that
if

there

women

quoted

in

would

were

full

be

a

registered.

on

pages

cost
It

26a-27a

to
did

of

military
make

the

the

opinion

But these do not contradict the view of the defense

establishment that it would be useful to have registration
of women and not detrimental to have some drafting of women
in a

full mobilization.

Congress found,

inter alia,

that

there "is no military need to include women in a selective
service system," that "manpower deficiencies under the AllVolunteer Force are concentrated in the combat arms," that
in time of mobilization "the primary manpower need would be
for combat replacements," that the
and

the

possibility

that

close

"need to rotate

support

units

troops

could

come

under enemy fire also limits the use of women in non-combat
jobs," and that "[i]f the law required women to be drafted
in egual

numbers with men, mobilization would be severely

impaired

because

of

strains

administrative services."

Id.

on

training

facilities

and

?~-9~~

..

~~~~~~
None of

these

findings questions the assertion

~

that it could only help the country to have women registered ~
and "on hand."

And none questions the Defense Dept

showing a possibility of drafting a
women

without

ill

effects.

significant number

Instead,

consistently on two wrong questions-- (1)

forced

focused~,

Congress
whether

of~

there

i~ ?

include women in the class of people ~

any military need to
who may be

stu~

to

serve,

and

(2)

militar ~

whether the

should be required to draft soldiers on a sex-blind basis~~
Neither

issue

is

presented here,

,,

where

whether _:he military ~d b_: harmed by

the

real

issue

,,

registrat~n.

that issue, the Court is left with the express findng of
three-judge district court that the United States failed
carry its "burden to establish that the exclusion of
from

registration

for

selective

service

Op.

o;;;_~,.,.r
~
~

fem~'f

~
an

below

~

~~~-it,.)
..

"Though military flexibility might call for less utilization
of female

inductees than male

inductees

in a given crisis

situation, it is the antithesis of 'flexibility' to exclude
women from the pool of registrants that could be called upon
in a time of national need."

Id., at 42a-43a.

II. Societal Justifications
Petitioners

do

not

rely

justifications for the exclusion of women.

on

_.

~

promotes

important government objective and is substantially
to the achievement of that objective."

¥o;

is / . . J

any

other

In my view, they

do this because other, societal justifications would either

6.

be

illegitimate--because based on sex-role stereotypes--or

clearly insufficient
all women.

to

justify the complete exclusion of

The Congress's finding in this area was:

Under the Administration's proposal there is no
proposal
for
exemption of mothers of
young
children.
The
Administration
has
given
insufficient attention to necessary changes in
Selective Service rules, such as those governing
the induction of young mothers, and to the strains
on family life that would
result
from
the
registration and possible induction of women.
Op. below at 27a.
The concern expressed by Congress concerning the
need

to

shield

considering

the

young mothers
biological

why many women play
children.

a

may

well

a

and deep-seated

predominant

role

valid

social

in

one--

reasons

rearing

young

But such a concern cannot be a justification for

excluding all women from registration.
a

be

justification for

Indeed, it cannot be

excluding any women from

registration

alone.

Many men are accorded exemptions because of societal

needs,

but all are

required

to

register,

in part so that

they can be located if the situation changes and they are
needed.
But Congress
registration of
life."
that

It

suggested more.

any women would

place

suggested

strains on

that

"family

This assertion can only be based on an assumption

women

continue

to

play

a

role

in

the

family

that

differs from that of men--even where they are not raising
children.

In other words,

it appears

to be

based on the

7.

assumption that women should never be required to serve in
the military, merely because that would not be appropriate
for

women.

under
tend

This

argument

this Court's cases.
to

be

is

fundamentally

Even

less qualified

for

if

it

is

illegitimate

true

that women

military service,

and

that

their absence will place somewhat greater strains on "family
life,"

these

sufficient

"loose-fitting

where

a

more

characterizations"
selective

possible.

Craig v. Boren, 429

there

a

is

"weak

characteristic

u.s.

congruence

or

trait

cannot

categorization

190, 199 (1976).
gender

between

that

gender

be
is

Where

and

the

purport[s]

to

represent," the legislature must "realign [its]

substantive

laws

in a gender-neutral fashion,

or

adopt procedures

for

identifying

where

the

those

instances

generalization actually comport[s] with fact."
Moreover,
be

too

sex-centered
Id.

these concerns about disrupt ion cannot

severe when one

considers

that

women will

not

be

drafted at all unless there is the kind of massive wartime
mobilization that will create much more severe "strains" on
society.

This

same

affirmance

in

concerning

military

this

women to draft.

fact

case

makes

will

decisions

lead
about

it

unlikely

to

further

the

that

an

litigation

actual

number

of

Such a decision belongs to the military,

and in any event the question would not arise until time of
real

emergency,

when

things to worry about.

presumably

people

would

have

better

8.

* * *
I know that the last thing you needed was another
long memo to read, but I wanted to make sure that you were
presented with the best arguments against the asserted state
interests

in

this

case--arguments

convincing--before coming to rest.

which

I

view

as

lfp/ss

3/20/81

zD
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Random Notes on Joint Appendix Material
Principal sources presently available to me, in
addition to the briefs, include the joint appendix, the
report dated June 20, 1980, of the Armed Services Committee
of the Senate, and report dated July 10, 1979, of the Senate
Committee's Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel that
contains testimony in 1979 of the various members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Conference Report on Defense
Authorication Act of 1981.
This memo will record notes as I read the Joint
Appendix.
Joint Appendix
The complaint in this case is not in the appendix.
For the most part, in appears to include reports, documents
and excerpts from interrogatories and depositions - some of
which date back to 1976.

It is important to check the dates

particularly when quotations appear in the briefs.
President's recommendations (February 11, 1980).
In a report to Congress expressed in the third person, it is
said that the "President has decided to seek authority to
register, classify and examine women for services in the
armed forces."

It is further stated that "equity can be

achieved by registering both men and women and then

(
2.

(

providing that they serve in proportion to the ability of
the armed forces to use them effectively."

p. 34, 35.

Note the emphasis on "equity" rather than combat
readiness and effectiveness.

This is a theme that runs

through many of the Administration's statements and
testimony.
Further report of behalf of the President
(2/11/80) - p. 38-80.
Army policy excludes women from combat - 58.
Performance of women in the voluntary service 59.
Report on use of women (May 1977, updated
September 1978) - p. 98.
This report does recognize that "the overriding
issue is maintaining the combat effectiveness of the armed
forces".

107.
(Note that this pertains only to the volunteer

system) •
This report is made in the context of a volunteer
service.

It points out, correctly, that higher quality

volunteers come from women than can be recruited from men who mostly are low quality.

Thus, the report states that

"use of more women can be a siginficant factor in making the
all volunteer force continue to work". 107.

(
3.
Brookings Institution Study:
Military (July 28, 1977).

Women in the

Apparently what is repoduced at

p. 182-184 of the JA is an "information paper" that
summarizes conclusions.

It contains little relevant

information beyond saying that the "military effectiveness"
of bringing women into the armed services has resulted in a
"healthy measure of uncertainty remaining".

184.

Further

study needed.

Combat exclusion definition for women (p. 185).
In a memorandum requesting approval by Secretary of the
Army, a definition of the "combat role from which women will
be excluded" was spelled out rather generally.

(

No women to

serve in "battalion and lower level combat maneuver units".
p. 186.

Nor should women serve with field artillery canon

and certain air defense artillery battalions.
Also excluded would be units such as airborne and
air mobile forces, combat engineers, special forces," etc.
p. 186.

Special report by

u.s.

Army Research Institute

(for behavioral and social sciences), dated May 30, 1978 p. 188-204.
Prepared two years before this legislation was
under consideration, this study - purporting to rely on
I

empirical data - produced some rather interesting

(_

(

(

4.

(

conclusions.

'\

Apparently the study included only "army

combat support and combat service support units at the
divison and corps level, including "speciality areas such as
maintenance, medical, military police, signal, supply and
transportation."

In these units the study concluded that

"women had little or no adverse impact on the performance of
their units", and "in a general sense" had a favorable
impact.

p. 190.

An exception exists where "physical

strength was a factor". p. 192.

Under a caption entitled

"training for tactical and sustainment tasks in the field",
the following enlightening "findings" were made.
"Women demonstated a general lack of
training for and knowledge of life in the
field and of tactical operations. This lack
of training and knowledge is detrimental to
unit survivability in a combat environment.
Further, it places an added burden on and
causes morale problems among male members of
the unit who must take up the slack in any
situation where females do not carry their
fair share of the load. Under current
methods of warfare, no unit is completely
safe from ground attack no matter how far
removed from the main battle area. Enemy
guerilla bands operate in the rear areas
seeking opportunities to disrupt the
logistics chain. As a result, every unit,
combat or combat support/combat service
support, must be capable of establishing a
strong perimeter defnse and be prepared to
withstand a full-scale attack, particularly
during hours of darkness. Women must be
prepared to fight in these situations,
operate individual and crew-served weapons
effectively, as well as being able to pitch
tents, dig latrines, and stand guard duty if
they are to carry their fair share of the
load. Failure to perform these tasks during
REF WAC 77 was not always due to lack of
ability. Many women made an effort to

(

(

(

5.
acquire the knowledge they needed. However,
either the common tendency of men to be
protective or male nonacceptance of females
often thwarted their efforts to learn.
In
units where commanders insisted that each
individual, man and woman, carry a full share
of the load in common tasks, the quality of
unit performance was much higher than in
units where women were protected or ignored."
192-193.

Note:

The above statement is important, and

reflects a good deal of my thinking and knowledge of combat
and military affairs.
fixed lines.

Modern war is no longer limited to

It envelopes large and unpredictable areas.

See also examples of women saying they did not wish to fight
even in an emergency. p. 193.
An apparently conflicting statement, made only two
pages later, is that "women are capable of rendering a
proficient performance in any combat support/combat service
support unit.
strength."

MOS not requiring a large measure of physical

Women also have as much "stamina and endurance"

as men. 195.
Under a caption entitled "leadership and
management", this study concluded that the units it observed
were badly led because they were "protective of women or
ignored women" (seems unlikely!).

"This mismanagement

resulted in low morale • • . and a mediocre unit
performance.

It created unreit among the male members who

were required to perform extended duty periods of duty to

(

(

.

6.

(

fill in where the women were either excused or not
employed." 196.
The report found substantial "bias against women".
Its findings included the following:
"Senior officers -

fartherest removed from the

problem - fully accepted women.
"Junior officers" were "indifferent to the
problem".
"Old soldier NCO's were openly opposed to women in
word and action".
"Although NCO's generally admitted that women can
perform well in their tasks, most NCO's just do not want

c

them around."

- 197.

With respect to "female field health and
sanitation", this study also made some interesting findings:
women complained about the "great distance and infrequency
of visits to showers".

This requirement for "frequent

showering" received support from the medical observers who
verified that "gynecologically speaking, a woman has a
greater need for more frequent attention to budy cleanliness
than a man." 199-200.

(In the African Campaign, 1942-43, we

went for four months without a shower, hot water, or indoor
and private closed latrines.)
The following summary of findings also is
interesting:

(

7.
" Pit type latrines were not satisfactory for
women, who sought other sources for relief.

They expressed

the added concern of possible assault while visiting a
darkened latrine site some distance from their billet,
although no such attack was reported."

p. 200.

It also was

noted that "no obstetrician-gynecologist was available
within the First Infranty Division, nor was one authorized".
200.

Nor were other facilities available for "particular

female medications" or "examining women". p. 200.

Statement by Richard Danzig on behalf of the
Administration.

(p. 206-208) - strongly supports

registration of women, stating this is the President's
position, and is "consistent with the Administration's
positions on equal rights for women and the principle of
fairness in imposing obligations on our citizens".

206.

While the statement praises past and present service of
women generally (a view with which I quite agree), it does
not mention that the purpose of armed services is to fight
and win wars; not to promote to equal rights for women or
any other citizens.

p. 206.

The statement emphasizes the "equity" of having
both men and women serve "in proportion to the ability fo
the armed forces to use them effectively".

208.

It also

states that "military efficiency will determine how many

(

8.

(

women will be used, and that the rate of induction for women
as well as men will be determined by military need". p. 208.

Statement of Robert B. Pirie, Assistant Secretary
of Defense.

(March 5, 1980) (p. 209).

This is a statement

before the Armed Services Committee of the House,
representing the Administration's view, emphasizes "equity".
"The President's decision to ask for
authority to register women is based on
equity. p. 211."

Hearings before House Armed Services Committee
(March 5, 1980).

c

The testimony of members of the

Administration (Robert B. Pirie, Bernard D. Rostker, and
Larry L. Simms - see p. 215 - before a subcommittee is
reproduced from pp. 214-250.

It does not appear to be

significantly helpful, although it follows the
Administration's line closely.

Testimony of Lt. Gen. Moore (Oct. 14, 1976), when
this case was in any early stage.

p. 252-258.

Although

called by plaintiff's counsel, his testimony does not seem
particularly helpful.

General Moore does say (and I would

agree) that "we have found that a dedicated female soldier
is a very effective soldier".

(p. 257)

The General

emphasized the need to be ready to fight .without delay.·

(

c
9.

(

(The Korean war started over a weekend). 257.

Perhaps his

most important statement was that
"Between 80 and 90% of the replacements in a
wartime situation are for combat arms units".
This was the experience in our last three
wars. p. 258.
General Moore also stated that there has been no
difficulty "in recruiting sufficiently high quality
volunteer women to fill the authorized slots, and authorized
skills" (p. 258).

Deposition of Gen. Edward
1976).

(p. 259-265).

c.

Meyer (Oct. 19,

Although a good deal of Gen. Meyer's

testimony seems meaningless, he did emphasize the
"tremendous management problem" that would arise in wartime
as to the disposition of women in relation to men (ratios,
etc.) among units.

He stated:

"Traditionally there have been some women
drivers, and things like that in a 'broader
theater', but it would be difficult, indeed
it would be almost impossible, in my view,
the management of people at that critical
point.
I just see the next war as being so
demanding that anything that complicates the
management of people in an early stage would
make it neigh on impossible to be effective."
(p. 261) •
General Meyer continues:
"I would say that any women in any units
would have this [adverse] effect on
management.
It would just be a flat
difficult of management." (p. 261).

(

(

10.
Depositon of Maj. Gen. Dean Tice.

(

(May 13, 1980),

also called - as all of these witnesses were - by the
plaintiff.

(p. 281).

Gen. Tice's first statement about the

battle of the Bulge hardly helped the plaintiff:
"Everybody immediately went into combat • • •
We even retrained all the clerks and cooks in
France and sent them to the front line." 281

* * *
The Joint Appendix includes statements or brief
excerpts from testimony of several other people, all called
as witnesses for the plaintiff.
particularly relevant.

None of this seemed

Apparently, the United States didn't

put on any testimony but relied on the findings and reports
of the Congress, plus testimony before the Armed Services
Committee that is a matter of public record.

lfp/ss

3/20/81
80-231 GOLDBERG
Random Notes on Joint Appendix Material
Principal sources presently available to me, in

addition to the briefs, include the joint appendix, the
report dated June 20, 1980, of the Armed Services Committee
of the Senate, and report dated July 10, 1979, of the Senate
Committee's Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel that
contains testimony in 1979 of the various members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Conference Report on Defense
Authorication Act of 1981.
This memo will record notes as I read the Joint
Appendix.
Joint Appendix
The complaint in this case is not in the appendix.
For the most part, in appears to include reports, documents
and excerpts from interrogatories and depositions - some of
which date back to 1976.

It is important to check the dates

- particularly when quotations appear in the briefs.
President's recommendations (February 11, 1980).
In a report to Congress expressed in the third person, it is
said that the "President has decided to seek authority to
register, classify and examine women for services in the
armed forces."

It is further stated that "equity can be

achieved by registering both men and women and then

2.

providing that they serve in proportion to the ability of
the armed forces to use them

effectiv~ly."

p. 34, 35.

Note the emphasis on "equity" rather than combat
readiness and effectiveness.

This is a theme that runs

through many of the Administration's statements and
testimony.
Further report of behalf of the President
(2/11/80) - p. 38-80.
Army policy excludes women from combat - 58.
Performance of women in the voluntary service 59.
Report on use of women (May 1977, updated
September 1978) - p. 98.
This report does recognize that "the overriding
issue is maintaining the combat effectiveness of the armed
forces".

107.
(Note that this pertains only to the volunteer

system).
This report is made in the context of a volunteer
service.

It points out, correctly, that higher quality

volunteers come from women than can be recruited from men who mostly are low quality.

Thus, the report states that

"use of more women can be a siginficant factor in making the
all volunteer force continue to work". 107.

3.

Brookings Institution Study:
Military (July 28, 1977).

Women in the

Apparently what is repoduced at

p. 182-184 of the JA is an "information paper" that
summarizes conclusions.

It contains little relevant

information beyond saying that the "military effectiveness"
of bringing women into the armed services has resulted in a
"healthy measure of uncertainty remaining".

184.

Further

study needed.

Combat exclusion definition for women (p. 185).
In a memorandum requesting approval by Secretary of the
Army, a definition of the "combat role from which women will
be excluded" was spelled out rather generally.

No women to

serve in "battalion and lower level combat maneuver units".
p. 186.

Nor should women serve with field artillery canon

and certain air defense artillery battalions.
Also excluded would be units such as airborne and
air mobile forces, combat engineers, special forces," etc.
p. 186.

Special report by

u.s.

Army Research Institute

(for behavioral and social sciences), dated May 30, 1978 p. 188-204.
Prepared two years before this legislation was
under consideration, this study - purporting to rely on
empirical data - produced some rather interesting

4.

conclusions.

Apparently the study included only "army

combat support and combat service support units at the
divison and corps level, including "speciality areas such as
maintenance, medical, military police, signal, supply and
transportation."

In these units the study concluded that

"women had little or no adverse impact on the performance of
their units", and "in a general sense" had a favorable
impact.

p. 190.

An exception exists where "physical

strength was a factor". p. 192.

Under a caption entitled

"training for tactical and sustainment tasks in the field",
the following enlightening "findings" were made.
"Women demonstated a general lack of
training for and knowledge of life in the
field and of tactical operations. This lack
of training and knowledge is detrimental to
unit survivability in a combat environment.
Further, it places an added burden on and
causes morale problems among male members of
the unit who must take up the slack in any
situation where females do not carry their
fair share of the load. Under current
methods of warfare, no unit is completely
safe from ground attack no matter how far
removed from the main battle area. Enemy
guerilla bands operate in the rear areas
seeking opportunities to disrupt the
logistics chain. As a result, every unit,
combat or combat support/combat service
support, must be capable of establishing a
strong perimeter defnse and be prepared to
withstand a full-scale attack, particularly
during hours of darkness. Women must be
prepared to fight in these situations,
operate individual and crew-served weapons
effectively, as well as being able to pitch
tents, dig latrines, and stand guard duty if
they are to carry their fair share of the
load. Failure to perform these tasks during
REF WAC 77 was not always due to lack of
ability. Many women made an effort to

s.
acquire the knowledge they needed. However,
either the common tendency of men to be
protective or male nonacceptance of females
often thwarted their efforts to learn. In
units where commanders insisted that each
individual, man and woman, carry a full share
of the load in common tasks, the quality of
unit performance was much higher than in
units where women were protected or ignored."
192-193.

Note:

The above statement is important, and

reflects a good deal of my thinking and knowledge of combat
and military affairs.
fixed lines.

Modern war is no longer limited to

It envelopes large and unpredictable areas.

See also examples of women saying they did not wish to fight
even in an emergency. p. 193.
An apparently conflicting statement, made only two
pages later, is that "women are capable of rendering a
proficient performance in any combat support/combat service
support unit.
strength."

MOS not requiring a large measure of physical

Women also have as much "stamina and endurance"

as men. 195.
Under a caption entitled "leadership and
management", this study concluded that the units it observed
were badly led because they were "protective of women or
ignored women" (seems unlikely!).

"This mismanagement

resulted in low morale • • • and a mediocre unit
performance.

It created unrest among the male members who

were required to perform extended duty periods of duty to

6.

fill in where the women were either excused or not
employed." 196.
The report found substantial "bias against women".
Its findings included the following:
"Senior officers - fartherest removed from the
problem - fully accepted women.
"Junior officers" were "indifferent to the
problem".
"Old soldier NCO's were openly opposed to women in
word and action".
"Although NCO's generally admitted that women can
perform well in their tasks, most NCO's just do not want
them around."

- 197.

With respect to "female field health and
sanitation", this study also made some interesting findings:
women complained about the "great distance and infrequency
of visits to showers".

This requirement for "frequent

showering" received support from the medical observers who
verified that "gynecologically speaking, a woman has a
greater need for more frequent attention to budy cleanliness
than a man." 199-200.

(In the African Campaign, 1942-43, we

went for four months without a shower, hot water, or indoor
and private closed latrines.)
The following summary of findings also is
interesting:

7.

" Pit type latrines were not satisfactory for
women, who sought other sources for relief.

They expressed

the added concern of possible assault while visiting a
darkened latrine site some distance from their billet,
although no such attack was reported."

p. 200.

It also was

noted that "no obstetrician-gynecologist was available
within the First Infranty Division, nor was one authorized".
200.

Nor were other facilities available for "particular

female medications" or "examining women". p. 200.

Statement by Richard Danzig on behalf of the
Administration. (p. 206-208) - strongly supports
registration of women, stating this is the President's
position, and is "consistent with the Administration's
positions on equal rights for women and the principle of
fairness in imposing obligations on our citizens".

206.

While the statement praises past and present service of
women generally (a view with which I quite agree), it does
not mention that the purpose of armed services is to fight
and win wars; not to promote to equal rights for women or
any other citizens.

p. 206.

The statement emphasizes the "equity" of having
both men and women serve "in proportion to the ability fo
the armed forces to use them effectively".

208.

It also

states that "military efficiency will determine how many

B.
women will be used, and that the rate of induction for women
as well as men will be determined by military need". p. 208.

Statement of Robert B. Pirie, Assistant Secretary
of Defense. (March 5, 1980) (p. 209).

This is a statement

before the Armed Services Committee of the House,
representing the Administration's view, emphasizes "equity".
"The President's decision to ask for
authority to register women is based on
equity. p. 211."

Hearings before House Armed Services Committee
(March 5, 1980).

The testimony of

~embers

of the

Administration (Robert B. Pirie, Bernard D. Rostker, and
Larry L. Simms - see p. 215 - before a subcommittee is
reproduced from pp. 214-250.

It does not appear to be

significantly helpful, although it follows the
Administration's line closely.

Testimony of Lt. Gen. Moore (Oct. 14, 1976), when
this case was in any early stage.

p. 252-258.

Although

called by plaintiff's counsel, his testimony does not seem
particularly helpful.

General Moore does say (and I would

agree) that "we have found that a dedicated female soldier
is a very effective soldier". (p. 257)

The General

emphasized the need to be ready to fight without delay.

9.

(The Korean war started over a weekend). 257.

Perhaps his

most important statement was that
"Between 80 and 90% of the replacements in a
wartime situation are for combat arms units".
This was the experience in our last three
wars. p. 258.
General Moore also stated that there has been no
difficulty "in recruiting sufficiently high quality
volunteer women to fill the authorized slots, and authorized
skills" (p. 258).

Deposition of Gen. Edward
1976). (p. 259-265).

c.

Meyer (Oct. 19,

Although a good deal of Gen. Meyer's

testimony seems meaningless, he did emphasize the
"tremendous management problem" that would arise in wartime
as to the disposition of women in relation to men (ratios,
etc.) among units.

He stated:

"Traditionally there have been some women
drivers, and things like that in a 'broader
theater', but it would be difficult, indeed
it would be almost impossible, in my view,
the management of people at that critical
point. I just see the next war as being so
demanding that anything that complicates the
management of people in an early stage would
make it neigh on impossible to be effective."
(p. 261).
General Meyer continues:
"I would say that any women in any units
would have this [adverse] effect on
management. It would just be a flat
difficult of management." (p. 261).

·~o...----~,.i/< ..--------~-------"'·

10.
Depositon of Maj. Gen. Dean Tice. (May 13, 1980),
also called - as all of these witnesses were - by the
plaintiff.

(p. 281).

Gen. Tice's first statement about the

battle of the Bulge hardly helped the plaintiff:
"Everybody immediately went into combat • • •
We even retrained all the clerks and cooks in
France and sent them to the front line." 281

* * *
The Joint Appendix includes statements or brief
excerpts from testimony of several other people, all called
as witnesses for the plaintiff.
particularly relevant.

None of this seemed

Apparently, , the United States didn't

put on any testimony but relied on the findings and reports
of the Congress, plus testimony before the Armed Services
Committee that is a matter of public record.

lfp/ss

3/20/81
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Comments on Opinion of Three-Judge Court
The purpose of this memorandum is to make

miscellaneous notes on the opinion below as I read it.
attempt is made to be comprehensive.

No

I will merely record

points and observations as they occur to me.
One must remember at the outset that this is a
suit brought by men who claim a denial of equal protection
because women also are not subject to registration for the
draft.

I note that if women are registered and assigned

only to noncombat roles, men will have an even more potent
reason for making the same argument.
The DC had before it a "five volume joint
documentary and stipulated record" (2a) .
The act in question 50

u.s.c.

App. §451, et seq.

is the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA).
The DC does not state the vote in either house.
The vote in the Senate Armed Services Committee was 12 to 5.
The House Subcommittee tabled the proposal to register
women, so that the full House did not vote on it.
Standard of Review
As the classification "constitutes discrimination
based on gender", the government has the burden of
"justifying the classification".

12a.

The DC noted that

2.

"ordinarily", a gender-based classification, fails unless it
is "substantially related to an important government
interest" citing Craig v. Boren, Frontiero v. Richardson,
and a case last year - Wangler v. Druggist.

The DC held

that the Boren standard {important government interest test)
applies.

14a.
It was recognized that drafting persons into the

services though a substantial limitation on freedom, is not
unconstitutional.

Thus, the DC stated that the issue in

this case:
"Is whether the deprivation of rights is
applied equally between the sexes. Thus, the
key focus is on the difference in the sexes
not the nature of the deprived right." 16a {I
agree generally with this).
The DC rejected the government's argument that the
"rational basis" test applies.
on Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419

18a.

u.s.

The government relied
498, where we sustained

- applying the rational basis test - a distinction between
male and female naval officers with respect to the length of
time they could remain in grade before a mandatory
discharge.
officers •

We concluded that "male and female
are not similarly situated with respect to

opportunities for professional service."

Ballard, at 508.

The DC found the Ballard case unpersuasive.

It noted that

we had said that "administrative convenience would not
justify the discrimination"; nor, according to the DC here,

3.

were the "classes in Ballard similarily situated". 19a.

The

DC further noted that the standard of analysis was not
identified in Ballard.
Against defining the question for decision, the DC
said:
"We need only decide if there is a
substantial relationship between the
exclusion of women and the raising of
effective armed forces. we need not decide
if women must serve in all roles in the
military, including combat. we need not
decide if women must be conscripted in equal
numbers to men." 2la, 22a.

My note:

The two questions thus left open

identify the "slippery slope" that may lie ahead:

If we

decide now that women may not be excluded from the Act
(which commands both registration and a draft} , the DC
leaves open (i} whether women must serve in combat, and (ii}
must be "conscripted in equal numbers to men".

The DC also followed its statement of the issue
with this curious observation:
"This careful consideration of what issues
are and are not before us should dispel any
concern that we are injecting ourseleves in
an inappropriate manner into military
affairs." 22a

4.

My note:

It is not easy to think of many greater

intrusions on military affairs, as well as on the authority
of Congress than for the judiciary to decide the sex of the
armed services.

At 24a of its opinion, the DC quoted a number of
excerpts from the report of the full Senate Armed Services
Committee (the portions quoted appear on pages 157, 158 of
the Committee's report).

Then, the DC erroneously stated

that the findings of fact by the full Committee actually had
been made by the subscommittee on manpower and personnel.
See p. 26a, 27a of the opinion.

The 11 findings of fact are

contained in the report of the full Senate Committee at pp.
160, 161.

The DC summarized the government's argument as
follows:
" . • women cannot fill all positions in the
armed services, especially combat positions;
in a time of mobilization the primary need of
the military services will be in combat
related positions and in support position
personnel who can readily be deployed into
combat; therefore, in order to maximize the
flexibility of personnel management, women
should be excluded from the MSSA. Further,
defendants argue that we should defer to the
congressional determination that this is the
best way to run our armed forces." 28a-30a.
The DC recognized that this argument "is
superficially appealing", but found it unpersuasive.

30a.

5.

In n. 19 (p. 29a, 30a), the DC quote fairly
reported General Rogers' testimony as to what happened at
the Battle of the Bulge, but then noted that General Rogers
"testified" in favor of the registration of women.
30.

See n.

(My friend Rogers was doing what he had to do under

President's orders, or resign his post).
The DC, pp. 3la-37a, emphasized the need for women
(see p. 3la for the present statistics, 32a for the
"scenario" in the event of mobilization), and quoted
extensively - primarily in the notes - from the testimony of
administrative officials who supported the President's
proposal, including General Tice, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Robert Pirie,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower (not
womenpower), Richard Danzig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower.

The DC then concluded that "military

opinion, backed by extensive study is that the availability
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility
not hamper it". p. 37a.

My note:

I should do some analysis of the

"military opinion".

I do not think it is as supportive as

the DC indicated, despite administrative pressure.

The DC, relying on quotations from administration
members, then stated:

6.

"It is difficult for us to accept the
inconsistent positions of Congress
(inconsistent with the Administration).
Congress has continuously allocated funds for
the increase of the number of women in the
armed services • • • There can be no doubt
that the experience of women in the all
volunteer army has been a success story." (I
fully agree with this). It is incongruous
that Congress believes on the one hand that
it substantially enhances our national
defense to constantly expand the utilization
of women, and on the other hand exclude women
from the pool of registrants . . • Congress
rejects the current opinion of each of the
military services and asserts that women can
contribute to the military effectiveness only
as volunteers and not as inductees." 39a
After making, persuasively, the argument for
inducting women based on the excerpts from the
Administration's testimony, the DC also said:
"The military does not lose flexibility if
women are registered became induction for
females can be made according to military
needs as they accrue in the future." 42a.

My note:

This seems to contract the DC's earlier

statement that it need not decide "if women must be
conscripted in equal numbers to men". p. 22a.

If fewer

women are conscripted than men, there certainly will be
another lawsuit despite the DC's dictum on page 42a.

My note:

The DC, in support of its dictum, relied

on testimony of Mr. Pirie quoted in n. 31.
interesting.

His testimony is

It assumes that the DOD could determine the

7.

number of women needed at any particular time on a
discriminatory basis.

Mr. Pirie expressly conceded that "a

female draft can[not] be justified on the argument that
wartime personnel requirements cannot be met without them.
The pool of draft eligible men is sufficiently large to meet
projected wartime requirements.

Furthermore, men, unlike

women, can be assigned to any military position including
close combat jobs". n. 31, p. 42a.

The DC, in its conclusion, said that "flexibility
is not enhanced, but is in fact limited by the complete
exclusion of women", and that the "complete exclusion of
women from the pool of registrants does not serve important
governmental objectives and is not substantially related to
any alleged governmental interest." 43a

Observations on the DC's Opinion
Without undertaking more than a random
observations at this time, I note the following:
1.
judgment.

The DC showed no deference to congressional

It did set forth substantial excerpts from the

Senate Committee report, together with the 12 specific
findings.

But I do not recall that any of our cases

emphasizing the duty of courts to defer to congressional
action is discussed.

8

2.

0

The DC basically acted as a legislative body,

weighing the evidence and making its own judgments with
respect to conclusions to be drawn.
3.

The evidence (testimony and public statements)

relied on for the most part was from administrative
spokesmen - both military and civilian - who were obligated
to support the President.
4.

The DC approached its task as if it were

reviewing findings of fact by a lower court, with hardly a
perfunctory genuflect to the findings and decision of the
Congress.
5.

To be sure, equal protection analysis requires

a weighing of an asserted governmental interest against the
mandate for equal protection of the laws.

Most of our equal

protection cases have involved action by states, usually
with little or no evidence of legislative or administrative
findings that purported to justify the discrimination.
Similarly, in the relatively few cases invalidating a
congressional classification, there has been little or no
indication of mature consideration - or findings of fact by the Congress.

Compare, for example, my dissent recently

in Schweiker (no evidence whatever of any congressional
reason for the discrimination) with our opinion last Term in
Fullilove (where findings by the Congress were conclusive) .
Cf. also Harris v. McCree.

9.
6.

Three judges, without any obvious qualifying

experience, rejected the findings of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, made after extensive hearings, and that
eventually were approved by both houses of Congress. See
Conference Committee Report No. 96-895 at 100.
Services Committees

The Armed

have the primary responsibility in the

legislative branch for hearings, study and making policy
judgments with respect to the military.

These Committees

include many members who have served for years, acquiring
extensive knowledge from testimony they have heard each year
and from the studies of their extensive staffs.
7.

I do not suggest by these preliminary comments

that reasonable people cannot differ on the question of
conscripting women.

I personally can testify that even in

World War II women performed fine service in appropriate
places.

There is a place for women in the armed services,

and the volunteer system has worked well with respect to
women - just as it has worked almost disastrously with
respect to men.
As pointed out in testimony that I believe was not
mentioned in the DC's opinion, the quality of women
volunteers exceeded that of men volunteers.

Job

opportunities for women in the armed services have been more
attractive for women for a variety of reasons.

The men

volunteering, for the most part, have been unemployable,
unskilled and uneducated.

To a large extent they have come

10.
from the poor and minority segments of our population
resulting in an army that lacks the skill to employ the
sophisticated equipment required in modern armies.
Moreover, the volunteer system is grossly inequitable as if
war occurred our nation would be defended - not by a fair
cross section of the male population of the country - but by
an army from whom the middle and upper classes largely are
excluded.
But conscription - unlike a volunteer service would be by random lot.

There would be no assurance,

therefore, that the quality of women on the average would be
anything like as high as at present.

Thus, one must bear in

mind that testimony as to the volunteer service is only
partially relevant when one thinks of a conscripted service.
If it were clear that conscription of women could
be limited to actual needs, and that they could be assigned
only to duties chosen by the military, more could be said
for such a system. Only 10 countries either register or
conscription both men and women.

Sixty-two other countries

do not conscript women. See n. 18 p. 29a. But even under the
equal protection analysis of the DC in this case (much less
under ERA if it is adopted), the questions purportedly left
open by the DC undoubtedly would be litigated with
unpredictable results.

Men, like the plaintiffs in this

case, would challenge conscription of the sexes other than
on an equal

basis~

they also would challenge drawing a line

11.
between combat and noncombat roles for women, bringing law
suits with respect to a variety of twilight zone cases. Now
women may serve no closer to combat than division
headquarters.

What about moving them to regimental

headquarters so that men also would enjoy the additonal
safety of divisional headquarters service?
themselves would bring suits.

And women

We know from the prison guard

case from Alabama that some women will want "combat" duties.
Other, more rational women, will want the opportunity for
full promotion which goes only - in most instances - with
varied combat experience.
9.

In the testimony and statements of

Administration supporters- including President Carter's
statement -great emphasis was placed on "equity".

See,

~~~·

e.g., 43a and Joint Apend ix 35, 206, 208 1 1\ As appealing as
this is, it is hardly the basic criterion for constituting
the military services.

The only purpose of military

services is related to war:

First to deter aggression, and

second if war is imposed on us to win it and to do so as
rapidly as possible. Moreover, the "equity" concept could
require equality in the conscripting of men and women and in
the assignment to military duties.
10.

Although the findings of the Senate Armed

Services Committee were based primarily on military
considerations, the Committee expresly recognized societal
interests that are implicated in so many ways - rooted in

12.

the history of our civilization, recopgnizing that women are
different (thank goodness!) and in some contexts need and
should receive protections never traditionally accorded to
men.

A judgment in this area by the Congress is peculiarly

a legislative function, an argument ignored by the DC.

lfp/ss
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Comments on Opinion of Three-Judge Court
The purpose of this memorandum is to make

miscellaneous notes on the opinion below as I read it.
attempt is made to be comprehensive.

No

I will merely record

points and observations as they occur to me.
One must remember at the outset that this is a
suit brought by men who claim a denial of equal protection
because women also are not subject to registration for the
draft.

I note that if women are registered and assigned

only to noncombat roles, men will have an even more potent
reason for making the same argument.
The DC had before it a "five volume joint
documentary and stipulated record" (2a).
The act in question 50

u.s.c.

App. §451, et seq.

is the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA).
The DC does not state the vote in either house.
The vote in the Senate Armed Services Committee was 12 to 5.
The House Subcommittee tabled the proposal to register
women, so that the full House did not vote on it.
Standard of Review
As the classification "constitutes discrimination
based on gender", the government has the burden of
"justifying the classification".

12a.

The DC noted that

2.

"ordinarily", a gender-based classification, fails unless it
is "substantially related to an important government
interest" citing Craig v. Boren, Frontiero v. Richardson,
and a case last year - wangler v. Druggist.

The DC held

that the Boren standard (important government interest test)
applies.

14a.
It was recognized that drafting persons into the

services though a substantial limitation on freedom, is not
unconstitutional.

Thus, the DC stated that the issue in

this case:
"Is whether the deprivation of rights is
applied equally between the sexes. Thus, the
key focus is on the difference in the sexes
not the nature of the deprived right." 16a (I
agree generally with this}.
The DC rejected the government's argument that the
"rational basis" test applies.
on Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419

18a.

u.s.

The government relied
498, where we sustained

- applying the rational basis test - a distinction between
male and female naval officers with respect to the length of
time they could remain in grade before a mandatory
discharge.
officers •

we concluded that "male and female • • •

. . are

not similarly situated with respect to

opportunities for professional service."

Ballard, at 508.

The DC found the Ballard case unpersuasive.

It noted that

we had said that "administrative convenience would not
justify the discrimination"; nor, according to the DC here,

3.

were the "classes in Ballard similarily situated". 19a.

The

DC further noted that the standard of analysis was not
identified in Ballard.
Against defining the question for decision, the DC
said:
"We need only decide if there is a
substantial relationship between the
exclusion of women and the raising of
effective armed forces. We need not decide
if women must serve in all roles in the
military, including combat. We need not
decide if women must be conscripted in equal
numbers to men." 2la, 22a.

My note:

The two questions thus left open

identify the "slippery slope" that may lie ahead:

If we

decide now that women may not be excluded from the Act
(which commands both registration and a draft) , the DC
leaves open (i) whether women must serve in combat, and (ii)
must be "conscripted in equal numbers to men".

The DC also followed its statement of the issue
with this curious observation:
"This careful consideration of what issues
are and are not before us should dispel any
concern that we are injecting ourseleves in
an inappropriate manner into military
affairs." 22a

4.

My note:

It is not easy to think of many greater

intrusions on military affairs, as well as on the authority
of Congress than for the judiciary to decide the sex of the
armed services.

At 24a of its opinion, the DC quoted a number of
excerpts from the report of the full Senate Armed Services
Committee {the portions quoted appear on pages 157, 158 of
the Committee's report).

Then, the DC erroneously stated

that the findings of fact by the full Committee actually had
been made by the subscommittee on manpower and personnel.
See p. 26a, 27a of the opinion.

The 11 findings of fact are

contained in the report of the full Senate Committee at pp.
160, 161.

The DC summarized the government's argument as

"· •• women cannot fill all positions in the
armed services, especially combat positions;
in a time of mobilization the primary need of
the military services will be in combat
related positions and in support position
personnel who can readily be deployed into
combat7 therefore, in order to maximize the
flexibility of personnel management, women
should be excluded from the MSSA. Further,
defendants argue that we should defer to the
congressional determination that this is the
best way to run our armed forces." 28a-30a.
The DC recognized that this argument "is
superficially appealing", but found it unpersuasive.

lOa.

5.

In n. 19 (p. 29a, 30a), the DC quote fairly
reported General Rogers' testimony as to what happened at
the Battle of the Bulge, but then noted that General Rogers
"testified" in favor of the registration of women.
30.

See n.

(My friend Rogers was doing what he had to do under

President's orders, or resign his post).
The DC, pp. 3la-37a, emphasized the need for women
(see p. 3la for the present statistics, 32a for the
"scenario" in the event of mobilization), and quoted
extensively - primarily in the notes - from the testimony of
administrative officials who supported the President's
proposal, including General Tice, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Robert Pirie,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for l-ianpower (not
womenpower), Richard Danzig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower.

The DC then concluded that "military

opinion, backed by extensive study is that the availability
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility
not hamper it". p. 37a.

My note:

I should do some analysis of the

"military opinion".

I do not think it is as supportive as

the DC indicated, despite administrative pressure.

The DC, relying on quotations from administration
members, then stated:

6.

"It is difficult for us to accept the
inconsistent positions of Congress
(inconsistent with the Administration).
Congress has continuously allocated funds for
the increase of the number of women in the
armed services • • • There can be no doubt
that the experience of women in the all
volunteer army has been a success story." (I
fully agree with this). It is incongruous
that Congress believes on the one hand that
it substantially enhances our national
defense to constantly expand the utilization
of women, and on the other hand exclude women
from the pool of registrants • • • Congress
rejects the current opinion of each of the
military services and asserts that women can
contribute to the military effectiveness only
as volunteers and not as inductees." 39a
After making, persuasively, the argument for
inducting women based on the excerpts from the
Administration's testimony, the DC also said:
"The military does not lose flexibility if
women are registered became induction for
females can be made according to military
needs as they accrue in the future." 42a.

My note:

This seems to contract the DC's earlier

statement that it need not decide "if women must be
conscripted in equal numbers to men". p. 22a.

If fewer

women are conscripted than men, there certainly will be
another lawsuit despite the DC's dictum on page 42a.

My note:

The DC, in support of its dictum, relied

on testimony of Mr. Pirie quoted in n. 31.
interesting.

His testimony is

It assumes that the DOD could determine the

7.

number of women needed at any particular time on a
discriminatory basis.

Mr. Pirie expressly conceded that "a

female draft can{not] be justified on the argument that
wartime personnel requirements cannot be met without them.
The pool of draft eligible men is sufficiently large to meet
projected wartime requirements.

Furthermore, men, unlike

women, can be assigned to any military position including
close combat jobs". n. 31, p. 42a.

The DC, in its conclusion, said that "flexibility
is not enhanced, but is in fact limited by the complete
exclusion of women", and that the "complete exclusion of
women from the pool of registrants does not serve important
governmental objectives and is not substantially related to
any alleged governmental interest." 43a

Observations on the DC's Opinion
Without undertaking more than a random
observations at this time, I note the following:
1.
judgment.

The DC showed no deference to congressional

It did set forth substantial excerpts from the

Senate Committee report, together with the 12 specific
findings.

But I do not recall that any of our cases

emphasizing the duty of courts to defer to congressional
action is discussed.

8.

2.

The DC basically acted as a legislative body,

weighing the evidence and making its own judgments with
respect to conclusions to be drawn.
3.

The evidence (testimony and public statements)

relied on for the most part was from administrative
spokesmen - both military and civilian - who were obligated
to support the President.
4.

The DC approached its task as if it were

reviewing findings of fact by a lower court, with hardly a
perfunctory genuflect to the findings and decision of the
Congress.
5.

To be sure, equal protection analysis requires

a weighing of an asserted governmental interest against the
mandate for equal protection of the laws.

Most of our equal

protection cases have involved action by states, usually
with little or no evidence of legislative or administrative
findings that purported to justify the discrimination.
Similarly, in the relatively few cases invalidating a
congressional classification, there has been little or no
indication of mature consideration - or findings of fact by the Congress.

Compare, for example, my dissent recently

in Schweiker (no evidence whatever of any congressional
reason for the discrimination) with our opinion last Term in
Fullilove (where findings by the Congress were conclusive).
Cf. also Harris v. McCree.

9.
6.

Three judges, without any obvious qualifying

experience, rejected the findings of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, made after extensive hearings, and that
eventually were approved by both houses of Congress. See
Conference Committee Report No. 96-895 at 100.
Services Committees

The Armed

have the primary responsibility in the

legislative branch for hearings, study and making policy
judgments with respect to the military.

These Committees

include many members who have served for years, acquiring
extensive knowledge from testimony they have heard each year
and from the studies of their extensive staffs.
7.

I do not suggest by these preliminary comments

that reasonable people cannot differ on the question of
conscripting women.

I personally can testify that even in

World War II women performed fine service in appropriate
places.

There is a place for women in the armed services,

and the volunteer system has worked well with respect to
women - just as it has worked almost disastrously with
respect to men.
As pointed out in testimony that I believe was not
mentioned in the DC's opinion, the quality of women
volunteers exceeded that of men volunteers.

Job

opportunities for women in the armed services have been more
attractive for women for a variety of reasons.

The men

volunteering, for the most part, have been unemployable,
unskilled and uneducated.

To a large extent they have come

10.
from the poor and minority segments of our population
resulting in an army that lacks the skill to employ the
sophisticated equipment required in modern armies.
Moreover, the volunteer system is grossly inequitable as if
war occurred our nation would be defended - not by a fair
cross section of the male population of the country - but by
an army from whom the middle and upper classes largely are
excluded.
But conscription - unlike a volunteer service would be by random lot.

There would be no assurance,

therefore, that the quality of women on the average would be
anything like as high as at present.

Thus, one must bear in

mind that testimony as to the volunteer service is only
partially relevant when one thinks of a conscripted service.
If it were clear that conscription of women could
be limited to actual needs, and that they could be assigned
only to duties chosen by the military, more could be said
for such a system. Only 10 countries either register or
conscription both men and women.

Sixty-two other countries

do not conscript women. See n. 18 p. 29a. But even under the
equal protection analysis of the DC in this case (much less
under ERA if it is adopted), the questions purportedly left
open by the DC undoubtedly would be litigated with
unpredictable results.

Men, like the plaintiffs in this

case, would challenge conscription of the sexes other than
on an equal basis: they also would challenge drawing a line

11.

between combat and noncombat roles for women, bringing law
suits with respect to a variety of twilight zone cases. Now
women may serve no closer to combat than division
headquarters.

What about moving them to regimental

headquarters so that men also would enjoy the additonal
safety of divisional headquarters service?
themselves would bring suits.

And women

we know from the prison guard

case from Alabama that some women will want "combat" duties.
Other, more rational women, will want the opportunity for
full promotion which goes only - in most instances - with
varied combat experience.
9.

In the testimony and statements of

Administration supporters - including President Carter's
statement -great emphasis was placed on "equity".
e.g., 43a and Joint Apendix 35, 206, 208.

See,

As appealing as

this is, it is hardly the basic criterion for constituting
the military services.

The only purpose of military

services is related to war:

First to deter aggression, and

second if war is imposed on us to win it and to do so as
rapidly as possible. Moreover, the "equity" concept could
require equality in the conscripting of men and women and in
the assignment to military duties.
10.

Although the findings of the Senate Armed

Services Committee were based primarily on military
considerations, the Committee expresly recognized societal
interests that are implicated in so many ways - rooted in

12 .

the history of our civilization, recopgnizing that women are
different (thank goodness!) and in some contexts need and
should receive protections never traditionally accorded to
men.

A judgment in this area by the Congress is peculiarly

a legislative function, an argument ignored by the DC.
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Notes of Senate Armed Services Committee Report No. 96-826
This report dated June 20, 1980, is the
recommendation of the Committee of Appropriations for fiscal
year 1981 for the DOD.
indexed.

It is 239 pages, and miserably

The discussion of including women is confined, I

believe, to pages 156-161.
This memo records notes on what the Committee
said.
Proposal Rejected
The opening sentence is that "The Committee
rejected a proposal to require the registration of young
women under the Military Selective Service Act".
Although the report is on an appropriations bill,
the language and findings reflect present as well as earlier
consideration of this issue, and is a response to the
Administration's made earlier in 1980 that women be included
in the revived selective service Act.

(See my notes on

Joint Appendix Material).
Reference was made to "Congress' constitutional
duty under Article I, §8 "to raise and support armies", "to
provide and maintain a navy" and "to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and navy forces".
Committee "expressed its serious concern over manpower

The

I

2.

problems that are so severe that the military services are
not now capable of meeting our national security
requirements • • • "

p. 157

It was noted that in 1979 when the Committee
reported a bill (S. 109) mandating peacetime registration of
males, the "issue of whether women should be registered
became a dominant part of the discussion • • • II
The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the
Armed Services Committee "held several additonal hearings in
1980 on the registration plan presented by the President, on
the question of including women in the plan, and on the
military issues involved • • • "

This report then states:

"The Committee remains convinced that
registration is vitally necessary and that
women should not be included in any
registration and induction system. This
judgment is based upon the Committee's
assessment of the military needs of the
nation, and its comprehensive study of the
registration issue. It is also based on the
Committee's assessment o~ the societal impact
of the registration and possible induction of
women • " p • 15 7

Would not be assigned to combat positions
But in the event of mobilization manpower
requirements would be greatest to fill combat roles
especially in infantry and armored units.

Note was taken of

the testimony in prior hearings that "it is in these combat
skills where the all volunteer force has failed to supply

',,

\ ..

3.

sufficient recruits, and where current strengths of combat
units is often woefully inadequate.

Although only 6% of

army enlisted skills are closed to women, fully 42% of all
"billets filled by enlisted personnel in the army are in
specialties, skills or units not available to women.

These

include non-combat positions in close support units that
could come under enemy fire."

p. 158.

After noting that "all the military services
testified at length about their mobilization plans, and the
place of women in those plans", this report states that
"Both the civilian and military leadership
agreed that there is no military need to
draft women. Because of the combat
restrictions, the need would be primiarly for
men, and women volunteers would fill [only]
the requirements for women. The argument for
registrationand induction of women,
therefore, is not based on military
necessity, but on considerations of equity.

* * *
"Selective service plans provide for drafting
only men during the first 60 days, and only a
small number of women would be included in
the total drafted for the first 180 days." p.
158.

Other reasons
Other military reasons preclude large numbers of
women from serving:
"Military flexibility requires that a
commander be able to move units or ships

4.

quickly. Units or ships not located at the
front or not previously scheduled for the
front nevertheless must be able to move into
action if necessary. In peace and war,
significant rotation of personnel is
necessary. we should not divide the military
into two groups - one in permanent combat and
one in permanent support. Large numbers of
non-combat positions must be available to
which combat troops can return for duty
before being redeployed." p. 158

As noted above, the Committee found "no military
need to draft women".

The report then identified negative

reasons, indicating difficulties and problems resulting from
including women.

As the above quotation indicates, the

Committee believe that "miltiary flexibility would be
adversely affected under conditions of combat.
In addition, "administrative problems" would
result such as "housing and different treatment with regard
to dependency, hardship and physical standards".

p. 159.

Important "societal reasons" also suggested the
unwisdom of including women.

Determining who should "fight

for the nation and how best to accomplish that end is a
social issue of the highest order, with sweeping
implications for our society".

p. 159.

The report goes on

to say:
"In addition witnesses representing a variety
of groups testified before the subcommittee
that drafting women would place unprecedented
strains on family life, whether in peacetime
or in time of emergency. If such a draft
occurred at a time of emergency,

5.

unpredictable reactions to the fact of female
conscription would result. A decision which
would result in a young mother being drafted
and a young father emaining home with the
family in a time of national emergency cannot
be taken lightly, nor its broader
implications ignored. The committee is
strongly of the view that such a result,
which would occur if women were registered
and inducted under the administration plan,
is unwise and unacceptable to a large
majority of our people." p. 159

My note:

Although I think the Committee may have

exaggerated the "societal reasons", they certainly are not
insignificant.

Constitutionality
The Committee noted the argument that "the
Constitution requires both men and women to be treated
equally", a view based on the perception that equal
protection of the laws "mandates an equal sharing among men
and women of the burdens of registration and conscription".
The Committee, however, "took note" of a Justice
Department opinion that concluded male only registration is
constitutional.

Specific findings
In addition to concluding that exclusion of women
is constitutional, the Committee made 11 specific findings,
as follows:

6.

(See Exhibit A attached for the findings)

* * *
Comment:

The Senate Armed Services Committee

voted 12 to 4 to adopt this report, including these
findings.

The Senate and House Conference Committee on the

Appropriations Act, specifically included - by reference these findings.

Thus, they were approved by both

Houses of Congress.
For me the findings thus approved are controlling
- unless arguments and subsequent discussion present more
compelling views to the contrary than I have yet identified.
I do note that the Senate Committee's discussion
and finding No. 10 make a "worst case" argument as to what
would happen ".if the law required women to be drafted in
equal numbers with men".

The Carter Administration, of

course, insist that although women would register on an
equal basis with men, only such women as were needed would
be inducted.

Even if it worked out this way, other reasons

stated by the Committee would remain relevant.
The Committee's report may overstate the
opposition of the most senior military officers (the Joint
Chief of Staff) to President Carter's proposal.

See the

testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel
of the Senate Armed Services Committee taken in the spring
and summer of 1979 on

s.

109 and

s.

226 - both Senate bills

7.

relating to registration and induction.
these hearings).

(I have a copy of

The generals and admirals who testified

often sounded a bit more like politicians than military men,
as they were extremely cautions in expressing certain
opinions.

In general, they praised the performance of women

in peacetime, non-combat roles, and there a number of
affirmative statements with respect to the registration of
women.

The same officers usually said, however, that the

drafting of women was not needed for military purposes.
Thus, some - but perhaps not all - were drawing a
distinction between mere registration and induction.
As I recall, all of the generals testified that
the real need in the event of mobilization would be for men.
There also is quite strong testimony as to the inability, in
certain combat conditions, to distinguish between combat and
non-combat personnel.

Consider, for example, General

Rogers' testimony as follows:
"General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, may I add
a footnote to my comment to Senator Warner?
"Senator Nunn. Yes, General.
"General Rogers. One thing which is
often lost sight of , Senator, is that in an
emergency during war, the Army has often had
to reach back into the support base, into the
supporting elements in the operating base,
and pull forward soldiers to fill the ranks
in an emergency, that is, to hand them a
rifle or give them a tanker suit and put them
in the frorit ranks.
"Senator warner. General Patton did that
at one time, I believe in the Battle of the
Bulge.
"General Rogers. Absolutely.

8.

"Now, if that support base and that
operating base to the rear consist in large
measure of women, then, we don't have that
opportunity to reach back and puyll them
forward, because women should not be placed
in a forward fighting position or in a tank,
in my opinion. So that, too enters the
equation when one considers the subject of
the utility of women under contingency
conditions." p. 16, Senate Subcommittee
Report, 1979.*

*This is the same General Rogers whose statement, in another
connection, is quoted by the district court with approval.
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Notes

')IV

of
I

Senate Armed Services Committee Report No. 96-826
This report dated June 20, 1980, is the

recommendation of the Committee
year 1981 for the DOD.
indexed.

~Appropriations

for fiscal

It is 239 pages, and miserably

The discussion of including women is confined, I

believe, to pages 156-161.
This memo records notes on what the Committee
said.
Proposal Rejected
The opening sentence is that "The Committee
rejected a proposal to require the registration of young
women under the Military Selective Service Act".

p.

IS'~

Although the report is on an appropriations bill,
the language and findings reflect present as well as earlier

-

consideration of this issue, and is a response to the
Administration's~made

earlier in 1980 that women be included

in the revived ~ lective...$ervice Act.

(See my notes on

Joint Appendix Material).
Reference was made to "Congress' constitutional
duty under Article I, §8 "to raise and support armies", "to
provide and maintain a navy" and "to make rules for the
government and regulation ·of the land and navy forces".
Committee "expressed its serious concern over manpower

The

2.

problems that are so severe that the military services are
not now capable of meeting our national security
requirements. .

II

p. 157

It was noted that in 1979 when the Committee
reported a bill (S. 109) mandating peacetime registration of
males, the "issue of whether women should be registered
became a dominant part of the discussion .

II

The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the
Armed Services Committee "held several additonal hearings in
1980 on the registration plan presented by the President, on
the question of in6luding women in the plan, and on the
military issues involved • . . "

This

repo~ ~ ~
J\

"The Committee remains convinced that
registration is vitally necessary and that
women should not be included in any
registration and induction system. This
judgment is based upon the Committee's
assessment of the military needs of the
nation, and its comprehensive study of the
registration issue. It is also based on the
Committee's assessment of the societal impact
of the registration and possible induction of
women." p. 157

Would not be assigned to combat positions
But in the event of mobilization manpower
requirements would be greatest to fill combat roles
especially in infantry and armored units.

Note was taken of

the testimony in prior hearings that "it is in these combat
skills where the all volunteer force has failed to supply

3.

sufficient recruits, and where current strengths of combat
units is often woefully inadequate.

Although only 6% of

army enlisted skills are closed to women, fully 42% of all
"billets filled by enlisted personnel in the army are in
specialties, skills or units not available to women.

These

include non-combat positions in close support units that
could come under enemy fire."

p. 158.

After noting that "all the military services
testified at length about their mobilization plans, and the
place of women in those plans", this report states that
"Both the civilian and military leadership
agreed that there is po military need tn
draft women. Because of €he combat
restrictions, the need would be primiarly for
men, and women volunteers would fill [only]
the requirements for women. The argument for
registratio~nd induction of women,
therefore, is not based on military
necessity, but on considerations of equity.

* * *
"Selective service plans provide for drafting
only men during the first 60 days, and only a
small number of women would be included in
the total drafted for the first 180 days." p.
158.

Other reasons
Other military reasons preclude large numbers of
women from serving:
"Military flexibility requires that a
commander be able to move units or ships

4.

quickly. Units or ships not located at the
front or not previously scheduled for the
front nevertheless must be able to move into
action if necessary. In peace and war,
significant rotation of personnel is
necessary. We should not divide the military
into two groups - one in permanent combat and
one in permanent support. Large numbers of
non-combat positions must be available to
which combat troops can return for duty
before being redeployed." p. 158

As noted above, the Committee found "no military
need to draft women".

The report then identified negative

reasons, indicating difficulties and problems resulting from
including women.

As the above quotation indicates, the

Committee believe that "miltiary flexibility would be
adversely affected under conditions of combat.
In addition, "administrative problems" would
result such as "housing and different treatment with regard
to dependency, hardship and physical standards".

p. 159.

Important "so; i<::-al_:__easons" also suggested the

...

unwisdom of including women.

Determining who should "fight

for the nation and how best to accomplish that end is a
social issue of the highest order, with sweeping
implications for our society".

p. 159.

The report goes on

to say:
"In addition witnesses representing a variety
of groups testified before the subcommittee
that drafting women would place unprecedented
strains on family life, whether in peacetime
or in time of emergency. If such a draft
occurred at a time of emergency,

5.

unpredictable reactions to the fact of female
conscription would result. A decision which
would result in a young mother being drafted
and a young father nemaining home with the
family in a time of national emergency cannot
be taken lightly, nor its broader
implications ignored. The committee is
strongly of the view that such a result,
which would occur if women were registered
and inducted under the administration plan,
is unwise and unacceptable to a large
majority of our people." p. 159

My note:

Although I think the Committee may have

exaggerated the "societal reasons", they certainly are not
insignificant.

Constitutionality
The Committee noted the argument that "the
Constitution requires both men and women to be treated
equally", a view based on the perception that equal
protection of the laws "mandates an equal sharing among men
and women of the burdens of registration and conscription".
The Committee, however, "took note" of a Justice
Department opinion that concluded male only registration is
constitutional.

Specific findings
In addition to concluding that exclusion of women
is constitutional, the Committee made 11 specific findings,
as follows:

6.

(See Exhibit A attached for the findings)

* * *
Comment:

The Senate Armed Services Committee

voted 12 to 4 to adopt this report, including these
findings.

The Senate and House Conference Committee on the

Appropriations Act, specifically included - by reference these findings.

y>

I t>l> Thus, they were approved by both

Houses of Congress.
For me the findings thus approved are controlling
- unless arguments and subsequent discussion present more
compelling views to the contrary than I have yet identified.
I do note that the Senate Committee's discussion
and finding No. 10 make a "worst case" argument as to what
would happen "if the law required women to be drafted in
equal numbers with men".

The Carter Administration, of

course, insist that although women would register on an
equal basis with men, only such women as were needed would
be inducted.

Even if it worked out this way, other reasons

stated by the Committee would remain relevant.
The Committee's report may overstate the
opposition of the most senior military officers (the Joint
Chief of Staff) to President Carter's proposal.

See the

testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel
of the Senate Armed Services Committee taken in the spring
and summer of 1979 on S. 109 and S. 226 - both Senate bills

7.

relating to registration and induction.
these hearings).

(I have a copy of

The generals and admirals who testified

often sounded a bit more like politicians than military men,
as they were extremely cautions in expressing certain
opinions.

In general, they praised the performance of women

in peacetime, non-combat roles, and

~

there ~a

number of

affirmative statements with respect to the registration of
women.

The same officers usually said, however, that the

drafting of women was not needed for military purposes.
Thus, some - but perhaps not all - were drawing a
distinction between mere registration and induction.
As I recall, all of the generals testified that
the real need in the event of mobilization would be for men.
There also is quite strong testimony as to the inability, in
certain combat conditions, to distinguish between combat and
non-combat personnel.

Consider, for example, General

Rogers' testimony as follows:
"General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, may I add
a footnote to my comment to Senator warner?
"Senator Nunn. Yes, General.
"General Rogers. One thing which is
often lost sight of , Senator, is that in an
emergency during war, the Army has often had
to reach back into the support base, into the
supporting elements in the operating base,
and pull forward soldiers to fill the ranks
in an emergency; that is, to hand them a
rifle or give them a tanker suit and put them
in the front ranks.
"Senator Warner. General Patton did that
at one time, I believe in the Battle of the
Bulge.
"General Rogers. Absolutely.

8.

"Now, if that support base and that
operating base to the rear consist in large
measure of women, then, we don't have that
opportunity to reach back and pu~ll them
forward, because women should n6t be placed
in a forward fighting position or in a tank,
in my opinion. So that, too enters the
equation when one considers the subject of
the utility of women under contingency
conditions." p. 16, Senate Subcommittee
Report, 1979.*

*This is the same General Rogers whose statement, in another
connection, is quoted by the district court with approval.

EXHIBIT A

SPECIFIC FINDINGS

-. ,

- · ~-

( 1) Article I, section 8 of the Constitution commits exclusively to
the Congress the powers to raise and suppo1t armies, provide and
maintain a Navy, and makes rules for Government and regulation ?f
the land and naval forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies withm
the discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions for expan·
sion of our Armed Forces, and the means best suited to such expansion
should it prove necessary.
(2) An ability to mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation
of our national security.
(3) A functioning registration system is a vital part of any mobili·
zation plan.
(4) ·women make an important contribution to our national de·
fens~, and are volunteering in increasing numbers for our armed
servwes.
( 5) Women should not be intentionally or routinely placed in com·
bat positions in our military services.
(6) There is no established military need to include women in a
selective service system.
(7) Present manpower deficiencies under the All-Volunteer Force
are concentrated in the combat arms-infantry, armor, combat en·
gineers, field artillery and air defense.
(8) If mobilization were to be ordered in a wa~time scenario, the
primary manpower need would be for combat replacements.
(9) The need to rotate personnel and the possibility that close sup·
port units could come under enemy fire also limits the use of women
in non-combat jobs.
(10) If the law required women to be drafted in equal numbers with
men, mobilization would be severely impaired because of strains on
training facilities and administrative systems.
_(11) _Under the administration's proposal there is no nroposal for
exemption
of mothers
of vou11cr
h'll
Th e a d nnmstrat10n
...,_ ,r_
·.·· '
u' ,
•• · . ffi ··
·---.-:..::......z"' c I. c ren.
has
~~1 r~t
Cient attentiOn .to neces?ary changes in Selective Service
Ill e~, sue . as those govermng the mduction of youno- mothers and
to tl11e st;balm~ odn f~mily life that would result from t"'J.le regisfr~tion
nne poss1 e m uct10n of women .
. (12) .A ~egistration and induction system which excludes women
JS constitutiOnal.
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~ostker,

Bernard
Director of On Appeal from the United
Selective Service, Appellant,
States District Court for
v.
the Eastern District of
_ ~r~ \;. Goldberg et al.
Pennsylvania.

~t

~

-ht~~

[May -, 1981]

JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
/Y"'I. .hU~
The question presented is whether the Military Selective
c~
Service Act, 50 U. S. ~· App. § 451 et s~q., .viol~tes the ~i~th
'~ ~ndment to the Umted States ConstitutiOn m authonzmg
l '_
. . IJ
the President to require the registration of males and not
~ cf.- females.

..

-.; . .- -

'-"

..,.

I

tf/!J>·~- ~n the power under the Constitution "To
~

~..,l,

,Lp);;;;:t

, , ~. .· _ d ~ ' . 0

~

~ ~
v

.f

/o

,/o J d~

.

~~v

raise and support Armies," "To provide and maintain a
Navy," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
Pursuant to this grant of authority Congress has enacted the
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq.
("the MSSA" or "the Act"). Section 3 of the Act, 50 U.S. C.
App. § 453, empowers the President, by proclamation, to require the registration of "every male citizen" and male resident aliens between the a.ges of 18 and 26. ·The purpose of
this registration is to facilitate any eventual conscription:
pursuant to § 4 (a) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a),
those persons required to register under § 3 are liable for
training and service in the Armed Forces. The MSSA registration provision serves no other purpose beyond providing
a pool for subsequent induction.
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Registration for the draft under § 3 was discontinued in
1975. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 11 Weekly Camp.
of Pres. Doc. 318 (April 7, 1975). In ea.ply 1980, President
Carter determined that it was necessa11y to reactivate the
draft registration process. 1 The immediate impetus for thiEl
decision was the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan. ·16
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980) (Stat~
of the Union Address). According to the Administration's
witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee, th~
resulting crisis in Southwestern Asia convinced the President
that the "time has come" "to use his present authority to
require registration . . . as a necessary step to preserving or.
enhancing our national security interests." Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year.
1981: Hearings on S. 2294 before the Senate Committee ori
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1805 (1980) (hereafte~
Hearings on S. 2294) (joint statement of Dr. John P. White,
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Dr.
Bernard Rostker, Director, Selective Service System, and
Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense). The Selective Service System had been inactiv~,
however, and funds were needed prior to reactivating registration. The President therefore recommended that funds
be transferred troffi' the Department of DeTense to ~ep
ifate Self}1't~r:i,ce Sy.§tem. H. R. Doc. No. 96-267, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1980). He also recommended that Con...
gress take action to amend the MS
· o permit the r~istra
tionand conSc'riP'tlo"i'l o1 wome'i; as well as men. See Presi-.
dential ecommen ations for Selective Service Reform-A
Report to Congress Prepared Pu:rsul'tnt to :Pub, :L. 96-107
(Feb. 11, 1980), J. A. 57-61.
a The President did nol.1?~k conscriPtion. Since the Act was amended
in 1973 to preclude cont>cription, Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353, .'){) U.S. C.
App. § 467 (c) , any actual conscri tion would require further congression:U action .. See . ep. No .. 96.-82.6, 9 t
ong., 2d Sess.,
980)~

JL
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Congress agreed that it was necessary to reactivate the
registration process, and allocated funds for that purpose in
a joint resolution which passed the House on April 22 and
the Senate on June 12. H. R. J. Res. 521, Pub. L. 96-282,
94 Stat. 552. The resolution did not allocate all the funds
originally requested by the President, but only those necessary to register males. See S. Rep. No. 96-789, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1, n. 1; 2 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen.
Nunn) (June 10, 1980). Although Congress considered the
question at great length, see infra, at 12-14, it declined to
amend the MSSA to permit the re istration of women.
n u y , 8 , the President, by proclamation, ordered
the registration of specified groups of young men pursuant
to the authority conferred by § 3 of the Act. Registration
was to commence on July 21, 1980. Proclamation No. 4771,
45 Fed. Reg. 45247.
These events of last year breathed new life into a lawsuit
which had been essentially dormant in the lower courts for
nearly a decade. It began in 1971 when several men sub.iect
to registration for the draft and subsequent induction into
the Armed Services filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the MSSA on several grounds. 2 A three-judge dis2 Plaintiffs contended that the Act amounted to a taking of property
witho'Ut due pr6Cks, imposed involuntary servitude, violated rights of
free expression and assemhly, was unlawfully impiemented to advance an
unconstitutional war, and impermissibly discriminated between... males and
females. The District Court denied plaintJffii' application to convene a
three-]uclge district court and dismissed the suit, Rowland v. Tarr, 341
F. Supp. 339 (ED Pa. 1972). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except the discrimination
claim, and remanded the case to the District Court to determine if this
claim was substantial enough to warrant the convening of a three-judge
court under then-applicable 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1970 ed.) and whether
plaintiffs had standing to assert that claim. 480 F. 2d 545 (1973). On
remand, the District Court answered both questions in the affirmative,
resulting in the convening of ti1e tflree--j'udge- court whicfl decided the-

80-251-0PINION
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trict court was convened in 1974 to consider the claim of
unlawful gender-based discrimination which is now before
us.9 On July 1, 1974, the court declined to dismiss the case
as moot, reasoning that although authority to induct registrants had lapsed, see n. 1, supra, plaintiffs were still under
certain affirmative obligations in connection with registration. 378 F. Supp. 766. Nothing more happened in the case
for five years. Then, on June 6, 1979, the court clerk, acting
pursuant to a local rule governing inactive cases, proposed
that the case be dismissed. Additional discovery thereupon
ensued, and defendants moved to dismiss on various justiciability grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss,
ruling that it did not have before it an adequate record on
the operation of the Selective Service System and what action would be uecessary to reactivate it. Civ. Action No.
71-1480 (Feb. 19, 1980). On July 1, 1980, the court certified
a plaintiff class of "all male persons who are registered or
subiect to registration under 50 U. S. C. App. § 453 or are
liable for training and service in the armed forces of the
United States under 50 U. S. C. App. § 454, 456 (h) and 467
(c) ." App. to Juris. Statement 2a-4a. 4
clilie below. The Act authorizing three-judge courts to hear claims surh
this wat> repealed in 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119
( AuJ!.. 12, 1!)76), but remains applicable to suits filed before repeal, ·id.,
§ 7, 00 Stat . 1119.
3 A~ the Court t>tated in Schl13singer v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 500, n. 3
( 1!J75), "Although it contains no Equal Protection Clause as does the
Fourl~enth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
prohibit~ the federt~l government from engtLging in discrimination that is
',;o unjustifiable al:i to be violative of due process.' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U. S. 497, 499.''
4 When entering its judgment on July 18, the District Court redefined
the class to includ~ " All male persons who are registered under 50 U. S. C.
App. § 453 or are liable for training and service in the armed forces of
the United States under 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 454, 456 (h) and 467 (c);
and who are also either subject to registration under Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 (July 2, 1980) or are presently registered with the·
Selective Serviee System."· App .. to Juris. Statement 4'4a.

W:l
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On Friday, July 18, 1980, three days before registration
was to commence, the District Court issued an opinion finding that the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from
requiring registration under the Act. The court initially determined that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case
was ripe, determinations which are not challenged here by
the Government. Turning to the merits, the court rejected
plaintiffs' suggestions that the equal protection claim should
be tested under "strict scrutiny," and also rejected defendants' argument that the deference due Congress in the area
of military affairs required application of the traditional
"minimum scrutiny" test. Applying the "important government interest" test articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S.
190 (1976) , the court struck down the MSSA. The court
stressed that it was not deciding whether or to what extent
women should serve in combat, but only the issue of registration, and felt that this "should dispel any concern that we
are injecting ourselves in an inappropriate manner in military affairs." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. See also id., at
27a, n. 17; 28a, n. 18. The court then proceeded to examine
the testimony and hearing evidence presented to Congress
by representatives of the military and the Executive Branch,
and concluded on the basis of this testimony that "military
opinion, backed by extensive study, is that the availability
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility,
not hamper it." Id., at 37a. It rejected Congress' contrary
determination in part because of what it viewed as CongTess'
"inconsistent positions" in declining to register women yet
spending funds to recruit them and expand their opportuni·
ties in the military. Id., at 37a-39a.
The United States immediately filed a notice of appeal and
the next day, Saturday, July 19, 1980, JusTICE BRENNAN,
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit,
stayed the District Court's order enjoining commencement
U. S. - . Registration began the ne~t
of registration. -

~
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Monday.
tion. -

On December 1, 1980, we noted probable juriEdic.,
U. S. - .

II
Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress-"the gravest and most delicate duty that
this Court is called upon to perform," Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)-the Conrt accords
"great wei ht to the decisions of Congress." CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National ornrntttee,
. S. 94, 102 (1973).
The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose members take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution
of the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Cornrn'ittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123,
164 (1951) (concurring opinion), we must have "due regard
to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judg- ~
ment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have
taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the
responsibility for carrying on government." The customary
deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly
appropna. e w en, as ere, Congress specifically considered
the question of the Act's constitutionality. See. e. g.. S. R3p.
No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 159-161 (1980); 126 Cong.
Rec. S6531- S6533 (Sen. Warner) (June 10, 1980), S6541
(Sen. Hatfield) (June 10, 1980).
This is not, however, merely a case involving the custom.,
ary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case
arises in the context of Congress' authority _.2ver mjlita~ af- ;
fairs, and perhaps in no oth r ~ the Court accorded
~gress greater deference. In rejecting the registration of
wo~tly relied upon its constitutional
powers under Art. I, § 8, cis. 12-14. The "specific findings"
section of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, later adopted by both Houses of Congress, began by
stating:
t'Article I , section 8 of the Constitution commits ex-

I
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elusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support
armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules
for Government and regulation . of the land and naval
forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies within the
discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions fol'
expansion of our Armed Forces, and the means best
suited to such expansion should it prove necessary." S.
Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160.
See also S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979),
'rhis Court has consistently recognized Congress' "broad con ..
stitutional power" to raise and regulate armies and navies,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 510 (1975). As the
Court noted in considering a challenge to the selective service laws, "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and
support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to
that end is broad and sweeping." United States v. O'Brien,
391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). See Lichter v. United States, 334
U. S. 742, 755 (1948).
Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in
this area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of
the courts is marked. In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10
(1973), the Court noted:
~
"It is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence. The
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional milita.ry judgments,
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and
Executive branches."
Fortunately for the continued well-being of the country,
"judges are not ~iven the task of running the Army." Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93 (1953). 5
1 See all:lo Simmous v. United States, 406 F. 2d 456, 459 (CA5 1969)
("That th(' court i~ not com{letent or empowered to sit as a super-
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The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident
in several recent decisions of this Court. In Parker v. Levy,
417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974), the Court rejected"both vagueness
and overbreadth challenges to army regulations, noting that
"Congre~:;s is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth
and with greater flexibility" when the statute governs military society, and that " [ w] hile the members of the military
are not excluded from the protection granted by the First
Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections." In Middendoti_ v,_ !l.!nru, 425
U. S. 25 (1976), the Court noted that i n considerfug due
process claims in the context of summary court martial it
"must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its military authority to regulate the land
and naval forces. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8," concerning what
rights were available. Id., at 43. See also id., at 49-50
(PowE ~ J., concurring). Deference to the judgment of
Other branches in the area of military affairs also played a
major role in Greer v.:. SrJQc[c, 424 U. S. 828, 837-838 (1976),
where the Court upheld a ban on political speeches by civilians on a milit-ary base, and Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348
(1980) , where the Court upheld reg ulations imposing a prior
rpst.raint on the right to petition of milita.r y personnel. See
also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953); United States v.
Mar1ntosh , 283 U. S. 605, 622 (1931).
The c s mo relevant to our present inquiry is Schlesing"r v. Ballard, 419
. 498 (1975). In that case the
Court considered a due process challenge, brought by males,
to the navy policy of according females a longer period than
f'xeculive authority to review the de<'i~ions of the Executive and Legislative
hranch~ ol government in regard to the necessity, method of selection,
illtd compo~ition of our defense forces i~ obvious and, n~ed_s no· furth~:r:
dil1CUStiion "),

v
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males in which to attain promotions necessary to continued
service. The Court distinguished previous gender-based discriminations held unlawful in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71
(1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973).
In those cases, the classifications were based on "overbroad
generalizations." See 419 U. S., at 506-507. In the case before it, however, the Court noted:
"the different treatment of men and women naval officers ... reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and
female line officers in the N av are not similarI Situated

In light of the combat restrictions women did not have the
same opportunities for promotion as men. The Court pro- ,
ceeded to recognize that "'it is the primary business of
armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight-war ssllould
tfie occas1~ariSe,'" it.;'"'at 510 (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350
U. S. 11, 17), and concluded that:
"The responsibility for determining how best our Armed
Forces shall attend to that business rests with Congress,
see U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14, and with the
President. . . . We cannot say that, in exercising its
broad constitutional power here, Congress has violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Ibid.
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard
the Constitution when it acts in the area of military a.ffairs.
In that area as any other Congress remains subject to the
limitations of the Due Process Clause, see Ex parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 2 (1866); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919), but the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because ro f the military
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context. We of course do not abdicate our ultimate respo11i
sibility to decide the c ns 1 u .wna uestion, but simply recognize that the ons 1tution itself requires such added deference. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412
U. S., at 103. In deciding the question before us w~st
be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of
what is desira le for t a o ongress, or our own eva uation
of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative
Branch.
The District Court purported to recognize the appropriateness of deference to Congress in the area of military affairs,
App. to Juris. Statement 28a, but it stressed that "we are not
here concerned with military operations or day-to-day conduct of the military into which we have no desire to intrude."
Ibid. Appellees also stress that this case involves mvilians,
not the military, and that "the impact of registration on the
military is only indirect and attenuated." Appellees Brief,
at 19. We find these efforts to divorce registration from the
military anu national defense context, with all the deference
called for in that context, singularly unpersuasive. United
States v. O'Brien, supra, recognized the broad deference due
Congress iu the selective service area before us in this case.
Registration is not an end in itself in the civilian world but
rather the first step in the induction process into the military
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of registratioll to induction, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra,
at 156, 160. Congressional judgments concerning registration and the draft are based on judgments concerning military operations and ueeds, see, e. g., id., at 157 ("the starting
point for any discussion of the appropria.teness of registering
women for the draft is the question of the proper role of
women in combat''), and the deference unquestionably due
the latter judgments is necessarily required in assessing the
former as well. Although the District Court stressed that it
was not intruding on military questions, its opinion was base1d

l~A __L,_h-~~JL
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.on assessments of military need and flexibility in a time of
mobilization. See, e. y., App. to Juris. Statement 3la-43a.
It would be blinking reality to say that our precedents compelling great deference to Congress in military affairs are not
implicated by the present case. 6
The ~General arg,ues, largely on the basis of the
foregoing cases emphasizing the deference due Congress in
the area of military affairs and national security, that this
Court should scrutinize the MSSA only to determine if the
distinction drawn between men and women bears a rational
:r~ to some legitimate government purpose, see Unifed
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, U. S. ( 1980), and should n_ot examine !the Act under the heightened
scruti&, with which~e ha~ approac!i'e'Cf" gender-basectdiscrimination, see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, ·--- U. S. (1981); f!!_aiy v. Boren, supra; Reed
1
v. Reed, supra. We do not think that the substantive guarantee of due process or certainty in the law will be advanced
J,
III

,,
i
II

i

l
i

8 Congress recognized that its decision on registration involved judgments on military needs and operations, and that its decisions were
entitled to particular deference: "The Supreme Court's most recent teachings in the field of equal protection cannot be read in isolation from its
opinions giving great deference to the judgment of Congress and military
commanders in dealing with the management of military forces and the
requirements of military discipline. The Court has made it unmistakably
clear that even our most fundamental constitutiona1 rights must in some
circumstance::; be modified in the light of military needs, and that Congress' judgment as to wha~ is nece::;sary to pre~erve our national security
is entitled to gre.at deference." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supr·a, at 159-160.
Deference to Congress' judgment was a consistent and dominant theme
in lower court decisions assessing the present claim. See, e. g., United
States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333, 335 (ED La. 1970); Unit·ed States v.
Offm·d, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (ED Wis. 1974).
1 It is clear that
g] ender has never been rejected as an impermissible
cla<;::;ifica.tion in all in~tancet>." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 356, n. 10
(1974) . In making this observation Justice Douglas noted that "Congress has not so far drafted women into the Armed Services, 50 U, S. C.
App .. § 454." Ibid.

"r
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by any further "refinement" in the applicable tests as sug.
gested by the Government. Rather, we think it more appropriate to recognize that in reviewing congressional decisions
in the area of military affairs, we are dealing in planes, rather
than lines, and that while the equafi;rotection test rei'llii:lns
t~ within or w~tthe military context, the cleferen~due Co'rigTeSSi~alJ'Udgments in assessin the merits of
an equa protec 1011 c a1m rna e considerably greater in the
c esmger v. Ballar di not purport to
roi 1tary cont~xt.
apply a different equal protection test because of the military
context, but did stress the deference due congressional judgments in assessing the merits of an equal protection claim
in that context. In this case as well we cannot ignore Congress' broad authority and our own limited competence in
the military area when we are urged to declare unconstitutional a studied congressional judgment on the point at issue.

III
This case is quite different f:mm 1everal gender-based discrimination cases which have previously come oefore the
cfoiirt. Appellees' assertions notwithstanding, this rather
clearly is not a case in which Congress acted "unthinkingly''
or "reflexively and not for any considered reason" in drawing
a distinction based on gender. Appellees' Brief, at 35. 'rhe
question of registering women for the draft not only received
considerable national attention and was the subject of wideranging public debate, but also was extensively considered
by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee.
Hearings held by both Houses of Congress in response to the
President's request for authorization to register women ad·
duced extensive testimony and evidence concerning the issue.
See Hearings on S. 2294; Hearings on National Service Legislation before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of
the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d.
Sess. (1980) (hereafter House Hearings). These he.attings
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built on other hearings held the previous year addressed to
the same question. 8
The House declined to provide for the registration of
women when it passed the Joint Resolution allocating funds
for the Selective Service System. See 126 Cong. Rec. H2728H2729, H2747 (April 22, 1980). When the Senate considered the Joint Resolution, it defeated, after extensive debate,
an amendment which in effect would have authorized the
registration of women. 126 Cong. Rec. S6527-S6549 (June
10, 1980). 9 As noted earlier, Congress in H. R. J. Res. 521
only authorized funds sufficient to cover the registration of
males. The Report of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. R. J. Res. 521 noted that the amount authorized
was below the President's request "due to the Committee's
decision not to provide $8,500,000 to register women," and
that "The amount recommended by the Committee would al~
low for registration of young men only." S. Rep. No. 96789, supra, at 21; see 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. Nunn)
(June 10, 1980).
While proposals to register women were being rejected in
the course of transferring funds to register males, committees
in both Houses which had conducted hearings on the issue
were also rejecting the registration of women. The House
Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed
Services Committee tabled a bill which would have amended
the MSSA to authorize registration of women, H. R. 6-569, on
March 6, 1980. Legislative Calendar, House Committee on
8

See Reinstitution of Procedures for Registration Under the Military
Selective Service Act: Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226 before the Subcommittee on Manpower & Per~ormel of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Seven months before the President's
caJI for the registration of women, the Senate Armed Services Committee
rejected the idea, seeS. Hep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1979).
9 The amendment provided that, no funds "shall be made av~tilable for
implementing a ~:>ystem of registration which does nob include womeiJ!'.~
1:26; Cong. Rec. S652t•.
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Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 54 (Sept. 30, 1980).
The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected a proposal
to register women, S. 2440, as it had one year before, see S.
Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 8-9, and adopted specific findings
supporting its action. See S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at
156-161. These findings were stressed in debate in the Senate 011 Joint Resolution 521, see 126 Cong. Rec. S6544-S6545
(Sen. Nunn) (June 10, 1980); S6531-S6532 (Sen. Warner)
(June 10, 1980). They were later specifically endorsed by
House and Senate conferees considering the Fiscal Year 1981
Defeuse Authorization Bill. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 96-895,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1980). 10 Later both Houses
adopted the findings by passing the Report. 126 Cong. Rec.
H7800, S11646 (Aug. 26, 1980). The Senate Report, therefore, is considerably more significant than a typical report
of 9, single House, and its findings are in effect findings of the
en tire Congress.
The foregoing clearly establishes that the decision to exempt women from registration was not the "accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about women."
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,320 (1977) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 233 (1977) (STEVENS, J.,
concurriug) ). In Michael M., supra, at-, n. 6, we rejected
p, similar argumentbecauseof action by the California Legislature considering and rejecting proposals to ma.ke a statute
challenged on discrimination grounds gender-neutral. The
eause for rejecting the argument is considerably stronger here.
Whatever one's views on the merits, it is clear that Congress,
decision to exempt women from registration wa.s not reflexive, or simply the incidental baggage of out-moded views.
The issue was considered at great length, and Congress
10

The findings were before the conferees because the Senate Armed
Scrvice;o Committee had added a provision to the 1981 Defense Authorization Bill authonzing the transfer of funds to register young men as a
stop-gap measure should Joint Resolution 521 fail. See S. Rep. No.
96- 895, supra, ut 100.
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clearly expressed its purpose and intent. Contrast Califano
v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 87 (1979) ("The gender qualification . . . escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and flool'
debate"). 11
For the same reasons we reject appellees' argument that we
must consider the constitutionality of the MSSA solely on
the basis of the views expressed by Congress in 1948, when
the MSSA was first enacted in its modern form. Contrary
to the suggestions of appellees and various amici, reliance on
the legislative history of Joint Resolution 521 and the activity of the various committees of the 96th Congress considering the registration of women does not violate sound
principles that appr~griations....!$isl~on should not be considered as modifying substantive legislation. Congress did
not change the MSSA in 1980, but it did thoroughly reconsider the question of exempting women from its provisions,
and its basis for doing so. The 1980 legislative history is, (
therefore, highly relevant in assessing'the constitutiona1 validity of the~
The MSSA established a plan for maintaining "adequate
armed strength ... to ensure the security of [the] nation."
50 U. S. C. App. § 451 (b). Registration is the first step
"in a united and continuous process designed to raise an
army speedily and efficiently," Falbo v. United States, 320
U. S. 549, 553 (1944), see United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S.
1, 9 (1953), and Congress provided for the reactivation of
registration in order to "provide the means for the early
delivery of inductees in an emergency." S, Rep. No. 96-826,
supra, at 156. Although the three-judge District Court often
11 Nor can we agree with the characterization of the MSSA in the
Brief for Amicus Curiae National Organization of Women as a law which
"coerce[sJ or preclude[s] women as a class from performing tasks or jobs
of which they are capable," or the suggPstion that this case involves "[t]he
exclusion of women from the military." !d., at 19-20. Nothing in the
MSSA restricts in any way the opportunities for women to volunteer fot
military servrce.---- _ __......_
-

l

80-251-0PINION

Jle

ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

tried to sever its consideration of registration from the particulars of induction, see, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 42a43a, Congress rather clearly linked the need for renewed registratio~;iews ~;'char-;cr-e~-;r-;;"s
'_u_b-se-q~u.-.e-n...;t-d-r-aft.
Th~ speCifically found that "A-;-ab'rrity to
mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation of our national security. A functioning registration system is a vital
part of any mobilization plan." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at
160. As Senator 'Y;lrner put it, "I equate registration with
the draft."- Heari';gs ·on S. 2294, supra, at 1197. See also
id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen), 1671 (Sen. Exon). Such an approach is certainly logical, since under the MSSA induction
is interlocked with registration: only those registered may be
drafted, and registration serves no purpose beyond providing
a pool for the draft. Any assessment of the congressional
purpose and its chosen means must therefore consider the
registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time of national emergency. Any other approach would not be testing
the Act in light of the purposes Congress sought to achieve.
Congress determined that any future draft, which would
be facilitated by the registration scheme, would be charactedzed by a need for combat troo.J]s. The Senate Report
explained, in a specificflndillg later adopted by both Houses,
that "if mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario, the primary manpower need would be for combat re0; see 2d., at
placements." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, a
158. This conclusion echoed one made a year before by the
same Senate Committee, see S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at
2-3, 6. As Senator Jepsen put it, "The shortage would be in
the combat arms. · That is why you have drafts." Hearings
on S. 2294, supra, at 1688. See also id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen); 126 Cong. Rec. H2750 (Rep. Nelson) (April 22, 1980).
Congress' determination that the need would be for combat
troops if a draft took place was sufficiently supported by testimony adduced at the hearings so that the courts are not free-
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to make their own judgment on the question. See Hearings
on S. 2294, supra, at 1528-1529 (Marine Corps Lt. Gen.
Bronars) ; 1395 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Army Clark); 1391 (Gen. Yerks); 748 (Gen. Meyer); House
Hearings, supra, J. A., at 224 (Assistant Secreta.ry of Defense
for Manpower Pirie). See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226,
S'Upra, at 24, 54 (Gen. Rogers). The }?Urp<?_se of reg~ration,
therefore, was to prepare for a draft o combat troops.
Women as a group, however, un ike men as a group, are
not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation
of womenin~ in the Navy and Air Force are statutory. Under 10 U. S. C. § 6015 "women may not be as~
signed to duty on vessels Qr in aircraft that are engaged in
combat missions," and under 10 U. S. C. § 8549 female members of the Air Force "may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." The Army and Marine
Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of
established policy. See J. A. 86, 34, 58. Congress specifically recognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from
combat in exempting women from registration. In the
words of the Senate Report:
wrhe prin~ women should not intentionally and
routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys
wide support among our people. It is universa.lly supported by military leaders who have testified before the
Committee. . . . Current law and policy exclude women
from being assigned to combat in our military forces,
and the Committee reaffirms this policy." S. Rep. No.
96-826, supra, at 157.
The Senate Report specifically found that "Women should
not be intentionalJy or routinely placed in combat positions
in our military services." Id., at 160. See S. Rep. No. 96226, supra, at 9. 12 The President expressed his intent to

-

n No major rountry has women in combat jobs in their standing army.

Sec J. A. 143.

I·

~
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continue the current military policy precluding women from
. combat, see Presidential Recommendations for Selective
Service Reform, supra, J. A. 34, and appellees present their
argument concerning registration against the background of
such restrictions on the use of women in combat. 13 Consistent with the approach of this Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard,
supra, we must examine appellees' constitutional claim concerning registration with these combat restrictions firmly in
mind.
The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates
the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a
draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from
combat, they would not be neededrn tfle event of ;-draft,
aii'atnerefore there was no reason to register them. Again
turning to the Senate Report:
"In the Committee's view, the starting point for any
discussion of the appropriateness of registering women
for the draft is the question of the proper role of women
in combat. . . . The policy precluding the use of women
in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most important reason for not including women in a registration
system." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 157.
The District Court stressed that the milita.r y need for
women was irrelevant to the issue of their registration. As
that court put it: "Congress could not constitutionally require registration under MSSA of only black citizens or only
white citizens, or single out any political or religious group
~imply because those groups contained sufficient persons to
fill the needs of the selective service system."· App. to Juris.
Statement 2la. This reasoning is beside the point. Women
18 See Appellees' Brief, at 1-2, n. 2 (denying ar1y concession of the
validity of combat restrictions, but submitting restrictions are frrelevan't
to the present case). See also J:. A: 256,
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ttre not exempt from registration because military needs can
be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situated
groups, such as would be the case with an all-black or allwhite, or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Republican or all-Democratic registration. Men and women, because of the combat re t ictions on women, are simply -;;t
similarly Situate for pur oses of a ra t or registration fop
a draft.
CongTess' decision to authorize the registration of only
men, therefore, is not violative of the Due Process Clause.
The exemption of women from registration is not only sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration. See Michael M., supra, at - ; Craig v.
Boren, supra; Reed v. Reed, supra. The fact that Con!5ress
and the Executive have decided that women shouia not serve
in com a u
'ustifies Congress in not authorizmg their
registration, since t e purpose of registration is to develop
a pool of potential combat troops. As was the case in Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, "the gender classification is not in-:
vidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are
not similarlv
situated"
in this case. Michael M., supra,
""............._, b&W..
-at - . In light of combat restrictions and Congress' deci-:
sion that the need in the event of a draft would be for
combat troops, re istration of women for a draft would be
an empty and seless esture.
e onstitution requires
that Congress treat similarly situated persons in an equal
manner, not that it engage such empty gestures of superficial
equality.
In striking down the MSSA the District Court relied
heavily on the President's decision to seek authority to register women and the testimony of members of the Executive
Branch and the military in support of that decision. See,
e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 37a, 39a, and n. 30. As stated
the Administration's witnesses before Congress, howe·ve~,
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tho PresiJent's "dec' 'on t
women is based ~:---.......--r~""'-_......,...,.__-:--_....._,._
(sta emen
ss1 ant ec ary of Defense Pirie and Director of Selective Se ·ce System Rostker) ; see also Presitlential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform,
supra, J. A. 35, 59, 60; Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1657
(statement of Executive Associate Director of Office of Management and Budget Wellford, Director of Selective Service
System Rostker, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defe11se Danzig). This was also the basis for the testimony
by military officials.
earings on . 2294, at 710 (Gen.
M~. Allen). The Senate Report, evaluating
the testimony before the Committee, recognized that "the
argument for registration and induction of women ... is not
based on military necessity, but on considerations of equity."
S. Rep. No. 96- 826, supra, at 158. Congress was C'Mtainly
entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers to raise
anti regulate armies and navies. to focus on the question of
m'litar need rather than "equity." 14 As Be1lat0r "'Nunn of
the Senate Armed erviCes ommittee put it:
"Our Committee went into very great detail. We
found that there was no military necessity cited by any
witnesses for the registration of females.
"The main point that those who favored the registratration of females made was that they were in favor of
this because of the equality issue which is, of course, a
legitimate view. But as far as military necessity, and
that is what we are primarily, I hope, considering in the
overall registration bill, there is no military necessity
for this." 126 Cong. Rec. S6544.
See also House Hearings, supra, J. A. 230 (Rep. Holt) ("You
are talki11g about equity. I am talking about military." ). 15
14 The grant of conslitutiOiwl authority is, after all, to C011gress ~mel
not to the Executive or military officials.
10 The Di~;trict Comt al::~o foclli>ed on what it tem1ed Congre::;:;•
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Although the military experts who testified in favor of
registering women uniformly opposed the actual draftin of
women. see, e. (!., Hearing on . 1 and
6, supra, at 11
(Geii: Rogers) , there was testimony that in the event of a
draft of 650,000 the military could absorb some 80,000 female
inductees. Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1661, 1828. The
80,000 would be used to fill noncombat positions, freeing men
to go to the front. In relying on this testimony in striking
down the MSSA, the District Court palpably exceeded its
authority when it ignored Congress' considered response to
this line of reasoning.
In the first place, assuming that a small uumber of women
could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress simply did
not consider it worth the added burdens of including women
in draft and registration plans. "It has been suggested that
all women be registered, but only a handful actually be inducted in an emergency. The Comimttee finds this a confused and ultimately unsatisfactory solution." S. Rep. No.
96-826, supra, at 158. As the Senate Committee recognized
2. year before, "training would be needlessly burdened by
wo en recruits who cou
m combat.
. Rep.
N o. 96- ·, sup a, a. 9.
ee also
ep. o. 96- 826, supra,
at 159 ("Other administrative problems such as housing and
different treatment with regard to dcnrndenf1· h'n~~h\p 4J}d

A
SIH
1lH W HI h a)(,
1 1_ '- 1 l!'l 1 "(l!llii11Str•l1"\\ ( pro!J1f"lt
1
"'.
.
.
t
.
' l tll.'l.!l •'
lth l_pH'Ill(l I • 1 1(''·'
1
'
h f'l.
I
1lr<.'!ilt8l~oit nt jJCJlll on::;
Jl1 !'l1courngmg won:lcb fo vo nnterr
01 1·111'
m J!Hry
servict~ ttll(l expanding their opportunities in the <;crvicc, on tlw om hail(!,
and exempting them from registration and the draft o~'l lhi:! other. Ap'[:\.
to J urit>. Statement 37a-41a. This reasoning fui1s to 'ltp~~eciate the
different purpo::;es Herved by encouraging women volunteers and registration for the draft Women volunteerl:l do not occupy combat positions,
so encouraging women to volunteer is not related to concerns about the
a>ailability of combat troops. In the event of a draft, however, the need
would be for eornbat troop~:> or troops which could be rotated into combat.
See 15- 16, sup1·a. Congress' positions are clearl) not inconsistPrlt and in
t.l'eating them a~ such the Di<ltrict Court failed to understand Congress'
purpose behind regi~tration as dit>tinguished from its purpose in encouring wot:r~en volunteer.,,
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physical standards would also exist."). It is not for this
Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future
mobilization.
Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women
for noncombat roles during mobilization, wi;th~r 80,000 or
less, it CQJ!ld be ~y vol ur.:..te..ers. SeeS. Rep. No. 96-826,
supra, at 160; id., at 158 ("Because of the combat restrictions, the need would be primarily for men, and women
volunteers would fill the requirements for women."); House
Hearings, supra, J. A. 227-228 (Rep. Holt). See also Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1195 (Gen. Rogers).
Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing noncombat positions with JWom~n duMng a mobilization would
be positively detrimental to the important goal of mititii'ry
flexibility.
"There are other military reasons that preclude very
large numbers of women from serving. Military flexibility requires that a commander be able to move units
or ships quickly. Units or ships not located at the front
or not previously scheduled for the front nevertheless
must be able to move into action if necessary. In peace
and war, significant rotation of personnel is necessary.
e s ould not IVIde t military into two groups-one
in permanent comb and one in permanent support.
Large numbers of non-combat positions must be available to which combat troops can return for duty before
being redeployed." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158.
The point was repea.ted in specific findings, id., at 160; see
also S. Rep. No. 96- 226, supra, at 9. In sum, Congress
carefully evaluated the testimony that 80,000 women conscripts could be usefully employed in the event of a draft and
rejected it in the permissible exercise of its constitutional responsibility. See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra,
at 16 (Gen. Rogers); Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1682.
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'The District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of that evidence.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Congress acted
well within its constitutional authority when it authorized
the registration of men, and not women, under the Military
Selective Service Act. The decision of the District Court
hoiding otherwise is accordingly
ReVe'T'sed.
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UNITED STATE!
No. 80-251

On Appeal from the United /
~
States District Court for _L...,
the Eastern District of [17~ ~
Pennsy1vania.

v.
Robert L. Goldberg et al.
[May

~~

-~

1981]

delivered the opinion of the Colj!£;~ ~ ~The question presented is whether the Military Selective
Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq., violates the UJ'7::;W~a~'A-L~
JI~.L4~'"""'fllltendment to the United States Constitution in authori · 1g
he President to require the registration of males and ~- _ ~
"' _ .
JusTICE REHNQUIST

fum~~

~~
J[

J

Congress is given the power under the Constitution "To ~
raise and support Armies," "To provide and maintain a
•
Navy," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regu~
lation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I, § 8, cis. 12-14.
Pursuant to this grant of authority Congress has enacted th
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq.
("the MSSA " or "the Act" ). Section 3 of the Act, 50 U.S. C.
App. § 453, empowers the President, by proclamation, to require the registration of "every male citizen" and male resident aliens between the ages of 18 and 26. The purpose of
this registration is to facilitate any eventual conscription :
pursuant to § 4 (a) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a) ,
those persons required to register under § 3 are liable for
training and service in the Armed Forces. The MSSA registration provision serves no other purpose beyond providing
a pool for subsequent induction.
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Registration for the draft under § 3 was discontinued in
1975. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 11 Weekly Comp.
of Pres. Doc. 318 (April 1, 1975). In early 1980, President
Carter determined that it was necessary to reactivate the
draft registration process. 1 The immediate impetus for this
decision was the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan. 16
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980) (State
of the Union Address). According to the Administration's
witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the
resulting crisis in Southwestern Asia convinced the President
that the "time has come" "to use his present authority to
require registration . , . as a necessary step to preserving or
enhancing our national security interests." Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1981: Hearings on S. 2294 before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1805 (1980) (hereafter
Hearings on S. 2294) (joint statement of Dr. John P. White,
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Dr.
BPrnard Rostker, Director, Selective Service System, and
Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense) . The Selective Service System had been inactive,
however, and funds were needed prior to reactivating registration. The President therefore recommended that funds
be transferred from the Department of Defense to the separate Selective Service System. H. R. Doc. No. 96-267, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1980). He also recommended that Congress take action to amend the MSSA to permit the registration and conscription of women as well as men. See Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform-A
Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to Pub. L, 96-107
(:Feb. 11, 1980), J. A. 57-61.
1 The President did not seek conscription. Since the Act was amended
in 1973 to preclude conscription, Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U. S. C.
App. § 467 (c) , any actual conscription would require further COJlgressional action. SeeS. Rep. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., ' l55 (1980).
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Congress agreed that it was necessary to reactivate the
registration process, and allocated funds for that purpose in
a joint resolution which passed the House on April 22 and
the Senate on June 12. H. R. J . Res. 521, Pub. L. 96-282,
94 Stat. 552. The resolution did not allocate all the funds
originally requested by the President, but only those necessary to register males. See S. Rep. No. 96-789, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1, n. 1; 2 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen.
Nunn) (June 10, 1980) . Although Congress considered the
question at great length, see infra, at 13-16, it declined to
amend the MSSA to permit the registration of women.
On July 2, 1980, the President, by proclamation, ordered
the registration of specified groups of young men pursuant
to the authority conferred by § 3 of the Act. Registration
was to commence on July 21, 1980. Proclamation No. 4771 ~
45 Fed. Reg. 45247.
These events of last year breathed new life into a lawsuit
which had been essentially dormant in the lower courts for
nearly a decade. It began in 1971 when several men subject
to registration for the draft and subsequent induction into
the ·Armed Services filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the MSSA on several grounds. 2 A three-judge dis! Plaintiffs contended tlmt the Act amounted to a taking of property
without due proces~, impo~>ed involuntary :,;crvitude, violated rights of
free expression and assembly, was unlawfully implemented to advance an
unconstitutional war, and impermbsibly discriminated between males and
females . The Dii:>triet. Comt. denied plaintiffs' application to convene a
three-judge district court and dismissed the suit, Rowland v. Tarr, 341
Supp. 339 (ED Pa. 1972) . On appeal, the Court. of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except the discrimination
claim, and remanded the case to the District, Court to determine if this
claim was substantial enough to warrant the convening of a. three-judge
court under then-applicable 28 U . S. C. § 2282 ( 1970 ed .) and whether
plaintiffs had standing to assert that claim. 480 F . 2d 545 (1973) . On
remand, the District Courl answered both questions in the affirmative,
resulting in the convening of the three-judge court which decided thtl

:r.
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trict court was convened in 1974 to consider the claim of
unlawful gender-based di5crimination which is now before
us.3 On July l , 1974, the comt declined to dismiss the case
as moot, reasoning that although authority to induct registrants had lapsed, see n. 1, S'Upra, plaintiffs were still under:
certain affirmative obligations in connection with registration. 378 F. Supp. 766. Nothing more happened in the case
for five years. Then, on June 6, 1979, the court clerk, acting
pursuant to a local rule governing inactive cases, proposed
that the case be dismissed. Additional discovery thereupon
ensued, and defendants moved to dismiss on various justiciability grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss,
ruling that it did not have before it an adequate record on
the operation of the Selective Service System and what action would be necessary to reactivate it. Civ. Action No.
71- 1480 (Feb. 19, 1980) . On July 1, 1980, the court certified
a. plaintiff class of "all male persons who are registered or
subject to registration under 50 U. S. C. App. § 453 or are
liable for training and service in the armed forces of the
United States under 50 U. S. C. App. § 454, 456 (h) and 467
(c)." App. to Juris. Statement 2a-4a.4
case below. The Act authorizing three-judge courts to hear rlairns >'ncb

11s this was repealed in 1975, Pub. L. 94- 381, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119
(Aug. 12, 1976), but

remain~:!

applicable to suits filed before repeal, id.,

§ 7, 90 Stat. 1119.
As the Court stated in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 500, n . 3
{1975), "Although it contains no Equal Protection Clause as does the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment 's Due Process Clause
prohibits the federal government. from engaging in discrimination that is
'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U. S. 497, 499 . "
"'When entering its judgment on July 18, the District Court redefined
the class to include "All male persons who are registered under 50 U. S. C,
App . § 453 or are liable for training and service in the armed forces of
the United States under 50 U S. C. App. §§ 454, 456 (h) and 467 (c) ;
»nd who are abo either subject to registration under Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 (July 2, 1980) or are presently registered with the•Selective Service System." App. to Juris. Statement 44a.
8
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On Friday, July 18, 1980, three days before registration
was to commence, the District Court issued an opinion find·
ing that the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from
requiring registration under the Act. The court initially determiued that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case
was ripe, determinations which are not challenged here by
the Government. Turning to the merits, the court rejected
plaintiffs' suggestions that the equal protection claim should
be tested under "strict scrutiny," and also rejected defendants' argument that the deference due Congress in the area
of military affairs required application of the traditional
&'minimum scrutiny" test. Applying the "important government interest" test articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S.
190 (1976), the court struck down the MSSA. The court
stressed that it was not deciding whether or to what extent
women should serve in combat, but only the issue of registration, and felt that this "should dispel any concern that we
are injecting ourselves in an inappropriate manner in milita.r y affairs." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. See also id., at
27a, n. 17; 28a, n. 18. The court then proceeded to examine
the testimony and hearing evidence presented to Congress
by representatives of the military and the Executive Branch,
and concluded on the basis of this testimony that "military
opinion, backed by extensive study, is that the availability
of women registrants would materia1ly increase flexibility,
not hamper it." ld., at 37a. It rejected Congress' contrary
determination in part because of what it viewed as Congress9
Hinconsistent positions" in declining to register women yet
spending funds to recruit them and expand their opportuni~
ties in the military. ld., at 37a-39a.
The United States immediately filed a notice of appeal and
the next day, Saturday, July 19, 1980, JusTICE BRENNAN,
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit,
stayed the District Court's order enjoining commencement
of registration, U, S, - , Registration began the next

0
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Monday. On December 1, 1980, we noted probable juriedic·
·
tion. U. S. - .

II
Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of al)
Act of Congress-"the gravest and most delicate duty that
this Court is called upon to perform," Blodgett v. Holden,
275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)-the Court accord~
."great weight to the decisions of Congress." CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic National Cornrnittee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973) .
!The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose mem~
bers take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution
pf the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Joint
Ant·i-Fasc·ist Refugee Cornrnittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123,
164 (1951) (concurring opinion) , we must have "due regard
to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also have
taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the
responsibility for carrying on government." The customary
deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly
Rppropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered
the question of the Act's constitutionality. See, e. g., S. R~p .
No. 96- 826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 159- 161 (1980); 126 Cong.
Rec. S6531-S6533 (Sen. Warner) (June 10, 1980) , S6547
(Sen. Hatfield) (June 10, 1980).
This is not, however , merely a case involving the customary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case
arises in the context of Congress' authority over military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded
Congress greater deference. In rejecting the registration of
women, Congress explicitly relied upon its constitutional
powers under Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14. The "specific findings"
section of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, later adopted by both Houses of Congress, began by
stating :
"Article I , section 8 of the Constitution commits ex-

••. ·t
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elusively to the Congress the powers to raise and supporb
armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules
for Government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies within the
discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions for
expansion of our Armed Forces, and the means best
suited to such expansion should it prove necessary." S.
Rep. No. 96- 826, supra, at 160.
See also S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979).
This Court has consistently recognized Congress' "broad constitutional power" to raise and regulate armies and navies,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 510 (1975). As the
·,Court noted in considering a challenge to the selective service laws, "The constitutional power of Congress to raise arid
support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to
that end is broad and sweeping." Un-ited States v. O'Br-ien,
391 U. S. 367. 377 (1968). See Lichter v. United States, 3:34
U. S. 742, 755 ( 1948).
Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in
this area broad, but the lark of competence on the part of
tl1e courts is marked. In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10
(1973), the Court noted:
ui t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence. The
complex, subtle. and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, aml control of a military
force are essentially professional milita.ry .iudgmen ts,
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and
Executive branches.' 1
See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 (1953). 5
See also SimmuniJ v. United States, 406 F . 2d 456, 459 (CA5 1969)
("That the court is not competent or empowered to sit as a superexecutive authority to review the decisions of the Executive and Legislative
branches of govemment in regard to the necessity, method of selection,.
5

)
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The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident
in several recent decisions of this Court. In Parker v. Levy!
4:17 U. S. 733, 756 (1974), the Court rejected both vagueness
and overbreadth challenges to army regulations, noting that
f'Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth
and with greater flexibility" when the statute governs military society, and that "[w]hile the members of the military
are not excluded from the protection granted by the First
Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections." In Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U. S. 25 (1976), the Court noted that in considering due
process claims in the context of summary court martial it
"must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its military authority to regulate the land
and naval forces. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8," concerning what
rights were available. ld., at 43. See also id., at 49-50
(PowELL, J., concurring) . Deference to the judgment of
other branches in the area of military affairs also played a
major role in Greer v. Spack, 424 U. S. 828, 837-838 (1976),
where the Court upheld a ban on political speeches by civilians on a military base, and Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348
(1980), where the Court upheld regulations imposing a prior
rE>st.raint on the right to petition of military personnel. See
also Burns v. Wifson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) .
In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975), the Court
considered a due process challenge, brought by males, to
the navy policy of according females a longer period than
males in which to attain promotions necessary to continued
service. The Court distinguished previous gender-based disnud composition of our defense forces is obvious and needs no further·
discussion").

ROSTKER

v. GOLDBERG

.S,

pdminations held unlawful in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71
(1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) .
In those cases, the classifications were based on "overbroad:
generalizations." See 419 U. S., at 506-507, ln the c~e be~
fore it, however, the Court nored:
"the different treatment of men and women naval offi~
cers . . . reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated·
with respect to opportunities for professional service.
Appellee has not challenged the current restrictions on
women officers' participation in combat and in most sea
duty." /d., at 508.
In light of the combat restrictions women did not have the
same opportunities for promotion as men, and therefore it J
was not unconstitutional for Congress to distinguish between
them.
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard'
the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs.
In that area as any other Congress remains subject to the
limitations of the Due Process Clause, see Ex parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 2 (1866 ) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919), but the tests and limitations to be applied may d1ffer because of the military·
context. We of course do not abdicate our ultima'!:€ responsibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to
Congressional choice. See CBS, inc. v. Democratic National'
Committee, 412 U. S., at 103. In decidiug the question before
us we must Le particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the ·
Legislative Branch.
The District Court purported to recognize the appropriat€Iress of deference to Congress when that body was exercising-
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iLl:> constitutionally delegated authority over military affairs,
A.pp. to Juris. Statement 28a, but it stressed that "we are not
here concerned with military operations or day-to-day conduct of the military into which we have no desire to intrude."
Ibid. Appellees also stress that this case involves civilians,
not the military, and that "the impact of registration on the
military is only indirect and attenuated." Appe1lees Brief,
at 19. We find these efforts to divorce registration from the
military and national defense context, with all the deference
called for in that context, singularly unpersuasive. United
States v. O'Brien, supra, recognized the broad deference due
Congress in the selective service area before us in this case.
Registration is not an end in itself in the civilian world but
rather the first step in the induction process into the military
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of reg~
istration to induction, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra,
at 156, 160. CongressiOnal judgments concerning registration and the draft are based on j ud~rnen ts concerning military operations and needs, see. e. g., id .. at 157 ("the starting
point for any discussion of the appropriateness of registering
women for the draft is the question of the proper role of
women in combat"), and the deference unquestionably due
the latter judgments is necessarily reqnired in assessing the
former as well. Although the District Court stressed that it
was not intruding on military questions, its opinion was based
on assessments of military need and flexibility in a time of
mobilization. See, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 3la-43a.
It would be bliuking reality to say that our precedents requiring deference to Congress iu military affairs are not
implicated by the present case.6
6
Congress recognized that its decision on registration involved judgments on military needs and operation::., and that its decisions were
entitled to particular deference : "The Supreme Court's most recent teachings in the field of equal protection cannot be read in isolation from it:>
opinions gh·ing great deferenct to the judgment of Congress and military
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The Solicitor General argues, largely on the basis of the
foregoing cases emphasizing the deference due Congress in
the area of military affairs and national security, that this
Court should scrutinize the MSSA only to determine if the
distinction drawn between men and women bears a rational
relation to some legitimate government purpose, see United
U. S. States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, (1980), and should not examine the Act under the heightened
scrutiny with which we have approached gender-based discrimination, see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
U. S. (1981); Craig v. Boren, supra,· Reed
County, v. Reed, supra. 7 We do not think that the substantive guarantee of due process or certainty in the law will be advanced
by any further "refinement" in the applicable tests as suggested by the GovernmPnt. Auuouncec.l degrees of "deference" to legislative judgmPuts, .iust as levels of "scrutiuy!)
which this Court announces that it applies to particular classifications made by a legislative body, may all too readily
become facile abstractions usec.l to justify a result. In thi
case the courts are called upon to decide whether Cougress,
acting under an explicit constitutional grant of authority,
has by that action transcended an explicit guarantee of inc.licommanders in dealing with the management of military forces and the
requirements of military discipline. The Court has made it unmista.k ably
clear that even our most fundamental constitutional rights must in some
circumstances be modified in the light of military need~:>, and that Congress' judgment as to what is necessary to preserve our national security
is entitled to great deference." S. Rep. No. 9(}-826, supra, at 159-160.
Deference to Congress' judgment was a consistent and dominant theme
in lower court decisions assessing the pre::;ent claim . See, e. g., United
States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333, 335 (ED La. 1970); United States v.
Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (ED W1s. 1974) .
7 It is clear that 'Tg] ender has never been rejected as an impermissible
classification in all in:stances" Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 356, n . 1(}
(1974) . In making thi;, ob~ervntion th£' Court uoted that ''Congre~s \
has not so far drafted women into the Armed Service:;, 50 U. S. (\
-i\pp. § 454." Ibid.

86-251-0PINION
ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

vidual rights which limits the authority so conferred. Simply
labelling the legislative decisioll umilitary" on the oue hand
or "gender-based" on the other does not automatically guide
a court to the correct constitutional result.
No one could deny that under the test of Craig v. Boren,
supra, the Government's interest in raising and supporting
armies is an "important governmental interest." Congress
and its committees carefully considered and debated two alternative means of furthering that iuterest: the first was to
register only males for potential conscription, and the other
was to register both sexes. Cougress chose the former alternative. When that decision is challenged 011 equal protection
grounds, the question a court must decide is not which altet·native it would have chosen, had it been the primary decisionmaker, but whether that chosen by Congress denies equal
protection of the laws.
Nor can it be denied that the imposing number of cases
from this Court previously cited suggest that judicial deference .to such congressional exercise of authority is at its
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged. As previously noted,
ante, at 9, deference does uot mean abdication. The reconciliation between the deference due Congress and our own
constitutional responsibility is perhaps best instanced in
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. R.. at 510, where we stated:
"This Court has recognized that 'it is the primary
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to
fight wars should the occasion arise.' U. S. ex rel. Toth
v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 17. See also Orloff v. Willouqhbu. 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). The responsibility
for determiuiug how best our Armed Forces shall attend
to that business rests with Congress, see U. S. Const..'
Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14, and with the President. See U. S.
Canst..,. Art. Il, § 2, cl. 1. 'We cannot say that, in ex-

80-251- 0PINION

ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

ermsmg Us broad constitutional power hel'e, C011gres~

has violated the Due Process CltHll;le of the Fifth
Amendment."
Or, as put a generation ago in a case not involving any claim
of gender-based discrimination:
" [JJ udges are not given the task of running the Army.
The responsibility for setting up channels through
which ... grievances can be considered and fairly settled
rests upon the Congress and upo11 the President of the
United States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to inter. fere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters." Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U. S., at 93-94.
I

Schlesinger v. Ballard did not purport to apply a different
equal protection test because of the military context, but did
stress the deference due congressional choices among alternatives in exercising the congressional authority to raise and
support armies and make rules for their governance. In
light of the floor debate and the report of the Senate Armed
Services Committee hereinafter discussed, it is apparent that
Congress was fully aware not merely of the many facts and
figures presented to it by witnesses who testified before its
committees, but of the current thinking as to the place of
women in the Armed Services. In such a case, we cannot
ignore Co11gress' broad authority conferred by the Constitution to raise and support armies when we are urged to declare
unconstitutional its studied choice of one alternative in preference to another for furthering that goal.

III
This case is quite different from several gender-based discrimination cases which have previously come before the ·
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Court, Appellees' assertions notwithstanding, this rather
clearly is not a case in which Congress acted "unthinkingly''
or "reflexively and not for any considered reason" in drawing
e. distinction based on gender. Appellees' Brief, at 35. The
question of registering women for the draft not only received
considerable national attention and was the subject of wideranging public debate, but also was extensively considered
by Congress in hearings, floor debate, and in committee.
Hearings held by both Houses of Congress in response to the
President's request for authorization to register women adduced extensive testimony and evidence concerning the issue.
See Hearings on S. 2294; Hearings on National Service Legislation before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of
the House Committee on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d
Se!"s. (1980) (hereafter House Hearings). These hearings
built on other hearings held the previous year addressed to
the same question .8
The House declined to provide for the registration of
women when it passed the Joint Resolution allocating funds
for the Selective Service System. See 126 Cong. Rec. H272SH2729. H2747 (April 22, 1980) . When the Senate considered the Joint Resolution, it defeated, after extensive debate,
an amendment which in effect would have authorized the
registration of women . 126 C'ong. Rec. S6527-S6549 (June
10, 1980) .9 As noted earlier, Congress in H. R. J. Res. 521
only authorized funds sufficient to cover the registration of
males. The Report of the Senate Committee on AppropriaSee Reinst itution of Procedures for Registration Under the Military
Selective Service Act: Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226 before the Subrommittee on Manpower & Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 96th Cong., 1st Se:::s. (1979) . Seven months before the President's
call for the registration of women, the Senate Armed Services Committee
rejrcted the idea, seeS. Rep. No. 9o-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1979).
9 The amendment provided that no funds "shall be made available for
implementing a system of registration which does not include women."
126 Cong. Rec. S6527.
8
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tions on H R. J . Res. 521 noted that the amount authorized
was below the President's request "due to the Committee's
decision not to provide $8,500,000 to register women," and
that "The amount recommended by the Committee would allow for registration of young men only." S. Rep. No. 96~
789, S'Upra , at 21; see 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. Nunn)
(June 10, 1980).
While proposals to register women were being rejected in
the course of transferring funds to register males, committees
in boLh Houses which had conducted hearings on the issue
were also rejecting the registration of women. The House
Subcolllmittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed
Services Committee tabled a bill which would have amended
the MSSA to authorize registration of women, H. R. 6569, ou
March 6. 1980. Legislative Calendar, House Committee on
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 54 (Sept. 30, 1980).
The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected a proposal
to register women, S. 2440, as it had one year before. see S.
Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 8- 9, and adopted specific findings
supporting its action. See S. Rep. No. 96- 826, supra. at
156-161. These findings were stressed in debate in the Senate on Joint Resolution 521, see 126 Cong. Rec. S6544-S6545
(Sen. Nunn) (June 10, 1980); S6531-S6532 (Sen. Warner)
(June 10, 1980). They were later specifically endorsed by
House and Senate conferees considering the Fiscal Year 1981
Defense Authorization Bill. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 96- 895,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1980). 10 Later both Houses
adopted the findings by passing the Report. 126 Cong. Rec.
H7800, S11646 (Aug. 26, 1980). The Senate Report. therefore , is considerably more significant than a typical report
10 The findings were before the conferees because the Senate Armect
Services Committee had added a provision to the 1981 Defense Authorizat ion Bill authorizing the transfer of funds to register young men as !l:
stop-gap measure should Joint Resolution 521 fail. See S. Rep . No.
f)(}-895, supra, a t 100,
·
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of a single House, and its findings are in effect findings of the
en tire Congress.
'
The foregoing clearly establishes that the decision to ex~
empt women from registration was not the "accidental by~
product of a traditional way of thinking about women.'~
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,320 (1977) (quoting Cali~
fano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 233 (1977) (STEVENS, J.,
eoncurring) ). In Michael M., supra, at-, n. 6, we rejected
& similar argument because of action by the California Legis~
lature considering and rejecting proposals to make a statut~
~hallenged on discrimination grounds gender~neutral. ThE'l
eause for rejecting the argument is considerably stronger here.
Whatever one's views on the merits, it is clear that Congress!
decision to exempt women from registration was not reflexive, or simply the incidental baggage of out-moded views.
The issue was considered at great length, and Congress
clearly expressed its purpose and intent. Contrast Califano
v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 87 (1979) ("The gender qualification ... escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and flooP
debate"). 11
For the same reasons we reject appellees' argument that we
must consider the constitutionality of the MSSA solely on
the basis of the views expressed by Congress in 1948, when
the MSSA was first enacted in its modern form. Contrary
to the suggestions of appellees and various amici, reliance on
the legislative history of Joint Resolution 521 and the activity of the various committees of the 96th Congress considering the registration of women does not violate sound
principles that appropriations legislation should not be con11 Nor can we agreP with the characterization of the MSSA in the
Brief for Amicus Curiae National Organization of Women as a law which
"coerce[s] or preclude[s] women as a class from performing tasks or jobs
of which they are capable," or the suggestion that this case involves "[t]he
exclusion of women from the military." !d., at 19-20. Nothing in theMSSA restricts in any way the opportunitie:; for womeu to volunteer for
military service.
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tsidered as modifying substantive legislation. Congress did
not change the MSSA in 1980, but it did thoroughly recon~
sider the question of exempting women from its provisions,
and its basis for doing so. The 1980 legislative history is,
thPrefore, highly relevant in assessing the constitutional validity of the exemption.
The MSSA established a plan for maintaining "adequate
armed strength ... to ensure the security of [the] nation."
50 U . S. C. App. § 451 (b). Registration is the first step
"in a united and continuous process designed to raise an
army speedily and efficiently," Falbo v. United States, 320
U. S 549, 553 (1944), see United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S.
1, 9 (1953), and Congress provided for the reactivation of
registration in order to "provide the means for the early
delivery of inductees in an emergency." S. Rep. No. 96-826,
supra, at 156. Although the three-:judge District Court often
tried to sever its consideration of registration from the particulars of induction, see, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 42a43a, Congress rather clearly linked the need for renewed registration with its views on the character of a subsequent draft.
The Senate Report specifically found that "An ability to
mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation of our national security. A functioning registration system is a vital
part of any mobilization plan." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at
160. As Senator Warner put it, "I equate registration with
the draft." Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1197. See also
id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen), 1671 (Sen . Exon). Such an approach is certainly logical, since under the MSSA induction
is interlocked with registration: only those registered may be
drafted, and registration serves no purpose beyond providing
a pool for the draft. Any assessment of the congressional
purpose and its chosen means must therefore consider the
registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time of national emergency. Any other approach would not be testing
the Act in light of the purposes Congress sought to achie\-I!"J.
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Congress determined that any future draft, which woul(l
be facilitated by the registration scheme, would be characterized by a need for combat troops. The Senate Report
explained, in a specific finding later adopted by both Houses,
that "if mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario, the primary manpower need would be for combat replacements." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160; see id., at
158. This conclusion echoed one made a year before by the
Bame Senate Committee, see S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at
2- 3, 6. As Senator Jepsen put it, "The shortage would be in
the combat arms. That is why you have drafts." Hearings
on S. 2294, supra, at 1688. See also id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen); 126 Cong. Rec. H2750 (Rep. Nelson) (April 22, 1980).
Congress' determination that the need would be for combat
troops if a draft took place was sufficiently supported by testimony adduced at the hearings so that the courts are not free
to make their own judgment on the question. See Hearings
on S. 2294, supra, at 1528- 1529 (Marine Corps Lt. Gen.
Bronars) ; 1395 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Army Clark); 1391 (Gen. Yerks); 748 (Gen. Meyer); House
Hearings, supra, J. A., at 224 (Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Manpower Pirie) . See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226,
3Upra, at 24, 54 (Gen. Rogers). The purpose of registration,
therefore, was to prepare for a draft of combat troops.
Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group, are
not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation
of women fn" comb"atln the Navy and Air Force are statutory. Under 10 U. S. C. § 6015 "women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in
combat missions," and under 10 U. S. C. § 8549 female members of the Air Force "may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." The Army and Marine
Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of
established policy. See J. A. 86, 34, 58. Congress specifi-
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,cally recognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from
combat in exempting women from registration. In the
:words of the Senate Report:
"The principle that women should not intentionally and
routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys
wide support among our people. It is universally supported by military leaders who have testified before the
Committee. . . . Current law and policy exclude women
from being assigned to combat in our military forces,
and the Committee reaffirms this policy." S. Rep. No.
96-826, supra, at 157.
The Senate Report specifically found that "Women should
not be intentionally or routinely placed in combat positions
in our military services." !d., at 160. See S. Rep. No. 96226, supra, at 9. 12 The President expressed his intent to
continue the current military policy ptecluding women from
combat, see Presidential Recommendations for Selective
Service Reform, supra, J. A. 34, and appellees present their
argument concerning registration against the background of
such restrictions on the use of women in combat. 18 Consistent with the approach of this Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard,
~"'.J-pra, we must examine appellees' constitutional claim concerning registration with these combat restrictions firmly in
mind.
The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates
the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a
draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from
combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed
12

No major rountry has women in rombat jobs in their standing army.
See .T. A. 143.
18 See Appellees' BriPf, at 1-2, n. 2 (denying any concession of the
validity of combat restrictions, but submitting restrictions are irrelev~Jnt
~o the present case). See also J. A. 256.
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in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register.
them. Again turning to the Senate Report i
" In the Committee's view, the starting point for any
discussion of the appropriateness of registering women
for the draft is the question of the proper role of women
in combat. . . . The policy precluding the use of women
in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most impor..
tant reason for not including women in a registration
system." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 157.
The District Court stressed that the military need for
women was irrelevant to the issue of their registration . As
that court put it: "Congress could not constitutionally require registration under MSSA of only black citizens or only
white citizens, or single out any political or religious group
simply because those groups contained sufficient persons to
fill the needs of the selective service system." App. to Juris.
Statement 21a. This reasoning is beside the point. Women
are not exempt from registration because military needs can
be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situated
groups, such as would be the case with an all-black or allwhite, or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Republican or all-Democratic registration. Men and women, be- )
cause of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not
similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for
a draft.
CongTess' decision to authorize the registration of only
inen , therefore, is not violative of the Due Process Clause.
The exemption of women from registration is not only sufficiently but closely related to Con11;ress' purpose in authorizing reg;stration . See Michael M ., swnra, at - ; Craig v.
Boren, suvra,· Reed v. Reed, suvra. The fact that Congress
and the Executive have decided that women should not serve
in combat fully justifies Congress in not authorizing their
registration, since the purpose of registration is to develop·
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It pool of potential combat troops.

As was the case in Schles..
inger v. Ballard, supra, "the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are not similarly situated" in this case. Michael M., supra,
at - . The Constitution requires that Congress treat simi- /
larly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures
of superficial equality.
In holding the MSSA constitutinally invalid the District
Court relied heavily on the Presideut's decision to seek authority to register women and the testimony of members of
the Executive Branch and the military iu support of that decision . See, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 37a, 39a, and n.
30. As stated by the Administration's witnesses before Congress, however, the President's "decision to ask for authority
to register women ~q_uity. " House Hearings,
J. A. 217 (statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense Pirie
and Director of Selective Service System Rostker) ; see also
Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform,
supra, J. A. 35, 59, 60; Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1657
(statement of Executive Associate Director of Office of Management and Budget Wellford, Director of Selective Service
'System Rostker, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Danzig). This was also the basis for the testimony
by military officials. Hearings on S. 2294, at 710 (Gen.
Meyer), 1002 (Gen. Allen) . The Senate Report, evaluating
'the testimony before the Committee, recognized that "the
argument for registration and induction of women ... is not
based on military necessity, but on considerations of equity."
'S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158. Congress was certainly
entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers to raise
·and regulate armies and navies, to focus on the question of
military need rather than "equity." 14 As Senator Nunn of
'the Senate Armed Services Committee put it:
11
0ur Committee went into very great detail. We

11 The gran1 of eonstitutional authority is, after all, to Congress and
1110t to ;the Executive or military officials.

I
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found that there was no military necessity cited by any
witnesses for the registration of females.
"The main point that those who favored the registratration of females made was that they were in favor of
this because of the equality issue which is, of course, . a
legitimate view. But as far as military necessity, and
that is what we are primarily, I hope, considering in the
overall registration bill, there is no military necessity
for this." 126 Cong. Rec. 86544.
See also House Hearings, supra, J. A. 230 (Rep. Holt) ("You
are talking about equity. I am talking about military."). 15
Although the military experts who testified in favor of
registering women uniformly opposed the actual drafting of
women. see, e. (]., Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra, at 11
(Gen..:-Rogers), there was testimony that in the event of a
draft~ 6stt.Doo the military could absorb some 80,000 female
inductees. Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1661, 1828. The
80,000 would be used to fill noncombat positions, freeing men
to go to the front. In relying on this testimony in striking
down the MSSA, the District Court palpably exceeded its
authority when it ignored Congress' considered response to
this line of reasoning.
15 The District Court also focused on what it termed Congress'
"inconsistent positions" in encouraging women to volunteer for military
service and expanding their opportunities in the service, on the one hand,
and exempting them from registration and the draft on the other. App.
to Juris. Statement 37a-4la. This reasoning fails to appreciate the
different purposes served by encouraging women volunteers and registration for the draft. Women volunteers do not occupy combat positions,
!iO encouraging women to volunteer is not related to concerns about the
availability of combat troops. In the event of a draft, however, the need
would be for combat troops or troops which could be rotated into combat.
See 15-16. supra. Congress' positions are clearly not inconsistrnt and in
treating them as such the District Court failed to understand Congress'
purpose behind registration as distinguishe~ from its purpose in encour'tng women volunteers..
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In the first place, assuming that a small number of women
could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress simply did
not consider it worth the added burdens of including women
in draft and registration plans. "It has been suggested that
all women be registered, but only a handful actually be inducted in an emergency. The Comimttee finds this a confused and ultimately unsatisfactory solution ." S. Rep. No.
96-826, supra, at 158. As the Senat€ Committee recognized
a year before, "training would be needlessly burdened by
women recruits who could not be used in combat." S. Rep.
No. 96-226, supra, at 9. See also S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra,
at 159 (" Other administrative problems such as housing and
different treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and
physical standards would also exist.") . It is not for this
Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future
mobilization.
Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women
for noncombat roles during mobilization, whether 80,000 01'
less, it could be met by volunteers. SeeS. Rep. No. 96- 826,
supra, at 160 ; id., at 158 ("Because of the combat restrictions, the need would be primarily for men , and women
volunteers would fill the requirements for women." ) ; House
Hearings. supra, J. A. 227-228 (Rep. Holt). See also Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1195 (Gen. Rogers).
Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing non- )
combat positions with women during a mobilization would
be positively detrimental to the-rr;portant goal of military
flexibility.
"There are other military reasons that preclude very
large numbers of women from serving. Military flexibility requires that a commander be able to move units
or ships quickly. Units or ships not located at the front
or not previously scheduled for the front nevertheless
must be able to move into action if necessary. In pea-ce.

/J
J,..
..
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and war, significant rotation of personnel is necessary,
We should not divide the military into two groups-one
in permanent combat and one in permanent support.
Large numbers of non-combat positions must be available to which combat troops can return for duty before
being redeployed." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158.
The point was repeated in specific findings, id., at 160; see
also S. Rep. No. 9~226, supra, at 9. In sum, Congress
~arefully evaluated the testimony that 80,000 women conscripts could be usefully employed in the event of a draft and
rejected it in the permissible exercise of its constitutional responsibility. See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra,
at 16 (Gen. Rogers); Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1682.
The District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of that evidence.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Congress acted
well within its constitutional authority when it authorized
the registration of men, and not women, under the Military
Selective Service Act. The decision of the District Court
·holding otherwise is accordingly
Reversed;.
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80-251 Rostker v. Goldberg
Dear Bill:
I am writing you a separate "join" note in this
case. Your opinion is quite persuasive, although I have
rarely seen Justice Rehnquist so "deferential" to anything
or anybody!
/'
In my view, Congress would have been irresponsible
to have included women in the registration/draft law. We
already have an army that probably cannot fight, as
thoughtful articles recently in The Atlantic Monthly and the
London Economist have documented. The Economist, for
example, concluded:
"Beneath a hard surface, the core is soft and
spongy. The American army's weaknesses have
to be cured, soon, if it is to face the
challenges of the 1980's." The Economist,
April 25, 1981, p. 23.
But my purpose in writing is not to share my
concerns. Rather, it is to suggest a possible addition or
two. For the most part, your opinion relies on generalities
in the record of hearings, and particularly with respect to
the "policy" against women in combat.
It seems to me that
the reasons for this policy merit greater emphasis. You do
have a good quote commencing on page 23 of your opinion from
the Senate Report.
I suggest the addition of General
Rogers' testimony on page 16 of the Senate Subcommittee
Report, 1979, commencing "General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, may
I add a footnote . • • ", and continuing with his description
of emergencies that often require "non-combatant" soldiers
to fight.
In recent wars there rarely have been stabilized
front lines. With modern mobility on land and in the air,
no one can predict when and where fighting may occur.
In my

.,...
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view, there are relatively few places in the armed services
for personnel - male or female - who cannot fight.
Apart from the foregoing, another point made by
witnesses and included in the Senate Report, relates to
"societal reasons". See page 159 of the Senate Report,
emphasizing that "drafting women would place unprecedented
strains on family life, whether in peacetime or in time of
emergency".
Finally, I do not recall that you have included
a reference to "administrative problems" that would result
from drafting women, such as "housing and different
treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and physical
standards". Senate Report, p. 159.
In sum, I think the opini9h would be strenghtened
by greater emphasis on the facts that prompted Congress to
reject the P~esident's novel view that military needs should
be subordinated to "equitable" considerations.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

May 7, 1981

80-251 Rostker v. Goldberg

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

May 7, 1981
80-251 Rostker v. Goldberg
Dear Bill:
I am writing you a separate "join" note in this
case. Your opinion is quite persuasive, although I have
rarely seen Justice Rehnquist so "deferential" to anything
or anybody!
In my view, Congress would have been irresponsible
to have included women in the registration/draft law. We
already have an army that probably cannot fight, as
thoughtful articles recently in The Atlantic Monthly and the
London Economist have documented. The Economist, for
example, concluded:
"Beneath a hard surface, the core is soft and
spongy. The American army's weaknesses have
to be cured, soon, if it is to face the
challenges of the 1980's.• The Economist,
April 25, 1981, p. 23.
But my purpose in writing is not to share my
concerns. Rather, it is to suggest a possible addition or
two. For the most part, your opinion relies on generalities
in the record of hearings, and particularly with respect to
the "policy" against women in combat. It seems to me that
the reasons for this policy merit greater emphasis. You do
have a good quote commencing on page 23 of your opinion from
the Senate Report. I suggest the addition of General
Rogers' testimony on page 16 of the Senate Subcommittee
Report, 1979, commencing "General Rogers. Mr. Chairman, may
I add a footnote • • • ", and continuing with his description
of emergencies that often require "non-combatant• soldiers
to fight.
In recent wars there rarely have been stabilized
front lines. With modern mobility on land and in the air,
no one can predict when and where fighting may occur. In my
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 8, 1981

Re:

80-251 - Rostker v. Goldberg

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

/4_

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

I.
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CHAMBERS OF

JU STI CE W I LLIAM H . R E HN Q UI S T

May 11, 1981

Re:

No. 80-251

Rostker v. Goldberg

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your "join" and letter of May 7th.
Taking your comments in inverse order, the opinion in
its present form does refer to the "administrative problems"
of drafting women, quoting on page 23 the language from the
Senate Report which you quote in your letter. I would have
gone into this concern at greater length, but neither the
reports nor hearing testimony did so. If you have read the
record more carefully than I, I would cheerfully consider
any additional references to the administrative problems it
contains.
As to the "societal reasons", I made a conscious
decision to leave them out of the opinion. I recognize a
strong argument can be made on this score, as was done, for
example, in the brief amicus curiae of Stacey Acker, et al.
I was less certain that there were five votes to uphold
male-only registration on the grounds that women have
different roles in family life and in society than men.
This would run into some broad language in previous opinions
about "sexual stereotyping", most if not all of which I
dissented from. Since I felt a solid Court could be lined
up behind an opinion based solely on military
considerations, I did not think it worthwhile to confuse the
case by a possibly divisive discussion of societal
considerations.
As to your first suggestion, I do cite to Gen. Rogers'
testimony on page 24. I hesitate to include a lengthy
quotation, since elaborating the evidentiary support for
Congress' determination detracts from the view that
decisions such as this one are within Congress' province and
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that courts should be loath to go over with a fine-tooth
comb the factual basis for Congress' exercise of its
constitutional authority. Ample factual support is there,
but giving it too much prominence in an opinion might
suggest it is necessary in every ca_9e. Slnce J: o cite Gen.
Rogers' testimony, however, if Y9U feel stron
about the
point I am willing to quote it i t\-a- · ·
to the citation
on page 24.

Mr. Justice Powell
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May 12, 1981

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 80-251 - Rostker v. Goldberg
Dear Bill:
I wonder if you would consider the following changes in
your opinion:
1.
The elimination, on page 14 of the recirculation of May 6, of the first full sentence and the
following reference to the Appellees' Brief,
2.
The elimination of the sentence beginning
with "Whatever one's views," just above the center of
page 16,
3.
The insertion of t~e words "in part" in the
second sentence of the first full paragraph on page
16. This is the sentence referring to Michael M.
4.
Indicating, on pages 16, 20, and 21, where
Michael M. is cited, that the opinion there was for
only a plurality and not a majority.
If you feel
joinder.

free

to make

these

changes,

Sincerely,

~/.
-Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-251
Bernard Rostker, Director of On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
- Selective ~ervice, Appellant,
v.
the Eastern District of
~obert L, Goldberg et al.
Pennsylvania.
[May-, 1981]
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question preEented is whether the Military Selective
Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq., violates the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in authorizing
the President to require the registration of male~ ~nd not
females.
I
Congress is given the power under the Constitution "To
raise and support Armies/ ' "To provide and maintain a
Navy," and "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Art. I , § 8, cis. 12-14.
Pursuant to this grant of authority Congress has enacted the
Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq.
("the MSSA " or " the Act" ). Section 3 of the Act, 50 U.S. C.
App. § 453, empowers the President, by proclamation, to require the registration of "every male citizen" and male resident aliens between the ages of 18 and 26. The purpose of
this registration is to facilitate any eventual conscription:
pursuant to § 4 (a ) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a),
those persons required to register under § 3 are liable for
training and service in the Armed Forces. The MSSA registration provision serves no other purpose beyond providing
a pool for subsequent induction.
·
JusTICE REHNQUIST
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Registration for the draft under § 3 was discorltinued in
1975. Presidential Proclamation No. 4360, 11 Weekly Comp.
of Pres. Doc. 318 (April 7, 1975). In early 1980, President
Carter determined that it was necessary to reactivate the
draft registration process. 1 The immediate impetus for this
decision was the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan. 16
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980) (State
of the Union Address). According to the Administration's
witnPsses before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the
resulting crisis in Southwestern Asia convinced the President
that the tctime has come" tcto use his present authority to
require registration . . . as a necessary step to preserving or
enhancing our national security interests." Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1981: Hearings on S. 2294 before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1805 (1980) (hereafter
Hearings on S. 2294) (joint statement of Dr. John P. White,
Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Dr.
BPrnard Rostker, Director. Selective Service System, and
Richard Danzig, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense). The Selective Service System had been inactive,
however, and funds were needed prior to reactivating registration. The President therefore recommended that funds
be transferred from the Department of Defense to the separate Selective Service System. H. R. Doc. No. 96-267, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1980). He also recommended that Congress take action to amend the MSSA to permit the registration and conscription of women as well as men. See Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform-A
Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to Pub. L. 96-107
(Feb. 11, 1980), J. A. 57-61.
1

The President did not seek conscription. Since the Act was amended
in 1973 to preclude conscription, Pub. L. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U. S. C.
App. § 467 (c) , any actual conscription would require further congressional action. See S. Rep. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 155 (1980).

•
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Congress agreed that it was necessary to reactivate the
i'egistration process, and allocated funds for that purpose in
a joint resolution which passed the Hous~ on April 22 and
the Senate on June 12. H. R. J. Res. 521, Pub. L. 96-282,
94 Stat. 552. The resolution did not allocate all the funds
originally requested by the President, but only those necessary to register males. See S. Rep. No. 96-789, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1, n. 1; 2 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen.
Nunn) (June 10, 1980). Although Congress considered the
question at great length, see infra, at 13-16, it declined to
amend the MSSA to permit the registration of women.
On July 2, 1980, the President, by proclamation, ordered
the registration of specified groups of young men pursuant
to the authority conferred by § 3 of the Act. Registration
was to commence on July 21, 1980. Proclamation No. 4771,
45 Fed. Reg. 45247.
These events of last year breathed new life into a lawsuit
which had been essentially dormant in the lower courts for
nearly a decade. It began in 1971 when several men subject
to registration for the draft and subsequent induction into
the Armed Services filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the MSSA on several grounds. 2 A three-judge disPlaintiffs contended that the Act amounted to a taking of property
without due process, imposed involuntary servitude, violated rights of
free expression and assembly, was unlawfully implemented to advance an
unconstitutional war, and impermissibly discriminated between males and
females . The Dh;trict Court d!:'nied plaintiffs' application to ronvene a,
three-judge district court and di:smi&;ed the suit, Rowland v. Tarr, 341
F . Supp. 339 (ED Pa. 1972) . On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims except the discrimination
claim, and remanded the case to the District Court to determine if this
claim was substantial enough to warrant the convening of a three-judge
court under then-applicable 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1970 ed.) and whether
plaintiffs had standing to assert that claim. 480 F. 2d 545 (1973). On
remand, the District Court answered both questions in the affirmative,
·resulting in the convening of the three-judge court which decided the- ·
2
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trict court was convened in 1974 to consider the claim o~
unlawful gender-based discrimination which is now before
us. 3 On July 1, 1974, the court declined to dismiss the case
as moot, reasoning that although authority to induct registrants had lapsed, see n. 1, supra, plaintiffs were still under.
certain affirmative obligations in connection with registration. 378 F. Supp. 766. Nothing more happened in the case
for five years. Then, on June 6, 1979, the court clerk, acting
pursuant to a local rule governing inactive cases, proposed
that the case be dismissed. Additional discovery thereupon
ensued, and defendants moved to dismiss on various justiciability grounds. The court denied the motion to dismiss,
ruling that it did not have before it an adequate record on
the operation of the Selective Service System and what action would be necessary to reactivate it. Civ. Action No.
71- 1480 (Feb. 19, 1980) . On July 1, 1980, the court certified
a plaintiff class of "all male persons who are registered or
subject to registration under 50 U. S. C. App. § 453 or are
liable for training and service in the armed forces of the
United States under 50 U. S. C. App. § 454, 456 (h) and 467
(c)." App. to Juris. Statement 2a- 4a.4
'ra~e brlow. ThE' Art authorizing three-judge courts to hear claims such
as this was repcalrd in 1976, Pub . L. 94-3 1, §§ 1 and 2, 90 Stat. 1119
(Aug. 12, 1976), but remains applicable to sui:s filed before repeal, id.,
§ 7, 90. tnt. 1119
3 As the Court ::-latcd in Schle8inger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 500, n. 3
(1975), "Although 1l contnins no Equnl Protection Clausr ns docs the
Fourteenth Amrndment , the Fifth Amendment's Due Procel:'s Clause
prohibits tht• l'eclrrnl government. from E'ngnging in discrimination thnl is
1:;o unjustifiable n:o lo be violative of due prorrss.'
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
497, 499."
4
When entering its judgment on July 18, the District Court rrdl'fined
the clnss to inrlud e "All male persons who arc registered under 50 U.S. C.
App. § 453 or are liabl e for training and service in the armed forces of
the United States unrlrr 50 U. S. C. App . §§ 454, 456 (h) :mel 467 (c) ;
and who a rc also either subjrct to registration under Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 (July 2, 1980) or are presently registered with the ·
Selective Service System." App. to Juris. Statement 44a.

u. s.
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On Friday, July 18, 1980, three days before registration
.was to commence, the District Court issued an opinion find-.
ing that the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from
requiring registration under the Act. The court initially determined that the plaintiffs had standing and that the case
was ripe, determinations which are not challenged here by
the Government. Turning to the merits, the court rejected
plaintiffs' suggestions that the equal protection claim should
be tested under "strict scrutiny," and also rejected defendants' argument that the deference due Congress in the area
of military affairs required application of the traditional
"minimum scrutiny" test. Applying the "important government interest" test articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S.
190 (1976), the court struck down the MSSA. The court
stressed that it was not deciding whether or to what extent
women should serve in combat, but only the issue of registra~
tion, and felt that this "should dispel any concern that we
are injecting ourselves in an inappropriate manner in military affairs." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. See also id., at
27a, n. 17; 28a, n. 18. The court then proceeded to examine
the testimony and hearing evidence presented to Congress
by representatives of the military and the Executive Branch,
and concluded on the basis of this testimony that "military
opinion, backed by extensive study, is that the availability
of women registrants would materially increase flexibility,
not hamper it." !d., at 37a. It rejected Congress' contrary
determination in part because of what it viewed as Congress'
11
inconsistent positions" in declining to register women yet
spending funds to recruit them and expand their opportunities in the military. !d., at 37a:-39a.
The United States immediately filed a notice of appeal and
the next day, Saturday, July 19, 1980, JusTICE BRENNAN,
acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit,
stayed the District Court's order enjoining commencement
U. S. - . Registration began the next
of registration. -
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Monday.
tion. -

On December 1, 1980, we noted probable juriEdic-:
U. S. - .
II

Whenever called upon to judge the constitutionality of an
Act of Congress-"the gravest and most delicate duty that
this Court is called upon to perform," Blodgett v. Holden;
;275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.)-the Court accords
"great weight to the decisions of Congress." CBS, Inc. v;
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973).
The Congress is a coequal branch of government whose mem~
bers take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution
of the United States. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123,
164 (1951) (concurring opinion), we must have "due regard
to the fact that this Court is not exercising a primary judgment but is sitting in judgment upon those who also hav~
taken the oath to observe the Constitution and who have the
responsibility for carrying on government." The customary
deference accorded the judgments of Congress is certainly
appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered
the question of the Act's constitutionality. See, e. g .. S. R3p.
No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 159-161 (1980); 126 Cong.
Rec. S6531-S6533 (Sen. Warner) (June 10, 1980), S6547
(Sen. Hatfield) (June 10, 1980).
This is not, however. merely a case involving the custom~
ary deference accorded congressional decisions. The case
arises in the context of Congress' authority over military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded
Congress greater deference. In rejecting the registration of
women, Congress explicitly relied upon its constitutional
powers under Art. I, § 8, cis. 12- 14. The "specific findings"
section of the Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee, later adopted by both Houses of Congress, began by
stating:
"Article I , sect.ion 8 of the Constitution coinmits ex-
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plusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support
armies, provide anti maintain a Navy, and make rule~
for Government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, and pursuant to these powers it lies within the
discretion of the Congress to determine the occasions fo~
expansion of our Armed Forces, and the means best
suited to such expansion should it prove necessary." S.
Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160.
St>e also S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979).
This Court has consistently recognized Congress' "broad constitutional power" to raise and regulate armies and navies,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 510 (1975). As the
Court noted in considering a challenge to the selective service laws, "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and
ilUpport armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to
that end is broad and swe<>ping." United States v. O'Brien,
391 U. S. 367. 377 (1968). See Lichter v. United States, 334
u. s. 742, 755 (1948).
Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in
this area broad. but the lark of comn-etence on the part of
the courts is marked. In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10
( 1973), the Court noted:
"It is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental
activity in which the courts have less competence. The
complex, snbtle. and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional military judgments,
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and
Executive branches."
See also Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94

(1953). ~

See also Simmons v United States, 406 F . 2d 456, 459 (CA5 1969)
("That the rourt i~ not competent or empowered to sit as a superexecutive authority to reYiew the decisions of the Executive and Legislative
branches of government in regard to the necessity, method of selection,
5

89-251-ePINION
8

ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

The operation of a healthy deference to legislative and
executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident
in several recent decisions of this Court. In Parker v. Levy,
417 U. S. 733. 756 (1974), the Court rejected both vagueness
and overbreadth challenges to army regulations, noting that
"Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth
and with greater flexibility" when the statute governs military society, and that "[w]hile the members of the military
are not excluded from the protection granted by the First
Amendment, thf' different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections." In Middendorf v. Henry, 425
U. S. 25 (1976), the Court noted that in considering due
process claims in the context of summary court martial it
11
must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its military authority to regulate the land
and naval forces. U. S. Canst., Art. I. § 8," concerning what
rights were available. I d., at 43. See also id., at 49-50
(PowELL, J., concurring). Deference to the j11dgment of
other branches in the area of militarv affairs also played a
major role in Greer v. Spack, 424 U. S. 828, 837-838 (1!176).
where the Court upheld a ban on political speeches by civilians on a military base, and Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 34'g
(1980) , where the Court upheld regulations imposing a prior
restraint on the right to petition of military personnel. See
also Burns v. Wilson. :146 U. S. 137 (1953); United States v.
Macintosh, 2S3 U.S . 605, 622 (1!131).
In Schlesingrr v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975), the Court
considered a due process challenge, brought by males, to
the navy policy of according females a longer period than
males in which to attain promotions necessary to continued
service. The Court distinguished previous gender-based disand <'Omposition of our deft•nse forces is obvious and needs no further
discussion").
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.r.riminations held unlawful in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71
(1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973).
In those cases, the classifications were based on "overbroad
generalizations." See 419 U. S., at 506-507. In the case before it, however, the Court noted:
"the different treatment of men and women naval officers . . . reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situatrd
with respect to opportunities for professional service.
Appellee has not challenged the current restrictions on
women officrrs' participation in combat and in mo t sea
duty." Id., at 508.
In light of the rombat restrictions women did not have the
same opportunities for promotion as men, and therefore it
was not uncoustitutional for Congress to distinguish between
them.
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard
the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs.
In that arra as any other Congress remains subject to the
limitations of the Due Prorcss Clause, see Ex parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 2 (1R66); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U . S. 146, 156 (1919), but the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the military
context. We of course do not abdicate our ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to
Congressional choice. Sec CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee , 412 U. S .. at 103. In deciding the question before
us we must br particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own
evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the
Legislative Branch.
The District Court purported to recognize the appropriatetress of flpferrnce to Congress when that body was exercising··

i
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its constitutionally delegated authority over military affairs,
App. to Juris. Statement 28a, but it stressed that "we are not
here concerned with military operations or day-to-day conduct of the military into which we have no desire to intrude.''
Ibid. Appellees also stress that this case involves civilians,
not the military, and that "the impact of registration on the
military is only indirect and attenuated." Appellees Brief,
at 19. We find these efforts to divorce registration from the
military and national defense context, with all the deference
called for in that cont0xt, singularly unpersuasive. United
States v. O'Brien, supra , recognized the broad dcfen•nce due
f'ongress in the selective service area b0fore us in this rase.
Registration is not an end in itself in the civilian world but
rather the first step in the induction process into the military
one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration of registration to induction, s e, e. g.. S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra,
at 156, 160. Congressional judgments concerning registration and the draft are based on judgments concerning military operations and needs, see. e. g., id., at 157 ("the starting
point for any clisrussion of the appropriateness of registering
women for the draft is the question of the proper role of
women in combat" ). and the deference unquestionably due
the latter judgments is necessarily required in assessing the
former as well. Although the District Court stressed that it
was not intrudin?: on military questions. its opinion was based
on assessment of military need and flexibility in a time of
mobilization. SeE'. e. g. , App. to Juris. Statement 31a-43a.
Tt would be blinking reality to say that our precedents requiring deference to Congress in military affairs are not
imp1icated by the present case. 6
11 Congress rerognized that Hs decision on registration involved judgments on militar~r needs and operations, and that its drcisions were
entitled to partirnlar deference : " The Supreme Court's most recent teachings in th e field of equal protection cannot be read in i8olation from its
opinions giving great deference to the judgment of Congre::<s and military
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The Solicitor General argues, largely on the basis of the
foregoing cases emphasizing the deference due Congress in
the area of military affairs and national security, that this
Court should scrutinize the MSSA only to determine if the
distinction drawn between men and women bears a rational
relation to some legitimate government purpose, see United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, U. S. (1980) , and should not examine the Act under the heightened
scrutiny with which we have approached gender-based discrimination, see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
U. S. (1981); Craig v. Boren, supra; Reed
County, 1
v. Reed, supra. We do not think that the substantive guarantee of due process or certainty in the law will be advanced
by any further "refinement" in the applicable tests as suggested by the Government. Announced degrees of "deference" to legislative judgments. just as levels of "scrutiny"
which this Court announces that it applies to particular classifications made by a legislative body, may all too readily
become facile abstractions used to justify a result. In this
case the courts are called upon to decide whether Co11gress,
acting under an explicit constitutional grant of authority,
has by that action transcended an explicit guarantee of indicommanders in dealing with the management of military forces and the
requirements of militarr di~cipline . The Court has made it unmistaknbly
clear that even our most fundamental constitutional rights must in some
circumstances be modified in the light of military needs, and that Congress' judgment as to what is ueces8ary to preserve our national security
is entitled to great deference." S. Rep. No. 9G-826, supra, at 159-160.
Deference to Congress' judgment was a consistent and dominant theme
in lower court deri:::ions assessing the present claim. See, e. g., United'
States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333. 335 (ED La . 1970); United States v.
Offord, 373 F. Supp. 1117, 1118 (ED Wis. 1974) .
7 It is clear that "fg]ender has never been rejected as an impermissible
classification in all instanceB." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 356, n. 10
(1974) . In making thi::; observation the Court noted that "Congress
has not so far drafted women into the Armed Services, 50 U. S. C,
App. § 454." I bid.
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vidual rights which limits the authority so conferred. Simply
labelling the legislative decision "military" on the one hand
()r "gender-based" on the other does not automatically guidea court to the correct constitutional result.
No one could deny that under the test of Craig v. Boren,
supra, the Government's interest in raising and supporting
armies is an "important governmental interest." Congress
and its committees carefully considered and debated two alternative means of furthering that interest: the first was to
register only males for potential conscription, and the other
was to register both sexes. Congress chose the former alternative. When that decision is challenged on equal protection
grounds, the question a court must decide is not which alternative it would have chosen, had it been the primary decisionmaker, but whether that chosen by Congress denies equal
protection of the laws.
Nor can it be denied that the imposing number of cases
from this Court previously cited suggest that judicial deference to such congressional exercise of authority is at its
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged. As previously noted,
ante, at 9, deference does not mean abdication. The reconciliation between the deference due Congress and our own
constitutional resnonsibility is perhaps best instanced in
S chlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S., at 510, where we stated:
"This Court has recognized that 'it is the primary
business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to
fight wars should the occasion arise.' U. S . ex rel. Toth
v. Quarles. 350 U. S. 11, 17. See alF:o Orloff v. Willrmqhbu , 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). The responsibility
for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend
to that business rests with Congress, see U. S. Const.,'
Art. I , § 8, cls. 12- 14, and with the President. See U. S.
' Const., Art. :II; §. 2, ;cl. 1. We cannot say that, in ex..
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E>rCJsmg lts broad constitutional power here, Congress
has violated the Due Procerss Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."
Or, as put a generation ago in a case not involving any claim
discrimination:
'
"[J] udges are not given the task of running the Army.
The responsibility for setting up channels through
which .. . grievances can be considered and fairly settled
rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the
UHited States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters." Orloff
v. Willoughby, 345 U. S., at 93-94.

of gender-based

Schlesinger v. Ballard did not purport to apply a different

equal protection test because of the military context, but did
stress the deference due congressional choices among alternatives in exercising the congressional authority to raise and
support armies and make rules for their governance. In
light of the floor debate and the report of the Senate Armed
Services Committee hereinafter discussed, it is apparent that
Congress was fully aware not merely of the many facts and
figures presented to it by witnesses who testified before its
committees, but of the current thinking as to the place of'
women in the Armed Services. In such a case, we cannot
ignore Congress' broad authority conferred by the Constitution to raise and support armies when we are urged to declare
unconstitutional its studied choice of one alternative in preference to another for furthering that goal.

III
This case is quite different from several gender-based discrimination cases which have previously come before the·
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Court
Appellres' assertions notwithstanding, this rather
clearly i. not a case in which Congress acted "unthinkingly''
or "rdlrxively and not for any considered reason" in dr~
e. distinction bused on gender. Appellees' Brief, at 35. I The
question of registering women for the draft not only received
considerable national attention and was the subject of wideranging public debate, but also was extensively considered
by Congress in hearings, floor debate. and in commit~
Hearings held by both Houses of Congrrss in response to the
Presidrnt's request for authorization to register women adduced rxtensiv0 testimony and evidence concerning the issue.
Ree Hearings on S. 2204; Hearings on National Service L<'gislation befor0 t.he Subcommittee on Military Personnel of
the Uousr C'ommittre on Armed Services, 06th Cong., 2d
Re:::s. (1980) (hereaftrr House Hearings). These hearings
built on other hearings held the previous year addressed to
thf' Rame question. 8
The House declined to provide for the registration of
women when it passed the Joint Resolution allocating funds
for the Selective Service System. See 126 Cong. Rec. H27213H2729. H2747 (April 22, 1980). When the Senate considered the Joint Resolution , it defeated, after extensive debate,
an amendment which in effect would have authorized the
registration of women . 126 Cong. Rec. S6527- S6549 (JunE'
10, 1980). 9 As notrd earlier, Congress in H. R. J. Res. 521
only authorized funds sufficient to cover the registration of
malt>s. The Report of the Senate Committee on Appropria8 See RE'in~titution of Procedure~ for Registration Under the Militnry
Selective Servirr Act: Hen ring on S. 109 and S. 226 before the Subcommittee on Manpower & Pf:'r~o nnel of the Senate Committee on Armed
Sen ices, !)6th Con g., 1st SrFs. (1979). Seven months before the Prf:'sident's
call for the regi~tration of women, tlw Senate Armed Sen·ice:s Committee
rejec ted the iden, seP S. Rep. No. 96-226, 96th Con g., 1st SPss., 8-9 (1979) .
ll The nmrndment provided that no funds "shall be made nvailable for
implementing a system of regi:;tration which does not include women ."·
126 Cong. Rec. S6527.

80-251-0PINION

ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

15

tions on H. R. J. Res. 521 noted that the amount authorized
was below the President's request "due to the Committee's
decision not to provide $8,500,000 to register women," and
that "The amount recommended by the Committee would allow for registration of young men only." S. Rep. No. 96789, supra, at 21; see 126 Cong. Rec. S6546 (Sen. Nunn)
(June 10, 1980).
While proposals to register women were being rejected in
the course of transferring funds to register males, committees
in both Houses which had conducted hearings on the issue
were also rejecting the registration of women. The House
Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the House Armed
Services Committee tabled a bill which would have amended
the MSSA to authorize registration of women, H. R. 6569, on
March 6, 1980. Legislative CaleJ1dar, House Committee on
Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. , 54 (Sept. 30, 1980).
The Senate Armed Services Committee rejected a proposal
to register women, S. 2440, as it had one year before. see S.
Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 8- 9, and adopted specific findings
. supporting its action. See S~ Rep. No. 96- 826, supra. at
156-161. These findings were stressed in debate in the Senate on Joint Resolution 521, see 126 Cong. Rec. S6544- S6545
(Sen. Nvnn) (June 10, 1980); S6531- S6532 (Sen . Warner)
(June 10, 1980). They were later specifically endorsed by
House and Senate conferees considering the Fiscal Year 1981
Defense Authorization Bill. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 96- 895,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1980). 10 Later both Houses
adopted the findings by passin~ the Report. 126 Cong. Rec.
H7800, S11646 (Aug. 26, 1980) . The Senate Report, therefore, is considerably more significant than a typical report
10 The findings were before the conferees because the Senrtte Armed
Services Committee had added a provision to the 1981 Defense Authoriza.
tion Bill authorizing the transfer of funds to register young men as a
stop-gap measure should .Joint Resolution 521 fail. See S. Rep. No,
96-895, supra, at 100.
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of a single House, and its findings are in effect findings of the
en tire Congress.
ThE' foregoing clearly <>stablishes that the decision to exempt women from registration was not the "accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about women."
Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 320 (1977) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 233 (1977) (STEVENS, J.,
concurring)). In Michael M., supra, at-, n. 6, we rejected
a similar argument because of action by th~ California Legislature considering and rejecting proposals to make a statute
challenged on discrimination grounds gender-neutral. The
use for rejecting the argument is considerably stronger here.
Whateve1 one's views on the merits, it is clear that Congress'
decision to exempt women from registration was not r<.'fiex-~
ive, or simply the incidental baggage of out-moded views.
The issue wa considered at great length, and Congress
clearly expressed its purpose and intent. Contrast Califano
v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 87 (1979) ("The gender qualification ... escaped virtually unnoticed in the hearings and floor
debate" ). 11
For the same reasons we reject appellees' argument that we
must consider the constitutionality of the MSSA solely on
the ba~is of thE' views <'Xpressed by Congress in 1948, when
the M~SA was first enacted in its modern form. Contrary
to the suggestions of app<'Jlees and various amici, reliance on
the legislative history of Joint Resolution 521 and the activity of the various committees of the 96th Congress considering the registration of women does not violate sound
principles that appropriations legislation should not be con-

/

l......--o

11 Nor can we ngrer with the characterization of the !\ISSA in the
Brief for Amirus Curiae National Organization of Women as a law which
"coerce[s l or prerludef s] women as a class from performing tasks or jobs
of which they nre rapable," or the suggestion that this cnse involves " rtJhe
Pxclusion of womPn from the military." Id., at 19-20. Nothing in the-·
MSSA restricts in any way the OI?portuni.tiet fQl: women to volunteer for ·
military service.
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sidered as modifying substantive legislation. Congress did
not change the MSSA in 1980, but it did thoroughly reconsider the question of exempting women from its provisions,
and its basis for doing so. The 1980 legislative history is,
therefore, highly relevant in assessing the constitutional validity of the exemption.
The MSSA established a plan for maintaining "adequate
armed strength ... to ensure the security of rthe] nation."
50 U. S. C. App. § 451 (b). Registration is the first step
"in a united and continuous process designed to raise an
Rrmy speedily and efficiently," Falbo v. United States, 320
U. S. 549. 553 (1944) , see United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S.
1. 9 (1953). and Congress provided for the reactivation of
registration in order to "provide the means for the early
delivery of inductees in an emergency." S. Rep. No. 96-826,
mpra, at 156. Although the three-judge District Court often
tried to sever its consideration of registration from the par"
ticulars of induction, see, e. g., App. to Juris. Statement 42a43a, Congress rather clearly linked the need for renewed registration with its views on the character of a subsequent draft.
The Senate Report specifically found that 11 An ability to
mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation of our national security. A functioning registration system is a vital
part of any mobilization plan." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at
160. As Senator Warner put it, "I equate registration with
t he draft." Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1197. See also
id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen) , 1671 (Sen. Exon). Such an approach is certainly logical, since under the MSSA induction
is interlocked wi th registration : only those registered may be
drafted, and registration serves no purpose beyond providing
a pool for the draft. Any assessment of the congressional
purpose and its chosen means must therefore consider the
registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time of national emergency. Any other approach would not be testing
the Act in light of the purposes Congress sought to achieve ..
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Congress determined that any future draft, which would
be facilitated by the registration scheme, would be characteriz.ed by a need for combat troops. The Senate Report
explained, in a specific finding later adopted by both Houses,
that "if mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario, the primary ma.npower need would be for combat replacements." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 160; see id., at
158. This conclusion echoed one made a year before by the
same Senate Committee, see S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at
2-3, 6. As Senator Jepsen put it, "The shortage would be in
the combat arms. That is why you have drafts." Hearings
on S. 2294, supra, at 1688. See also id., at 1195 (Sen. Jepsen); 126 Cong. Rec. H2750 (Rep. Nelson) (April 22, 1980).
Congress' determination that the need would be for combat
troops if a draft took place was sufficiently supported by testimony adduced at the hearings so that the courts are not free
to make their own judgment on the question. See Hearings
on S. 2294, supra, at 1528-1529 (Marine Corps Lt. Gen.
Bronars); 1395 (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Army Clark); 1391 (Gen. Yerks); 748 (Gen. Meyer); House
Hearings, supra, J. A., at 224 (Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Manpower Pirie). See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226,
supra, at 24, 54 (Gen. Rogers). The purpose of registration,
therefore, was to prepare for a draft of combat troops.
Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group, are
not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation
of women in combat in the Navy and Air Force are statutory. Under 10 U. S. C. § 6015 "women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in
combat missions," and under 10 U. S. C. § 8549 female members of the Air Force "may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions." The Army and Marine
Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter of
established policy. See J. A. 86, 34, 58. Congress specifi-
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pally recognized and endorsed the exclusion of women from
pombat in exempting women from registration, In the
words of the Senate Report:
"The principle that women should not intentionally and
routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys
wide support among our people. It is universally supported by military leaders who have testified before the
Committee. . . . Current law and policy exclude women
from being assigned to combat in our military forces,
and the Committee reaffirms this policy." S. Rep. No.
96--826, supra, at 157.
The Senate Report specifically found that "Women should
not be intentionally or routinely placed in combat positions
in our military services." /d., at 160. See S. Rep. No. 96226, supra, at 9. 12 The President expressed his intent to
continue the current military policy p1ecluding women from
combat, see Presidential Recommendations for Selective
Service Reform, supra, J. A. 34, and appellees present their
argument concerning registration against the background of
such restrictions on the use of women in combat. 13 Consistent with the approach of this Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard,
S'U.pra, we must examine appellees' constitutional claim concerning registration with these combat restrictions firmly in
mind.
The existence of the combat restrictions clearly indicates
the basis for Congress' decision to exempt women from registration. The purpose of registration was to prepare for a
draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from
combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed
12 No major country h11s women in combat joqs in their standing army.
See J . A. 143.
1 ~ S<'e AppeliC'ef'' BriPf, nt 1- 2, n. 2 (denying any concession of the
validity of combat restrietions, but . ubmitting restrictions are irreievant
to the present rase) . See also J . A. 256.

80-251-0PINION

ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

in t he event of a draft, and therefore decided not
them. Again turning to the Senate Report:

to register

"In the Committee's view, the starting point for any
discussion of the appropriateness of registering women
for the draft is the question of the proper role of women
in combat. . . . The policy precluding the use of women
in combat is, in the Committee's view, the most important reason for not including women in a registration
syRtem." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 157.
The District. Court stressed that the military need for
women was irrelevant to the issue of their registration. As
that court put it: "Congress could not constitutionally require registration under MSSA of only black citizens or only
~bite citizens, or single out any political or religious group
simply because those groups contained sufficient persons to
till the needs of the selective service system." App. to .Juris.
Statement 21a. This reasoning is beside the point. Women
are not exempt from registration because military needs can
be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Congress arbitrarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situatrd
groups, such as would be the case with an all-blark or allwhite, or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Republican or all-Democratic registration. Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are simply not
similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for
a draft.
Congress' decision to authorize the registration of only
men, therefore. is not violative of the Due Process Clause.
The exemption of women from registration is not only sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizin~ reg;stration. See Michael M., swnra, at - ; Craig v.
Boren, suvra; Reed v. Reed, suvra. The fact that Congress
and the Executive have decided that women should not serve·
in combat fully justifies Congress in not authorizing their
registration, since the purpose of registration is to develop
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a pool of potential combat troops. As was the case in Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, "the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact tha.t the sexes
are not similarly situated" in this case. Michael M., supra,
at - . The Constitution requires that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly, not that it engage in gestures
of superficial equality.
In holding the MSSA constitutinally invalid the District
Court relied heavily on the President's decision to seek authority to register women and the testimony of members of
tllf~ Executive Branch and the military in support of that decision. See, e. (J., App. to Juris. Statement 37a. 39a. and n.
30. As stated by the Administration's witnesses before Congress, however, the President's "decision to ask for authority
to register women is based on equity." House Hearings.
J. A. 217 (stakment of Assistant Secretary of Defense Pirie
and Director of Selective Service System Rostker) ; see also
Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform,
supra, J. A. 35. 59, 60; Hearings on S. 2294, swvra, at 1657
(statement of Executive Associate Director of Office of Management and Budget Wellford, Director of Selective Service
System Rostker, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Dofense Danzig). This was also the basis for the testimony
by military officials. Hearinjl;s on S. 2294, at 710 (Gen.
Meyer), 1002 (Gen. Allen). The Senate Report. evaluating
the tPstimony before the Committee, recognized that "the
argument for registration and induction of women ... is not
based on military necessity, but on considerations of equity."
S. Rep. No. 96-826. supra, at 158. Congress was certainly
entitled. in the exercise of its constitutional powers to raise
and regulate armies and navies. to focus on the q11estion of
military ne<'d rather than "equity." 14 As Senator Nunn of
the Senate Armed Services Committee put it:
"Our Committee went into very great detail. We
14 The grant of constitutional authority is, after all, to Congres
and
not to the Executive or military officials.
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that there was no military necessity cited by any
witnesses for the registration of females.
·
"The main point that those who favored the registratration of females made was that they were in favor o~
this because of the equality issue which is, of course, a
legitimate view. But as far as military necessity, and
that is what we are primarily, I hope, considering in the
overall registration bill, there is no military necessity
for this." 126 Cong. Rec. 86544.

See also House Hearings, supra, J. A. 230 (Rep. Holt) ("You
jl.re talking about equity. I am talking about military."). 15
. Although the military experts who testified in favor of
registering women uniformly opposed the actual drafting of
women. see, e. g., Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, supra, at 11
(Gen. Rogers). there was testimony that in the event of a
draft of 650,000 the military could absorb some 80.000 female
inductees. Hearings on S. 2294, supra, at 1661, 1828. The
80,000 would be used to fill noncombat positions, freeing men
to go to the front. In relying on this testimony in striking
down the MSSA. the District Court palpably exceeded its
authority when it ignored Congress' considered response to
this line of reasoning.
Thr District Court also focused on what it termed Congress'
positions" in encouraging women to volunteer for military
service and expanding their opportunities in the sen ·ice, on the one hand,
.a nd exempting them from rcgistrat ion and the draft on the other. App.
to Juris. Statrmcnt 37a-41a. This rea soning fnils to appreciate the
differrnt purposes served by encomaging womrn volunteers and registration for the draft. Women volunteers do not occupy combat positions,
so encouraging womrn to volunteer is not related to concerns about the
availability of combat troops. In the event of a draft , however, the need
would be for combat trcops or troops which could be rotated into combat.
Ree 15-16, supra. Congress' positions are clearl~r not inronsi:;;trnt and in
treating thrm as such the District Court. failrd to understa nd Congress'
purpose behind registration as· distinguished from its purpose in encour·
'ing women volunteers.
H•

~ ' inconsistent
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Tn the first place, assuming that a small number of women
could be drafted for noncombat roles, Congress simply did
not consider it worth the added burdens of including women
in draft and registration plans. "It has been suggested that
all women be registered, but only a handful actually be inducted in an emergency. The Comimttee finds this a confused and ultimately unsatisfactory solution." S. Rep. No.
96-826, supra, at 158. As the Senate Committee recognized
a year before, "training \vol'ld be needlessly burdened by
women recruits who could not be used in combat." S. Rep.
No. 96-226, supra, at 9. See also S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra,
at 159 ("Other administrative problems such as housing and
different treatment with regard to dependency, hardship and
physical standards would also exist."). It is not for this
Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future
mobilization.
Congress also concluded that whatever the need for women
for noncombat roles during mobilization. whether 80,000 or
less, it could be met by volunteers. See S. Rep. No. 96- 826,
supra, at 160; id., at 158 ("Because of the combat restrictions, the need would be primarily for men, and women
volunteers would fill the requirements for women."); House
Hearings, sunra, J . A. 227-22~ (Rep. Holt). See also Hearings on S. 2294. supra, at 1195 (Gen. Rogers).
Most significantly, Congress determined that staffing noncombat positions with women during a mobiliza.tion wovld
be positively detrimental to the important goal of military
fiexibili ty.
"There are other military reasons that preclude very
large numbers of women from serving. Military flexibility requires that a commander be able to move 1111its
or ships quickly. Units or ships not located at the front
or not previously scheduled for the front nevertheless
must be able to move into action if necessary. In peace
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and war, significant rotation of personnel is necessary.
We should not divide the military into two groups-one
in permanent combat and one in permanent support:
Large numbers of non-combat positions must be available to which combat troops can return for duty befor~
being redeployed." S. Rep. No. 96-826, supra, at 158.
The point was repeated in specific findings. id., at 160; seE:
also S. Rep. No. 96-226, supra, at 9. In sum, Congress
carefully evaluated the testimony that 80,000 women conscripts could be usefully employed in the event of a draft and
rejected it in the permissible exercise of its comtitutional responsibility. See also Hearing on S. 109 and S. 226, sup1 a,
at 16 (Gen. Rogers); 10 Hearings on S. 2294. supra, at 1682.
The District Court was quite wrong in undertaking an independent evaluation of this evidence, rather than adopting an
appropriately deferential examination of Congress' evaluation of that evidence.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Congress acted
well within its constitutional authority when it authorized
the registration of men, and not women, under the Military
General Rogers' tE>stimony merits quotation:
"General ROGERS. One thing which i~ often lost sight of, SPnator, is
that in an emergency during war, the Army has often had to reach back
Into the support basE', into thE' supporting elE'ment~ in the operating basr,
and pull forward soldier~; to fill the rank~ in An E>mergency; that i~, to
hand them a rifle or give thrm a l!mker suit and put them in thr front
ra11ks.
"Senator WARNER. General Patton did that At one time, I believe at
the Battle of the Bulge.
"Genernl ROGERS. Absolntrl~' ·
"Now, if that support basE' and that operating base to the rear consists
in large measure of womE'u, tlwn W<' dou't have thnt opportunit~r to reach
back and pull them forwnrd. bC'rnui'r wom('n should not bP placed in a
forward fighting position or in a tank, in my opinion. So thnt, too, E>nters
the equation whE>n onr eonsidcrs the subject of the utility of women tmclercontingency conditions."
16
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Selective Service Act. The decision of the District Court
holding otherwise is accordingly
Reversed.
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May 29, 1981

I
Re:

80-251 - Rostker v . Goldberg

De ar Bill,
I should have said so before, but I
am awaiting the dissent in this case .
Sincerely yours ,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
cpm

;§u.pumt <!Jourl of tqt ~~ ~taftg
2I!T~ qmghrn. gl. <!J. 2'll&i'~~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 9, 1981

Re:

80-251 - Rostker v. Goldberg

Dear Bill:
' I join.
Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

.:§u.vuuu <q curl of litt 'Jllniidt ;%hilig
~rurfrhtgion, ~. <.q. 211,?'1-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 12, 1981

Re:

No. 80-251, Rostker v. Goldberg

Dear Bill,
I would have no objection to the new
footnote you contemplate.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Rehnquist
Copy to The Chief Justice
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens

.:§u:pum.c <!Jcmi cf t~t 'Jltni.t.cb .*ta!fg
~cwltittgton. IQ. <!J. , 202>1~
CHAM BERS OF

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
JUSTICE STEWART
JUSTICE BLACKMUN
JUSTICE POWELL
JUSTICE STEVENS
Re:

No. 80-251

Rostker v. Goldberg

You have been chosen from the field of nine to receive
this communication because each of you has had the foresight
and prescience to join my proposed opinion for the Court in
this case. The only point in Thurgood's dissent that I am
considering responding to ~his contention on £age 13 that
if a peacetime draft were held the Court could "be forced to
declare the male-only registration program unconstitutional"
because the present opinion focuses on Congress'
determination that registration was linked to a possible
future draft characterized by a need for combat troops.
I
believe there are two significant errors in this reasoning.

•

First, the constitutional validity of male-only
registration would not be affected by a peacetime draft.
Inductees could challenge the peacetime draft itself, but
male-only registration would be valid for the reasons stated
in our opinion.
More importantly, a draft of combat troops of the sort
anticipated by Congress need not at all be limited to actual
wartime, and Congress, although focusing on mobilization,
recognized this.
If a peacetime draft were held the need
would also be for combat or combat-eligible troops. See S.
Rep. No. 96-826, at 160 ("Present manpower deficiencies
under the All- Volunteer Force are concentrated in the
combat arms--infantry, armor, combat engineers, field

- 2 -

artillery and air defense."). Congress recognized that its
considerations concerning registration of women, based on
the perceived need in the event of a draft for combat
troops, applied both to wartime and peacetime conscription.
See, ~' id., at 157 ("registering women for assignment to
combat or assigning women to combat positions in
peacetime ..• would leave the actual performance of sexually
mixed units as an experiment to be conducted in war with
unknown risk") (emphasis supplied) . Some of Congress'
reasons for exempting women from registration explicitly
applied both to peacetime and wartime conscription. See,
e.g., id., at 158 ("In peace and war, significant rotation
of personnel is necessary."). Certainly Congress and the
Executive do not have to await the actual outbreak of
hostilities if they decide there exists a need for a draft
of combat or combat-eligible troops.
Although I am not convinced that it is necessary to say
anything, do any of you have objections to a footnote along
the following lines, perhaps added at the end of the block
quotation on page 20 of the May 14 draft?:
The dissent's suggestion that since Congress
focused on the need for combat troops in
authorizing male-only registration the Court
"could be forced to declare the male-only
registration program unconstitutional" in the
event of a peacetime draft misreads our opinion.
The perceived need for combat or combat-eligible
troops in the event of a draft was not limited to
- a wartime draft. See, ~' S. Rep. No. 96-826,
supra, at 157 (considering problems associated
with "[r]egistering women for assignment to combat
or assigning women to combat positions in
peacetime"); id., at 157 (need for rotation
between comba~and non - combat positions "[i]n
peace and war") •
Sincerely,

-.lune 12, 1981

80-251 Rostker v. Goldberg

Dear Bill:
I think your proposed footnote will be helpful.
It has my approval.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.$iuttrtmt ~l!lttt cf tqt ~~ .§tafts
'Jlilll'ffringron. gl. (!}. 2o~J!~
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 12, 1981

j

No . 80 - 2 51 - Rostker v . Goldberg

Dear Bil l:
I have n o objec t i on to yo u r proposed footnote .

Regar/;uifl

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Stewart
Blackrnun
Powell
Stevens

~ttpr ttru

<!Jtrnrt .of flrt 2ltnitrlt .*tafrg
I

'JIITaglpnghm. ~.

QJ.

20,?J!.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/
June 12, 1981

Re:

80-251 - Rostker v. Goldberg

Dear Bill:
The new footnote is acceptable to me.
Respectfully,

}L
Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Chief Justice
Justice Stewart
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
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